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THE TRAGEDY OF FAUST 
PART I 
FAUST 
…And here I stand, 
With all my lore, 
Poor fool, no wiser than before. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Scholarly journals play a crucial role in the communication of scientific knowledge and 
new ideas. As Anne-Wil Harzing (author of The Publish or Perish Book) points out in a 2002 
article, “[a]cademics and practitioners alike turn to academic articles as a reliable source of 
information” (127). Recently, however, the academic system has become even more 
competitive, producing a situation in which “graduate students and assistant professors are 
under extreme time pressure. In some cases, it is an ‘all or nothing’ issue: either they are able 
to publish in a good refereed journal, or they have to bury their dream of an academic career” 
(Bruno S. Frey 2005: 178).
1 
This paper takes a very close look at the American Economic Review (AER), the first 
journal of the American Economic Association. Created in 1911, AER is one of the top 
economics journals and has substantially influenced the economics landscape over the last 
100 years. Economics journals began emerging a century after Adam Smith’s 1776 
publication in Europe of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
                                                            
1 In February 2011, Maastricht University’s School of Business and Economics ran the following ad in JOE 
(Job Openings for Economists) for a tenured full professor: “Applicants should have proven their high research 
quality through publications in high-ranked peer reviewed journals. The ideal candidate will have published in 
the top-5. The successful candidate is expected to continue publishing in high-ranked journals. In addition, the 
candidate is expected to actively engage in securing research grants on a national and international level. The 
successful candidate is expected to be willing to teach in the area of economic theory and behavior at the 
undergraduate and graduate level. The language of instruction is English. The successful candidate is also 
expected to actively participate in the self-administration of the department” (see 
http://www.aeaweb.org/joe/listing.php?JOE_ID=201102_395195). 
 3 
(Arthur W. Diamond 1988). Previously, serious economics were covered only in books or 
nonspecialist periodicals. The first fully professional journal in the U.S., the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, came into being in 1886 (George J. Stigler, Stephen M. Stigler, and 
Claire Friedland 1965). Two additional U.S. publications that today are leading journals in 
the field were founded within the next 15 years (AER and then the Journal of Political 
Economy in 1892). However, as Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland (1995: 332) note, the “birth of 
the English-language journals slightly lags the development of economics as an academic 
calling. In the 1890s, there were perhaps a half dozen professorships of economics in Britain 
and probably no more than two or three dozen in the United States.” Interestingly, at his 
testimonial dinner (“Remarks” 1941), the first AER editor Davis Rich Dewey explained that 
when he was invited to undertake the managing editorship of the American Economic 
Review, he “demurred, partly on the grounds that I did not read easily foreign languages. The 
chief qualification I possessed was that I had edited the quarterly of the American Statistical 
Association during its first fifteen years. Fortunately, French and German statistical tables 
could be easily deciphered. It was far otherwise with the journals conducted by Schmoller 
and Conrad. I was, however, assured that the Association wished to publish an American 
economic journal and that my objection was not an outstanding defect” (viii). 
The first article in AER, entitled “Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation,” was published 
in 1911 by a distinguished female economist, Katharine Coman (1857–1915), who in the 
early 1880s, was the first American woman to become a professor of statistics (Gerard F. 
Vaughn 2004). During the early 1900s, she also chaired the Department of Economics and 
was Dean of Wellesley College. Three papers in the first AER issue in 2011 were dedicated 
as commentaries to Coman’s contribution (see Elinor Ostrom 2011, Gary D. Libecap 2011, 4 
and Robert N. Stavins 2011).
2 According to Dewey, the inaugural issue led to no end of 
trouble (as quoted in Ann Mari May and Robert W. Dimand 2009), a situation that has been 
referred to as the Cross/Eaves Controversy.
3  
Davis Rich Dewey was in charge of managing AER for 30 years (between1911 and 
1940), a longer tenure than any other editor since. In the same testimonial dinner speech, he 
emphasized his situation at the time: “When I assumed the duties of managing editor, I was 
past middle age and had settled down to the routine of teaching undergraduate students. I had 
no graduate students with whom I could soar into distant stratospheres where dynamic 
principles seem to contradict those which operate upon this lowly earth. Although I had no 
competency for empyreal flights, I enjoyed and even envied the tales which these 
aeronautical economists, with their helical ascents, brought back. A few of these are nose-
divers as well, and I read with some satisfaction that these nose-divers, in pulling out from 
the dive, have a rush of blood from the head to the feet and the flyer often blacks out into 
unconsciousness. In this way you supplemented the pleasures of my later life; and for this I 
again give you my most hearty thanks” (“Remarks” 1941: vii).  
One key task of a new journal is to distinguish itself from those journals already in 
existence. In addressing this task, Dewey points out, he “had no clear answer, but believed 
                                                            
2 Elinor Ostrom (2011: 49), for example, points out that “Coman described tough collective-action 
problems half a century before Mancur Olson (1965) and Garrett Hardin (1968: 49) identified the challenging 
theoretical problem facing many groups.” Likewise, Gary D. Libecap (2011: 64) stresses that “[t]hese same 
issues have relevance today, 100 years later, in the face of growing concern about the availability of fresh water 
world-wide as demand grows and as supplies become more uncertain due to the potential effects of climate 
change.” Robert N. Stavins (2011: 81) echoes these sentiments by beginning his article as follows: “As the first 
decade of the twenty-first century comes to a close, the problem of the commons is more central to economics 
and more important to our lives than a century ago when Katharine Coman led off the first issue of the 
American Economic Review with her examination of ‘Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation’ (Coman 1911). 
Since that time, 100 years of remarkable economic progress have accompanied 100 years of increasingly 
challenging problems.”  
3 A critical review by Ira Cross of a book by Lucile Eaves was the starting point for this controversy. It 
prompted a reaction from Eaves, who saw it as an unjust attack and mobilized a large number of economists in 
her defense. This reaction led to a debate on the length of a reply. After a shortened form was published, Cross 
exploded because he did not receive an advance copy of Eaves’ response. He then sought the chance to submit a 
reply in order to have the last word. Dewey was then bombarded with letters from Eaves expressing her opinion 
(for a detailed discussion see Ann Mari May and Robert W. Dimand 2009).  
 5 
that, if possible, the new Review should serve as a working tool for the hundreds of graduate 
students who were on their way to becoming teachers of economics; and secondly that the 
Review should be the organ of the members of the Association rather than the organ of the 
editors” (“Remarks” 1941: ix).  
Since then, AER has had 9 additional editors: Paul T. Homan (1941–1951),
4 Bernard F. 
Haley (1952–1962), John G. Gurley (1963–1968), George H. Borts (1969–1980), Robert W. 
Clower (1981–1985), Orley Ashenfelter (1985–2001), Ben S. Bernanke (2001–2004), Robert 
A. Moffitt (2004–2010), and Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg (2011–). Goldberg, who received 
her Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1992 and is the William K. Lanman, Jr. Professor of 
Economics at Yale University, is the first female editor
5 in AER’s 100-year history, after 
having been its coeditor between 2007 and 2010. Interestingly, the Johns Hopkins University 
appears both at the beginning and the end of AER’s century.  Robert A. Moffitt (editor from 
2004 to 2010) is the Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Economics at the Johns Hopkins 
University and has worked at the university since 1995. Davis Rich Dewey was a student at 
Johns Hopkins of Richard T. Ely,
6 one of the key driving forces in establishing AER: “For 
three years I had been a pupil of Dr. Ely at Johns Hopkins University, and it could not be 
expected that I would reject the blandishments of my enthusiastic teacher. I was a trailer 
rather than a founder” (“Remarks” 1941: viii).  
                                                            
4 Paul Homan moved several times between Ithaca, Washington, and London before settling in Los Angeles 
in 1950. As A. W. Coats (1969: 63) points out, “the first of these moves aroused some misgivings in the minds 
of his Association colleagues, who feared that the A.E.R. would be neglected; and his work in London 
necessitated the appointment of Fritz Machlup (who, like Homan, was working in Washington) as Acting 
Managing Editor from July, 1944 to August, 1945.”  
5 The notation has changed over time (from managing editor, to production editor, back to managing editor, 
and again to editor (see Robert A. Margo 2011: 17).  
6 Coats (1960: 560) provides a useful overview of Ely’s contribution to the American Economic 
Association and points out that “despite the danger of overestimating the role of a single individual in the life of 
an organization, it is no exaggeration to say that in the early years of its history, the public response to the 
American Economic Association was largely determined by the various reactions to his work.” Ely, described as 
“a vigorous young member of The Johns Hopkins University,” was the initiator of the official inauguration of 
the American Economic Association on September 9, 1885 (555).  6 
This present paper, however, does not aim to provide a detailed historical overview of 
AER, not least because A. W. Coats (1969) has developed an excellent historical account of 
AER’s pre-history and the first period of the journal under the editorial regimes of Dewey, 
Homan, and Haley (1911–1962). Coats’ analysis has also been recently updated and extended 
by Robert A. Margo (2011) to cover the period from the 1970s to the present. Margo’s 
account, however, rather than focusing on the editors, explores the expansion of the 
economics profession and documents, in three figures and two tables,  such statistics as the 
ratio of published-to-submitted manuscripts (1948 –2006) and the average length of the 
articles for various years.
7 He also conducts a citation analysis of articles published in AER 
from 1960 to 2000
8 which, interestingly, reveals that “elite citations”
 9 are quite infrequent 
but did increase over time (influenced by an increase in the 1960s and 1990s). However, he 
notes: “Although elite citations for the average AER paper were higher for the 2000 cohort 
than for the 1970 cohort, this is not true if the rates are page standardized. That is the rise in 
average length is the mechanism through which the increase frequency of elite citation was 
realized historically. Prospect authors may shudder at the (very) low unconditional 
acceptance rate, but subscribers can take some comfort in the knowledge that today’s AER is 
better than their father’s AER in this (admittedly limited)  sense” (Margo 2011: 32).   
Given that these historical overviews of AER have already dealt with the journal’s 
development, we have discretionarily selected the topics for this paper based on what we 
ourselves find interesting and what we hope will prove enjoyable for our readers. The 
selection does not, therefore, aim to provide coherence or historical structure, which lightens 
                                                            
7 Specifically, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005. Interestingly, there was a 68% increase in 
length between 1980 and 2005. 
8 At five-year intervals, based on age, cohort, and period effects. As Margo (2011:35) points out, 
“[k]nowledge advances and thus scientific papers have a shelf life. Advances come in clumps, editors come and 
go, and other factors may make a particular year’s papers unusually significant or unusually stale.”  
9 That is, citations appearing in other AER articles or citations to AER articles in the top-6 leading 
economics journals (AER, JPE, QJE, Review of Economics and Statistics, Review of Economic Studies, and 
Econometrica). Margo (2011: 32) stresses that “if some AER publication cohorts were really ‘better’ on average 
than others—this should be reflected in a greater likelihood of citation in the top journals.”  7 
the burden of ensuring completeness and helps us maintain a high level of intrinsic 
motivation. Indeed, as George Loewenstein points out in the introduction to his book Exotic 
Preferences (2008: xv), “the overwhelming desire to include everything is one of the most 
destructive motivations in academia, and it applies not only to seminars, but to the choice of 
chapters for a book of collected works like this one.”
10  As a result, our contribution merely 
scratches the surface and presents only a sketch—one however, that we hope is deep or 
interesting enough to attract the attention of readers in an academic environment suffering 
from serious congestion on the supply side.
11  We also somehow hope that there is something 
for everyone in this contribution.  
In the spirit of Dewey, this work is perhaps more of a statistical than an economics 
paper.
12 That is, it is descriptive rather than causal and retrospective rather than forward 
looking. That is, we make little attempt to put forward a mechanism driven by hypotheses 
that provide a coherent overall description of AER’s development
13 and report rather than 
synthesize what we believe is interesting in the journal’s history.  We would also like to 
apologize in advance for the copious use of quotes. Having chosen no overall theory on 
which to base our analysis, we felt it appropriate in a descriptive paper to draw extensively on 
                                                            
10 The length of this paper shows that we have partially failed to control such forces.  
11 Sixteen years ago, George J. Stigler, Stephen M. Stigler, and Claire Friedland (1995: 333–334) asked the 
following question: “How many can one examine of the two to four dozen journals that carry papers one 
sometimes wishes to read? Of course there are bibliographic services such as the listing of economic articles in 
the Journal of Economic Literature, but the very length of these listings is another form of congestion.”  
12 A. W. Coats (1969: 59), referring to an interaction between Dewey and H. G. Moulton, points out that by 
“training and predilection Dewey was a statistician and historian rather than an economist, and he made no 
effort to conceal the limitations of his theoretical equipment. While not hostile to theory, he assigned it a 
subordinate role, believing that priority should be accorded to the economist’s ‘sacred obligation to handle facts 
with respect.” 
13 The potential does exist to reduce such shortcomings. In his brilliant book The Nature of Creative 
Development, Jonathan Feinstein (2006: 28) suggests a way of presenting a model as a causal structure using 
“language in which creative interests and conceptual structures in interest domains are described as generative 
of creativity and guiding individuals in their development.” The causal mechanisms he describes are “not 
proximal, but extend over longer time periods” and, as hypotheses, function to “generate a coherent description 
of creative development.” One other methodology that could be considered is analytic narratives, in which 
researchers “attempt to address several issues. First, many of us are engaged in in-depth case studies, but we 
also seek to contribute to, and to make use of, theory. How might we best proceed? Second, the historian, the 
anthropologist, and the area specialist possess knowledge of a place and time. They have an understanding of 
the particular. How might they best employ such data to create and test theories that may apply more generally? 
Third, what is the contribution of formal theory? What benefits are, or can be, secured by formalizing verbal 
accounts?” (Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast 2000) 8 
past descriptions. We also thought that the paper needed a personal touch,
14 although we are 
aware that this may (somewhat ironically) support the cult of personality, in particular for 
contributions that are cited extensively (e.g., the work of Paul A. Samuelson and Bruno S. 
Frey). Awareness of this irony, however, allows us to eventually derive policy implications. 
That is, with the help of the data, we try to provide the right camera angles, lens effects, and 
lighting. We also try to script the quotes’ character development so that they optimally shape 
the paper while allowing us to discuss certain AER publications in greater detail. These latter 
have also been selected in a relatively discretionary manner so that we may relate them to the 
topics explored.  
While putting together this contribution, we avoided the task of thinking about 
boundaries (e.g., space restrictions) so that we were free to work for our own approval.
15 The 
ability to publish a contribution as a working paper alleviates the pressure to publish it as an 
article or to think strategically about producing text in which a referee will find less to 
criticize.
16 Thus, providing there is no refereeing system similar to that of a printed journal, it 
lightens the burden of being forced to intellectually prostitute oneself (Frey 2005).
17 In our 
case, we believe that this lack of restrictios has been beneficial and has facilitated a relaxed 
approach to exploring the topics in this paper.
18 We also recognize, however, that one may 
pay a price if the research product is not user friendly. Academia in general has developed 
into a “battle of attention” based on an overflow of papers produced per year, and economics 
                                                            
14 Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey (2009), for example, refer to a study that shows that around 70 to 90% 
of the papers cited have not been read and have been copied from the list of references used in other papers.  
15 However, this does not exclude the idea put forward by Paul A. Samuelson (2004: 61), that “part of this 
involves the faith that what one craftsman will like, so will eventually the rest.”  
16 Bruno S. Frey (forthcoming: 4) discusses publication pressure: “An effort must be made to ‘sell’ the 
results as novel and pertinent, although there is an incentive to suppress the works and insights of other scholars 
who are unlikely to be the editors or the referees of the journal in which one aspires to publish.”  
17 For example, citations reduce the importance of journal publications as citations can refer to any work 
available to researchers such as books, book chapters, or working papers (Bruno S. Frey 2005).  
18 “If scholars are to be original in a similar way to artists today, they have to be given as much 
independence as possible. This principle has been accorded to universities a long time ago, and is rightly 
guarded by them. Nevertheless, economics scholars have managed to establish a journal publication system, 
tending to turn them into intellectual prostitutes” (Frey 2005: 182).  9 
is no exception. Such proliferation is amply illustrated by the development of IDEAS, the 
largest bibliographic database dedicated to economics and freely accessible on the Web, 
which aims to enhance the free dissemination of research in economics (see 
http://ideas.repec.org/). This repository contains information on 11,975 institutions, covering 
26,852 authors registered with the RePEc Author Service who have authored 593,619 items 
listed in the archive. In 2010, the information dissemination service NEP (New Economics 
Papers) sent our 4,448 weekly reports about new research based on 87 fields, and the RePEc 
services recorded 8,989,727 downloads and 30,777,612 abstract views (see 
http://blog.repec.org/, accessed January 6, 2011). Not only does this level of activity seem to 
characterize a highly competitive environment, but academics cannot assume or expect that 
fellow researchers will read a paper that does not use what George J. Stigler (1955: 295) 
terms the “technique of persuasion.” He explains this technique as follows: “Suppose I get a 
‘new’ idea and gradually work it (and myself) into the state where I believe that it is 
scientifically important.  I may then find it in earlier writers, for now I am sensitive to the 
subject and look more searchingly and sympathetically at the relevant writing. Then I take up 
my pen, and write: I submit for critical appraisal my recent thoughts on linear oligopoly. 
These thoughts, which were first presented by Süssmilch in 1745, by Say in 1814, and then 
became so common as to reach the United States by 1870, are by no means of major 
significance. In fact if they are improperly utilized they will probably lead to serious error. 
Yet under certain conditions, which I am not fully able to specify, they offer promise of a 
minor usefulness. Will my fellow economists read on—once they get used to the novelty of 
this approach? No. New ideas are even harder to sell than new products. Inertia and the many 
unharmonious voices of those who would change our ways combine against the balanced and 
temperate statement of the merits of one’s ‘original’ views. One must put on the best face 
possible, and much is possible. Wares must be shouted—the human mind is not a divining 10 
rod that quivers over truth.” How, then, can one achieve persuasion? Stigler (1955: 295) 
provides the following answer: “The techniques of persuasion also in the realm of ideas are 
generally repetition, inflated claims, and disproportionate emphases, and they have preceded 
and accompanied the adoption on a large scale of almost every new idea in economic theory. 
Almost, but not quite, every new idea. A few men have such unusual powers that their 
contemporaries recognize their claims without the usual exaggerations: Smith and Marshall 
are the only economists who seem to me indisputably to belong in this supreme class.”  
To generate our datasets, we primarily accessed resources that should be available to 
most economists,
19 academics or not, given that AEA membership provides access to the 
association’s journals and to JSTOR.
20 Most particularly, this choice is consistent with the 
fact that AER is an official AEA journal
21 rather than the product of an economics department 
or institution: “In the end, the American Economic Review was launched in 1911 mainly 
because a substantial body of rank and file members was determined to assert the 
Association’s  right to its own journal” (Coats 1969: 58). We hope, therefore, that our 
selection will allow others to easily replicate our work or move beyond our analysis.
22 
                                                            
19 We work mainly with AER articles or articles discussing AER contributions, annual reports of the 
(managing) editor, and occasionally Journal Citation Reports. 
20 There are restrictions, however, for those interested in constructing a similar database. We have been 
informed that the JSTOR system has a number of tools in place that monitor excessive downloading and other 
activities that contravene the JSTOR Terms and Conditions 
(http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp). When such excessive downloading takes place, their 
system automatically denies JSTOR access from the IP address for a short period of time in order to disrupt this 
activity. If the activity persists, JSTOR will then contact the license holder (such as the library), providing 
details of the downloading so that there is an opportunity to shut down the accounts responsible as soon as 
possible. 
21 Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland (1995: 346) refer to it as the “flagship journal of the major North American 
economic society.”  
22 In the spirit of a 1986 editorial statement that appeared in vol. 76, no. 4 of the American Economic 
Review under Orley Ashenfelter’s leadership as managing editor (with Robert H. Haveman, John G. Riley, and 
John T. Taylor as co-editors), we will make our datasets and (mostly STATA) estimations accessible: “It is the 
policy of the American Economic Review to publish papers only where the data used in the analysis are clearly 
and precisely documented, are readily available to any researcher for purposes of replication, and where details 
of the computations sufficient to permit replication are provided. The Managing Editor should be notified at the 
time of submission if the data used in a paper are proprietary, or if, for some other reason, the above 
requirements cannot be met” (v). In 2004, AER “began to require that authors of accepted papers that employ 
data in econometric exercises, simulation models, or experiments agree to post their data and programs on the 
journal Web site unless an exemption for proprietary data is requested and granted. The policy was strengthened 
in 2005 with more systematic enforcement and with tighter rules for exemptions. Exemptions are generally 11 
Clearly, such an approach has substantial shortcomings. For instance, we are unable to 
explore many interesting questions that would require the cooperation of the journal itself 
(through the release of detailed data on submissions, assigned referees and editors, and so 
forth). With access to this information, we could have analyzed such topics as the 
determinants of success in publishing in American Economic Review, a subject of interest to 
many researchers in our economics guild. Admittedly, however, doing so would also raise the 
challenging question of which came first, the chicken or the golden egg.
23 
  
2.  Top Institutions, Top Papers, and Leading Economists Publishing in AER 
Given that there appears to be a natural desire for distinction (see, e.g., the work of 
Robert Frank
24), it is no surprise that a large set of papers has emerged on the rankings of 
economics departments and researchers (see table 1) and that the last two decades have 
witnessed an impressive development of economic research on the evaluation of scientific 
progress (Rabah Amir and Malgorzata Knauff 2008). The demand for rankings is 
understandable as academics in the market are keen to obtain information on the best research 
environment in which to continue their careers. University administrators also find rankings 
useful for evaluating the progress of their departments and for developing student recruitment 
strategies (Loren C. Scott and Peter M. Mitias, 1996).
25 More important, as pointed out by 
David N. Laband and Robert D. Tollison (2003), there has also been a “considerable ramping 
up of the incentives and imperative for faculty to be ‘research-active’. This increased 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
granted only if the data can be accessed by other researchers in some alternative fashion” (Report of the Editor, 
AER Papers and Proceedings, 96(2): 498). This report presents tabular evidence (in table 8, page 501) of full 
compliance after a second-round reminder. Only 4 out of 99 papers were given an exemption.  
23 For a valuable and entertaining discussion on causality, see Joshua D. Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke’s 
(2009) book Mostly Harmless Econometrics. 
24 For example, Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook (1996), Robert H. Frank (1985, 1991, 1999), and 
Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein (2001). 
25 However, Osterloh and Frey (2009) point that output-oriented rankings can crowd out intrinsically 
motived curiosity to conduct research. The danger is that such intrinsic motivation is substituted by extrinsic 
motivation to earn high ranking scores. Thus, content loses its relevance. These authors therefore suggest that 
evaluators work with a combination of qualitative peer reviews and bibliometrics (informed peer reviews).  12 
emphasis on research is evident not only in the United States, but also in many countries in 
Europe, as well as Canada, Australia, and several South American countries. In the United 
States and Canada the principal inducements have taken the form of reduced faculty teaching 
loads, marginally higher raises for faculty who publish in peer-reviewed journals, and 
financial support for conference travel; in other countries there has been a less pronounced 
decrease in faculty teaching loads, but there are pecuniary rewards to publishing” (161–162).  
Bruno S. Frey (forthcoming: 2) argues that today, “the importance of scientific idea and the 
position of a scholar are defined by rankings. What matters nowadays is the recognition 
produced by a general rankings system, normally based only on the quantity of scientific 
output, irrespective of quality.”  
Interestingly, researchers today invest much effort in having their contributions screened, 
which indicates a keen interest in publishing well. For example, in 1974, only 19% of the 
papers published in AER had been presented at one or more conferences, workshops, or 
seminars for critical commentary prior to publication. On average, the number of 
presentations was 0.24 per paper. Twenty-five years later, 73% of the papers accepted for 
publication had been previously presented, and the mean number of pre-publication 
presentations was 4.73. Similarly, the mean number of informal contributors thanked per 
AER article increased from 4.33 to 9.59 (Laband and Tollison, 2003: 165–166). To some 
extent, however, such a “tour de force” in the academic circle is almost reminiscent of a 
promotional tour for a best-selling book, although definitely less glamorous and time 
consuming and perhaps more rewarding in terms of content feedback.
26 This book-promoting 
experience is vividly illustrated by Judith Krantz’s description of her promotional tour for 
                                                            
26 In addition, David N. Laband and Michael J. Piette (1994: 196) state that editors are searching for good 
papers and compete to identify them. Thus, as “part of this competitive process, editors attend professional 
meetings to learn about research papers in the ‘presubmission’ stage. Many universities housing journal 
editorships maintain active seminar series that become de facto, and valuable, inputs in this search process.”  13 
Scruples:
27 “Touring for a book—it’s the literary equivalent of war. I remember my 
hardcover tour. I’d hit a city—say, Cleveland—at night, unpack, steam out the clothes that 
were wrinkled, and, the next morning, get up at six. Because there’s always an ‘A.M. Show,’ 
a ‘Good Morning Show,’ a ‘Hello Show‘ in every city in the country.(…) When you leave 
that hotel early in the morning, you have to be packed up and all checked out—the publisher 
has a limo to get you to the studio, and your suitcase is going to be in that limo all day while 
you make your  sixteen different stops. Your arrival at the studio is at seven-thirty or eight, 
and the author invariably goes on last, but you have to be there an hour ahead of time in order 
to keep them from going crazy. Then, after I went on, I’d do a whole day of media in 
Cleveland, finishing up at six o’clock, just in time to catch a plane to Detroit, and the 
departure gate is always at the very end of the airport. You do all that day after day and 
enough weeks in a row, and you get so that you feel you can hardly function” (as quoted by 
Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook 1996: 9–10). 
  
2.1 Institutional Rankings 
In assessing institutional rankings, to obtain what Frey (forthcoming: 9) describes as an 
aggregate “super ranking,”
28 we first aggregated the institutional ranking results presented in 
several previous journal articles.
29 To generate table 1, which summarizes our aggregations, 
we looked at all the tables in these articles and counted the number of times a university 
                                                            
27 This book, her first novel, published in1978, when Krantz turned 50 (see Wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judith_Krantz), reached the number one spot on the New York Times bestseller list. 
As Krantz described it, “[j]ust in time for my 50th birthday, I discovered that I could write fiction. My husband 
had urged me to try fiction for 15 years before I did. (...) I believed that if I couldn't write ‘literature,’ I shouldn't 
write at all. (…) Now, I would say to young women, do something you have a true feeling for, no matter how 
little talent you may believe you have. Let no masterwork be your goal—a modest goal may lead you further 
than you dream” (see http://www.wellesley.edu/Anniversary/krantz.html).  
28 Frey (forthcoming: 9) discusses the direction in which academia could be heading: “The ranking mania 
may be expected to lead to more and more rankings, which then will be aggregated to super rankings and super 
rankings of super rankings (…) until it becomes clear to everyone that numerical evaluations of academic 
research lead to nothing, and people return to evaluate the content of science.”  
29 In many cases, we observe single rankings that accumulate a relatively large number of journals together. 
For example, Loren C. Scott and Peter M. Mitias (1996) used 36 journals to develop a university ranking. 14 
appeared in the top 10 (first results column) or top 20 institutions (second results column). 
This table may thus provide a simple overview of institutional historical strength that takes 
into account the advantages and shortcomings of different ranking methods and approaches. 
The results in table 1 do clearly indicate the dominance of U.S. universities. More 
specifically, the best 15 universities are in the U.S., and among the 23 universities listed, only 
three are outside the U.S. In first place is MIT, followed by Harvard, and Chicago.
30 As two 
of these studies used only U.S. data
31, we present in the appendix table A1 a revised ranking 
excluding these two papers. The results are very similar with only minor changes. For 
example, Columbia University is now in the top 10 and University of California, Berkeley 
has improved its position among the top 10 university.  
In the next four tables, we focus entirely on single main articles that appeared over the 
100 years of AER’s existence (1911–1920 and 1931–1940 in table 2; 1950–1959 in table 3; 
and 1981–1990 and 2001–2010 in table 4).
32 For the 1950–1959 period only, we rely on 







30 We do not wish to offend any institution, but these results (i.e., the top three universities) “cry out” for a 
reference to Paul A. Samuelson’s (2004: 54-55) contribution to the Lives of the Laureates: “Here briefly, in the 
third person for objectivity, is the superficial outline of my scientific career. (…) If PAS was born as a child his 
freshman year at Chicago, he was born a second time as a man that October 1940 day he succumbed to a call 
from MIT. MIT’s force met no detectable Harvard resistance, so the movable object moved. It was the best 
thing that could have happened to PAS. A boy must always remain a boy in his father’s house. On his own acres 
a man can build his own mansion and after 1941 PAS, along with magnificent colleagues, was able to help build 
up what became recognized as a leading world center for economics. Living well is the best revenge, 
Hemingway’s crowd used to say; but, in sober truth, the example of MIT’s Norbert Wiener, who in his days of 
fame still brooded over his ejection from Harvard Yard, led PAS ever to cherish his Harvard connections and 
labor for the greater glory of Cambridge and Middlesex County.”  
31 Richard Dusansky and Clayton J. Vernon (1998) and Loren C. Scott and Peter M. Mitias (1996).  
32 When more than one author affiliation was listed, we used the author’s main affiliation.  15 





Notes: Data from Tom Coupé (2003), table 2 and table 4 (covering two time periods, 1978–
1982 and 1996–2001; four different rankings); two tables from Philip E. Graves, James R. 
Marchand, and Randal Thompson (1982), table 1 and table 2; table 1 from Richard Dusansky 
and Clayton J. Vernon (1998); table 3 from Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Theofanis P. Mamuneas, 
and Thanasis Stengos (2003); five from Erkin Bairam (1994), table 1 (AER 1985–90), table 2 
(Econometrica 1985-90), table 3 (Economic Journal 1985–90), table 4 (JPE 1985–90) and 
table 5 (QJE 1985–90); table 1 from Amir and Knauff  (2008); three tables from Stephen Wu 
(2007), table 2 (AER), table 3 (JPE), and table 4 (QJE) between for the 2000–2003 period; 
eight from Scott and Mitias (1996), table 1 (1984–93), table 3 (1984–93) , table 4 , tables 5, 6, 
7 (a comparison of the Top 5 in five journals);  and 12 by John J. Siegfried (1994), table 1 
(AER, by decade between 1950 and 1989), table 2 (JPE, by decade between 1950 and 1989) 
and table 3 (QJE, by decade between 1950 and 1989) and table 2 by Jean Louis Heck (1993). 
 
Table 2, which focuses on the periods 1911–1920 and 1931–1940, ranks the institutions 
that contributed 100 pages or more to AER. As Paul A. Samuelson (2004:50) points out, in 
1935, “only a few strong centers for economic research—Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, and a 
few others were visible.” Besides these three institutions, we also find names such as 
Princeton University, Yale University, New York University, Cornell University, University 
University 
Appearance as a Top 
10 University  
Appearance as a 
Top 20 University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  38  38 
Harvard University  34  36 
University of Chicago  32  36 
Stanford University  31  37 
Princeton University  30  36 
University of Pennsylvania  28  33 
Yale University  27  32 
University of California, Berkeley  26  33 
Northwestern University  22  32 
University of California, Los Angeles  15  31 
Columbia University  13  26 
University of Michigan  12  26 
University of  Wisconsin  11  29 
Carnegie Mellon University  7  17 
New York University  6  25 
Hebrew University  5  8 
University of Washington  4  8 
Rochester University  4  24 
University of Western Ontario  3  10 
London School of Economics  3  13 
University of Minnesota  3  20 
Brown University  3  10 
Cornell University  3  16 16 
of Illinois, or University of Wisconsin at the top. These six (1911–1920) or seven institutions 
(1931–1940) represent over 30% of all pages published as primary AER articles.
33  
 






 Percent of Total 
Pages 
Yale University  324  9.2 
Harvard University  254  7.2 
Princeton University  228  6.5 
Columbia University  215  6.1 
University of Illinois  172  4.9 
Cornell University  140  4 
Total 1333  37.9 
1931–1940 
Institutions  Number of 
Pages 
 Percent of Total 
Pages 
Columbia University  248  6.8 
Harvard University  197  5.4 
Princeton University  176  4.8 
University of Wisconsin  141  3.9 
New York University  133  3.7 
University of Chicago  130  3.6 
Ohio State University  123  3.4 
Total 1148  31.6 
Notes: Institutions whose total contribution to AER during the period 
was 100 pages or more (based on author affiliation). Only primary 
journal articles are counted (i.e., Papers and Proceedings are 
excluded). Washington, D.C., although it contributed 125 pages in 
1931–1940, is excluded  because no affiliation was provided.  
 
Table 3 shows the institutions whose total contribution to AER during the 1950–1959 
period was 100 pages or more. These results reflect Samuelson’s (2004) reference to “a 
postwar boom in education and how the ‘expansion in economists’ prestige and self-esteem 
has been followed by some leaner years. We have become more humble and, as Churchill 
                                                            
33 The Pax Americanus provided good U.S. institutions with a further advantage: “Hitler gave us even 
before the war the cream of the continental crop. (…) Along with such names as Einstein, von Neumann, and 
Fermi go such American economists [sic] names as Koopmans, Leontief, Schumpeter, Marschak, Haberler, 
Kuznets, and many others. Later, as strength draws to itself strength, there began to appear in the American 
lineup the names of Hurwicz, Debreu, Theil, Bhagwati, Coase, Fischer, and many others” (Samuelson 2004: 
51).” 
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said, we have much to be humble about” (p. 52).
 34 This expansion of the educational system 
led to excellent graduate departments all over the U.S.: “the period from 1932 to 1975 was a 
favorable one for economists like me, in that it was an epoch of tremendous university 
expansion and job opportunity. If one can borrow from the vulgar terminology of economic 
science fiction, my generation of economic activity was buoyed along by the great wave of a 
Kondratieff expansion” (Samuelson 2004: 50).
35  As table 3 shows, during the 1950–1959 
period, other institutions such as the University of California, MIT, Stanford University, the 
Johns Hopkins University, the University of Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt University, and the 
Carnegie Institute of Technology appear together with the Federal Reserve System and the 
International Monetary Fund. Moreover, not only are the top 7 institutions responsible for 
around one-third of the published pages, but all 17 institutions together account for more than 
60% of all the pages published in AER.  
Table 4 provides an overview of what has happened in more recent times, with a focus 
on institutions whose total contribution numbers 200 pages or more. The institutions new to 
the list are from outside the U.S. and include the University of Western Ontario, the 
University of British Columbia, and the London School of Economics (LSE). In fact, the 
2001–2010 data indicate that the concentration of universities at the top of the list has 
decreased. Whereas in the 1950s, 17 institutions were responsible for 60% of AER content, 





34 As Samuelson (2004: 52) comments, “[e]conomists have not been able to agree on a good cure for 
stagflation. That disillusions non-economists. And, to tell the truth, it punctures our own self-complacency.  We 
shop around for new paradigms the way alchemists prospect for new philosophers’ stone. Just because a 
National Bureau paper is silly does not mean it is uninteresting. Just because it is profound does not mean that it 
is admired.”  
35 As Samuelson (2004: 52) also points out, however, “[t]rees do not grow to the sky. Every Kondratieff 
wave has its inflection point.”  18 
 T ABLE 3: TOP INSTITUTIONS 1950–1959 
Institution  Number of Pages  Percent of Total Pages 
University of California  392  6.9 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  363  6.4 
Stanford University  309  5.4 
University of Chicago  218  3.8 
University of Michigan  214  3.8 
Federal Reserve System  200  3.5 
Johns Hopkins University  199  3.5 
University of California, Los Angeles  197  3.5 
Harvard University  185  3.3 
Yale University  164  2.9 
University of Wisconsin  158  2.8 
University of Pennsylvania  135  2.4 
Princeton University  134  2.4 
University of Illinois  133  2.3 
Vanderbilt University  112  2.0 
Northwestern University  111  2.0 
Carnegie Institute of Technology  102  1.8 
International Monetary Fund  100  1.8 
Total 3426  60.5 
Notes: Institutions whose total contribution to AER during the period was 100 pages or more (based on author 
affiliation), but Papers and Proceedings are excluded. Data from this time period are from Cleary and Edwards 
(1960: 1012). A contribution was defined to include articles, review articles, notes, communications, and 
memorials; book reviews are excluded.  
 
We now adopt a different perspective and investigate the publication record based on 
where authors obtained their doctoral degree rather than their affiliated institution. We take a 
closer look at the last 60 years and analyze the data using shorter time periods (5 instead of 
10 years; the 1984–1988 and 2004–2008 periods). These results reveal a much stronger 
concentration: researchers with a Ph.D. from the 10 universities listed in table 5 are 
responsible for more than 70% of the pages published in AER in all three time periods (for 
the 1980s, this figure is as high as 85%). Over the past few decades, a clear dominance 
emerges of MIT followed by Harvard University, which together were responsible for around 
30% of the pages published from 2004 to 2008 and from 1984 to 2008. In line with the 
results from table 1, MIT is again ranked before Harvard. In this top 10 list, LSE appears as 
the only non-American university (2004–2008 period)
36.  
                                                            
36 Ann Rute Cardoso, Paulo Guimarães, and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2010: 623) provide a nice overview of 
studies that discuss the productivity gap between North-American and European universities. They also refer to 
studies that stress that the gap will decrease over time. Their results focusing on labor economics PhD graduates 19 
TABLE 4: TOP INSTITUTIONS 1981–1990 AND 2001–2010 
1981–1990 
Institutions  Number of Pages  Percent of 
Total Pages 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  539  4.7 
Princeton University  510  4.5 
Harvard University  500  4.4 
University of Chicago  432  3.8 
University of California, Los Angeles  333  2.9 
University of Pennsylvania  312  2.7 
University of Michigan  283  2.5 
Stanford University  267  2.3 
University of California, Berkeley  260  2.3 
University of Western Ontario  228  2 
Yale University  200  1.8 
Total 3864  33.9 
2001–2010 
Institutions  Number of Pages  Percent of 
Total Pages 
Harvard University  1049  5.5 
University of California, Berkeley  875  4.6 
University of Chicago  758  4 
Stanford University  749  3.9 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  651  3.4 
Yale University  493  2.6 
Princeton University  483  2.5 
Columbia University  479  2.5 
University of Pennsylvania  456  2.4 
New York University  399  2.1 
University of California, Los Angeles  382  2 
Northwestern University  377  2 
University of Michigan  343  1.8 
London School of Economics   299  1.6 
University of Maryland  267  1.4 
University of British Columbia  253  1.3 
University of California, San Diego  204  1.1 
Carnegie Mellon University  201  1.1 
Total 7899  45.9 
Notes: Institutions that contributed 200 pages or more to AER (based on authors 
affiliation). Only primary journal articles are included (Papers and Proceedings are 
excluded). 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
in Europe or the US (year 2000-2005) indicate that European graduates publish on average more articles, but in 
journals of lower average quality. They also provide potential explanations for it: “This may be because, when 
hired by a top-USA institution, graduates already have several good acceptances or because of more focused 
research efforts and clearer career incentives. This could also be because the American-based institutions still 
provide a better academic environment to reach the standard leading journals, which are still closer attached to 
the USA. Another explanation is that the rising quantity and the increased visibility the European researchers 
have provided over recent years needs more time to breed higher quality research and lead to high quality 
research and lead to high quality journal publications. Part of this is related to the fact that the very many new 
European-based journals where Europeans publish more than proportionally need many more years to move up 
the quality ladder in international competition. Publication strategies also seem to differ across both continents. 
In the USA, PhD graduates aim at a decent number of articles in “A-journals” before the tenure decision; the 
probability of acceptance in those journals is low, and hence delays to acceptance and publication of papers are 
longer. In Europe, young researchers often publish before defending their PhD; journals are not necessarily A-
ranked; and the rank of the journals (although of rising importance) is not yet so crucial for the tenure decision, 
which often follows other rules” (p. 635).  20 
TABLE 5: TOP TEN INSTITUTIONS BASED ON CONTRIBUTORS’ PH.D. INSTITUTION 
1950-1959 
Institutions  Number of 
Contributors 
Percent of Total 
Sample of 287 
Contributors 
Harvard University  62  21.6 
Columbia University  38  13.24 
University of Chicago  34  11.85 
University of California  20  7 
University of Wisconsin  13  4.53 
Yale University  12  4.18 
University of Pennsylvania  11  3.83 
University Michigan  10  3.48 
Cornell University  8  2.79 
Stanford University  8  2.79 
Total 216  75.29 
1984-1988 
Institutions  Number of 
Contributors 
Percent of Total 
Sample of 435 
Contributors 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  70  16.1 
Harvard University  55  12.6 
University of Chicago  47  10.8 
Stanford University  36  8.3 
University of California, Berkeley  35  8 
Princeton University  30  6.9 
Yale University  27  6.2 
University of California, Los Angeles  26  6 
University of Pennsylvania  22  5.1 
Northwestern University  20  4.6 
Total 368  84.6 
2004-2008 
Institutions  Number of 
Contributors 
Percent of Total 
Sample of 600 
Contributors 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  100  16.7 
Harvard University  83  13.8 
Stanford University  43  7.2 
Princeton University  39  6.5 
University of Chicago  32  5.3 
University of California, Berkeley  29  4.8 
University of Minnesota    25  4.2 
Yale University  25  4.2 
London School of Economics  24  4 
Northwestern University  22  3.7 
Total 422  70.4 
Notes: Data for the years 1950 to 1959 are from Frank R. Cleary and Daniel J. Edwards (1960). For 
the other years, we include short papers (e.g., notes, comments, replies) but exclude Papers and 
Proceedings items.  
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Interestingly, Amir and Knauff (2008: 185) propose an alternative criterion on which to 
judge economics departments. Their method ranks the departments based not on research 
productivity but on the strength of the Ph.D. program as measured by a department’s ability 
to place doctoral graduates in top-level economics departments or business schools: “Within 
the respective context, faculty hires probably constitute a more reliable and stable indicator of 
influence than journal citations.” Their results also indicate a clear dominance by MIT 
(number one) and Harvard University  (number two), followed by Stanford University, 
Princeton, the University of Chicago, Yale University, UC Berkeley, Oxford University, the 
University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, and the London School of Economics. 




2.2 Country Rankings 
Rather than focusing only on institutions, we felt it might also be interesting to examine 
the performance of individual countries.
37 In terms of the number of publications per 
capita,
38, Israel is at the top of the list in both periods, followed by the U.S. This result is 
comparable to Martin Kocher and Matthias Sutter’s (2001) finding for 15 economics journals 
from a period that includes 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997. Looking at the entire period at 
once, they also found that Israel was number one and the U.S. number two. Hence, these 
results seem to indicate that U.S. dominance decreases once population size is controlled for. 
As we both are Swiss, we are pleased to see that Switzerland has improved its position from 
number six (1984–1988) to number three (2004–2008).  
 
                                                            
37 For previous studies in that area, see, e.g., Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Harry Rothman (1999) or Martin 
Kocher and Matthias Sutter (2001).  
38 This approach assumes that academic resources devoted to economics are highly correlated with a 
country’s population. Such may not, however, be the case for populous developing countries (Martin Kocher 
and Matthias Sutter 2001). This problem can thus be mitigated by looking at only the top 10 countries.  22 
TABLE 6: TOP COUNTRIES PUBLISHING IN AER 
Notes: Number of AER publications; top 10 countries in each period; per capita in millions.  
 
2.3 Top Papers 
After dealing with institutions and countries, the natural progression is to “zoom in” and 
focus on top papers and top authors published in AER. To identify the former, we adopt an 
imperfect but widely available proxy for quality, namely citations.
39 More specifically, we 
work with the 2009 Journal Citation Reports
40 and produce the results listed  in table 7. The 
most cited papers to date are Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz’s (1972) study 
“Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” followed by Michael C. 
Jensen’s paper “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers.”
41 
Interestingly, Joseph Stiglitz appears three times and Carl Shapiro twice. To gain insight into 
an author’s perspective, we asked Harold Demsetz whether he would be willing to describe to 
us his personal experience with this paper, and are thankful that he generously agreed. Here is 
his detailed response to our request:
42 “The paper began life while I was on the faculty of the 
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and Alchian was in residence for a year 
as a visitor from UCLA.  My prior position was on the faculty of the UCLA Economics 
                                                            
39 We discuss the limitations of citations at a later stage.  
40 This dataset includes a reloading on September 22, 2010, of data originally collected in December 2010. 
41 When Google Scholar is used as the search engine, these two papers are also ranked top among the 
papers reported in Table 7 (accessed January 25, 2011).  
42 Email correspondence, January 2011.  
Country  Period 1984–1988  Period 2004–2008  Rank 1984–1988  Rank 2004–2008 
Israel 5.35  2.55  1  1 
USA 3.17  2.37  2  2 
Switzerland 0.61  1.33  6  3 
Sweden 0.72  1.32  5  4 
Norway  − 1.28 − 5 
United Kingdom  − 1.00 − 6 
Canada 2.10  0.95  3  7 
Netherlands  − 0.79 − 8 
Ireland 0.57  0.71  8  9 
Belgium 0.41  0.57  10  10 
Australia 0.75  − 4 − 
New Zealand  0.61  − 7 − 
Finland 0.41  − 9 − 23 
Department. There, Armen and I got to know each other well.  After departing UCLA for 
Chicago, I urged my colleagues to invite Alchian for a year’s visit in the hope that we might 
be able to lure him from Los Angeles.  Hence, we both were in Chicago.  Toward the end of 
the year’s visit (he decided not to remain at the U. of Chicago) we began to discuss the 
emptiness of the theory of the firm that was being taught.  That is, the theory simply 
described the objective of the firm—to maximize profit—and said next to nothing—other 
than equating marginal cost to marginal revenue—about the problems and methods the firm 
faced and used.  Our discussion gave rise to the notion of team productivity and to the 
difficulty this caused when attempting to ascertain the value of the marginal product of a 
worker’s service.  This difficulty led us to see the organization of the firm, its methods of 
compensation, and the monitoring of activities within the firm as responses to problems 
created by team-oriented production.  The chief contribution of the paper, as I see it, was to 
break through the simplistic model that extended its reach to virtually all textbooks and most 
professional papers and to provide the profession with an eye-opening new approach to the 
theory of the firm. Our discussion of the shirking problem was transformed by Jensen and 
Meckling into an agency problem and became part of the larger problem of the financial 
structure of the firm.  Our way of viewing the firm then permeated a variety of nooks and 
crannies in economics. We knew we had produced a good paper centered on a new way of 
viewing the general problem of cooperation between persons possessed of their own self-
interests, but the great success of the paper came as somewhat of a surprise.  The paper was 
actually written by way of a series of independently written drafts that we exchanged by way 
of mail (or were we using computers at that time?).  We worked over a draft that was sent by 
the other co-author, sent it back with suggestions, revisions, and new ideas, and then went 
through the process again and again until, at last, we thought we had reached the final 
product.  The paper, then, truly was a joint product produced by a team (!) that had somehow 24 
resolved the team production problem that our paper centered on, though, to this day, I cannot 
say which of us wrote which part of the paper.  We sent it off to the AER.  Happily, they 
accepted it.  Shortly thereafter, UCLA offered me a handsome arrangement to visit for a year; 
with much difficulty, and after too long a visit, I chose to remain at UCLA.” 
The first issue of the American Economic Review in 2011, published to celebrate the 
AER’s centenary, is a report that identifies the top 20 articles in the journal’s history as 
judged by a committee composed of Kenneth J. Arrow, B. Douglas Bernheim, Martin S. 
Feldstein, Daniel L. McFadden, James M. Poterba, and Robert M. Solow (chair). In the first 
page of the report, the committee outlines its decision process: “We decided against trying to 
define formally the criteria for inclusion: they surely comprise sheer intellectual quality, 
influence on the ideas and practices of economists, and general significance or breath; but it 
would be fruitless to try to specify the marginal rates of substitution among these and other 
qualities. We were looking for 20 admirable and important articles.” As a starting point, the 
committee used citation counts and the number of searches in JSTOR: “This is obviously 
important and relevant information, but not decisive on its own. Citation counts are biased in 
favor of subfields of economics with the largest populations. There is also a bias in favor of 
moderately recent articles, if only because the number of potential readers and writers has 
been increasing in time; very recent articles suffer from the fact that citations build up over 
time. In any case we were expected to use our judgment about quality and significance.  So 
we used the citation and JSTOR data only to give us a large group of eligible [articles].” They 
then point out that they were “worried especially about overlooking articles in the very early 
days of the AER, some by great names in the history of economics.” Their decision process 
thus unfolded as follows: “In the event, our early ballots showed an encouraging unanimity or 
near-unanimity, especially about the leading candidates. We very quickly converged on the 
Top 15 articles. There were occasional differences of opinion, only to be expected from a 25 
group with diverse interests, as we filled in the remaining three to five places.” Their final list 
(Arrow et al. 2011: 2–8) is reproduced below in alphabetical order: 
–  Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization.” American Economic Review, 62(5): 777–95. 
 
–  Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care.” 
American Economic Review, 53(5): 941–73. 
 
–  Cobb, Charles W., and Paul H. Douglas. 1928. “A Theory of Production.” American 
Economic Review, 18(1): 139–65. 
 
–  Deaton, Angus S., and John Muellbauer. 1980. “An Almost Ideal Demand System.” 
American Economic Review, 70(3): 312–26. 
 
–  Diamond, Peter A. 1965. “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model.” American 
Economic Review, 55(5): 1126–50.  
 
–  Diamond, Peter A., and James A. Mirrlees. 1971. “Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: 
Production Efficiency.” American Economic Review, 61(1): 8–27.  
 
–  Diamond Peter A., and James A. Mirrlees. 1971. “Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: 
Tax Rules.” American Economic Review, 61(3): 261–78.   
 
–  Dixit, Avinash K., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1977. “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum 
Product Diversity.” American Economic Review, 67(3): 297–308. 
 
–  Friedman, Milton. 1968. “The Role of Monetary Policy.” American Economic Review, 58(1): 
1–17. 
 
–  Grossman, Sanford J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1980. “On the Impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets.” American Economic Review, 70(3): 393–408. 
 
–  Harris, John R., and Michael P. Todaro. 1970. “Migration, Unemployment and Development: 
A Two-Sector Analysis.” American Economic Review, 60(1): 126–42. 
 
–  Hayek, Friedrich A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.”  American Economic Review, 
35(4): 519–30.  
 
–  Jorgenson, Dale W. 1963. “Capital Theory and Investment Behavior.” American Economic 
Review, 53(2): 247–59. 
 
–  Krueger, Anne O. 1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” American 
Economic Review, 64(3): 291–303. 
   
–  Krugman, Paul. 1980. “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade.” 
American Economic Review, 70(5): 950–59.  
 
–  Kuznets, Simon. 1955. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality.” American Economic 
Review, 45(1): 1–28.  
 
–  Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1973. “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs.” 
American Economic Review, 63(3): 326–34.  26 
 
–  Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. 1953. “The Cost of Capital, Corporation and 
Finance and the Theory of Investment.” American Economic Review, 48(3): 261–97.  
 
–  Mundell, Robert A. 1961. “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.” American Economic 
Review, 51(4): 657–65.  
 
–  Ross, Stephen A. 1973. “The Economic Theory of Agency: A Principal’s Problem.” 
American Economic Review, 63(2): 134–39.  
 
–  Shiller, Robert J. 1981. “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent 
Changes in Dividends?” American Economic Review, 71(3): 421–36.  
 
 
Four articles out of this list also appear in table 7; namely, the contributions of Armen A. 
Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Friedrich A. Hayek, 
and Milton Friedman.  
 
TABLE 7: TOP 10 AER PAPERS BY CITATION 
Title Authors  Publication  Date  Citations 
PRODUCTION, INFORMATION COSTS, AND 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
ALCHIAN, AA 
DEMSETZ, H  62(5) 1972  2215 
*AGENCY COSTS OF FREE CASH FLOW, 
CORPORATE FINANCE, AND TAKEOVERS  JENSEN, MC  76(2) 1986  2014 
CREDIT RATIONING IN MARKETS WITH 
IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
STIGLITZ, JE 
WEISS, A  71(3) 1981  1462 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND 
OPTIMUM PRODUCT DIVERSITY 
DIXIT, AK 
STIGLITZ, JE  67(3) 1977  1421 
THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY  HAYEK, FA  35(4) 1945  1159 
EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT AS A 
WORKER DISCIPLINE DEVICE 
SHAPIRO, C 
STIGLITZ, JE  74(3) 1984  1053 
A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF CROSS-
COUNTRY GROWTH REGRESSIONS 
LEVINE, R 
RENELT, D  82(4) 1992  1050 
ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY  FRIEDMAN, M  58(1) 1968  1000 
NETWORK EXTERNALITIES, COMPETITION, 
AND COMPATIBILITY 
KATZ, ML 
SHAPIRO, C  75(3) 1985  993 
MIGRATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT —2-SECTOR ANALYSIS 
HARRIS, JR 
TODARO, MP  60(1) 1970  974 
*CLIO AND THE ECONOMICS OF QWERTY  DAVID, PA  75(2) 1985  974 
Notes: *Articles in the Papers and Proceedings (entitled AER Papers until vol. 100, no. 4). Data based on the 
2009 Journal Citation Reports including the reloading on September 22, 2010. Data accessed December 2010. 
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2.4 Publishing Frequency 
In Table 8, using data that covers almost the entire 100-year history of the journal, we 
report the frequency with which authors publish in AER.
43 As the table shows, 67% of the 
authors publish only once, 16% twice, and 7% three times, indicating that only a minority 
(less than 10%) were able to publish more than three times in AER. Figure 1 then graphs what 
we would call a “citation Lorenz curve,” thereby providing a citation inequality proxy for all 
articles published in AER between 1911 and 2010. This figure reveals a significant level of 
citation inequality
44 (Gini coeff. = 0.75); for example, 20% of the articles are responsible for 
80% of the citations. Interestingly, the sports environment, a highly competitive arena in 




     TABLE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATIONS AMONG AUTHORS (1911–2010) 
NUMBER OF 
PUBLICATIONS  FREQUENCY P ERCENT 
1 4288  66.98 
2 1046  16.34 
3 464  7.25 
4 214  3.34 
5 140  2.19 
6 86  1.34 
7 44  0.69 
8 35  0.55 
9 22  0.34 
10 21  0.33 
11 14  0.22 
>11 28  0.45 
Total 6402  100 




43 Until vol. 100, no. 4. 
44 Samuelson (2004: 60) recalls the following exchange: “Once I asked my friend the statistician Harold 
Freeman, ‘Harold, if the Devil came to you with the bargain that, in exchange for your immortal soul, he’d give 
you a brilliant theorem, would you do it?’ ‘No,’ he replied, ‘but I would for an inequality.’”  
45 Rodney D. Fort (2003: 203) reports Gini coefficients for a tournament outcome in men’s and women’s 
pro golf of 0.635 (men) and 0.621 (women) but argues that in team sports, the values are lower (up to 0.5).  
 28 




2.5 Top Authors 
Because of the strong “superstar effect” illustrated in figure 1, it should be interesting to 
identify who these authors are who have published 12 or more contributions in AER 
(including Papers and Proceedings) throughout almost its entire 100-year history.
46 The 
results, presented in table 9, demonstrate that out of these 27 researchers, 8 are Nobel 
Laureates and the 3 who are not Nobel Laureates (Martin S. Feldstein, Kenneth E. Boulding, 
and Lawrence H. Summers) have all been awarded the John Bates Clark Medal. When we 
include Papers and Proceedings, Joseph E. Stiglitz has the most publications followed by 
William J. Baumol (Stiglitz: 36; Baumol: 29), a position they maintain when Papers and 
Proceedings are excluded (Stiglitz: 24; Baumol: 22).  One column also reports the total 
accumulated citations of the 27 authors’ AER papers, and again Stiglitz and Baumol lead the 
group. Stiglitz is also the top researcher with the highest average citations per article, 
followed by George J.  Stigler  (when Papers and Proceedings are included) or Milton 
Friedman (when they are not). Table 9 also reports “dry holes”; that is, publications that so 
far have received no citations (Laband and Tollison 2003). Around two-thirds of these top 
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authors have one or several AER dry holes when Papers and Proceedings are included, a 
number that increases to over 50% when they are not. Thus, not even the top researchers 
whose contributions have so enlightened our knowledge in economics can escape dry holes. 
For instance, the 2003 study by David N. Laband and Robert D. Tollison, which focuses on 
73 and 91 economics journals for the years 1974 and 1996, respectively, shows an average of 
26% dry holes. However, as Thomas Mayer (2004: 624) points out, not all dry holes are 
useless: some can terminate a particular research program or may settle or solve a puzzle in 
such a way that the papers are not cited. Thus, a dry hole may actually have an undetectable 
surface that marks a point of no return.  
In addition, Frey (forthcoming: 3) makes the point that “works are often cited because 
they are considered to be wrong and not because they are taken to be a valuable contribution 
to knowledge.”
47 Thus, citations can be a sign that subsequent authors are generalizing a 
model or applying the knowledge or technique to another problem. However, there are also 
so-called “hat-tipping” citations, made to please authors that could be potential referees, 
demonstrate that the relevant literature has been read, or even in the hope that cited authors 
will reciprocate (Mayer 2004: 624). Thus, dry holes should be seen not as a waste but rather 
as “veritable proof of healthy competition” (Hendrik P. van Dalen and Arjo Klamer 2005: 
412). Overall, as George J. Stigler, Stephen M. Stigler, and Claire Friedland (1995: 344) 
point out, the network of citations is the “product of a complex combination of factors, 
ranking from scientific influence and social contact to an element of pure chance in the 




47 For a detailed discussion of the advantages and shortcomings of citations, see Osterloh and Frey (2009).  30 
TABLE 9: TOP “SUPERSTARS” IN AER (12 AND MORE PUBLICATIONS) 
Author 
N AER 















STIGLITZ, JE  36 YES  YES  6963  193.4  0  24  6161  256.7  0 
BAUMOL, WJ  29 NO  NO  2155  74.3  1  22  1945  88.4  1 
CLARK, JM  24 NO  NO  139  5.8  7  10  112  11.2  3 
EISNER, R  20 NO  NO  271  13.6  2  13  199  15.3  2 
BUCHANAN, JM  19 YES   NO   730  38.4  2  13  635  48.8  2 
SMITH, VL  19 YES  NO  1383  72.8  0  15  1067  71.1  0 
FELDSTEIN, M  18 NO  YES  573  31.8  2  9  469  52.1  0 
BOULDING, KE  15 NO  YES  118  7.9  2  4  20  5.0  1 
MODIGLIANI, F  15 YES  NO  1140  76.0  0  12  938  78.2  0 
FISHER, I  14 NO  NO  35  2.5  6  8  31  3.9  1 
FRIEDMAN, M  14 YES  YES  1288  92.0  3  9  1217  135.2  1 
HELPMAN, E  14 NO  NO  1273  90.9  0  14  1273  90.9  0 
NELSON, RR  14 NO  NO  813  58.1  2  6  281  46.8  1 
ROTH, AE  14 NO  NO  1098  78.4  0  14  1098  78.4  0 
STIGLER, GJ  14 NO  NO  1487  106.2  0  9  1151  127.9 0 
HANSEN, AH  13 NO  NO  119  9.2  6  7  114  16.3  3 
REYNOLDS, LG  13 NO  NO  83  6.4  3  6  73  12.2  0 
SAMUELSON, PA  13 YES  YES  891  68.5  1  10  837  83.7  1 
AKERLOF, GA  12 YES  NO  857  71.4  2  7  649  92.7  0 
BACH, GL  12 NO  NO  78  6.5  5  10  47  4.7  4 
BLINDER, AS  12 NO  NO  1023  85.3  0  5  665  133.0 0 
FETTER, FA  12 NO  NO  16  1.3  3  9  12  1.3  2 
HART, AG  12 NO  NO  10  0.8  7  6  6  1.0  3 
SMITHIES, A  12 NO  NO  26  2.2  3  5  12  2.4  1 
STEIN, JL  12 NO  NO  318  26.5  2  11  307  27.9  2 
SUMMERS, LH  12 NO  YES  862  71.8  0  6  511  85.2  0 
TOBIN, J  12 YES  YES  781  65.1  0  4  299  74.8  0 
Notes: *AER Papers and Proceedings are excluded, as is R. G. Blakey (mainly Revenue Acts).31 
Citation can also be driven by fashion even though fashionable topics may not be the 
most promising avenues for scientific progress (Hendrik P. van Dalen and Arjo Klamer, 
2005). In fact, fashion in its compact mass may deform our scientific “knowledge spacetime.” 
Fortunately, however, through publication elsewhere in the journal universe or as human 
knowledge on the World Wide Web, dry holes can still emit “radiation” and retain a finite 
chance of being cited in the future. Nonetheless, this chance might be inversely proportional 
to the mass of dry holes, making this radiation difficult to see. Yet dry holes also provide an 
opportunity to create new fashion. The challenge is to find the right dry hole, which is itself a 
difficult task because of their almost invisible interior. Admittedly, relatively new earthbound 
search technologies like EconLit, Journal Citation Reports, or the Internet can help 
researchers track down dry holes. In fact, if one assumes that economics is the “Queen of the 
Social Sciences,”
48 one might even find a supermassive dry hole at the center of our 
discipline.  
 
3.  Cooperation, Coauthorship, and Alphabetical Name Ordering  
Having found such a superstar market and seeing that so many authors are able to 
publish only once in AER, one might wonder just how much cooperation there is in 
academia? According to Bruno S. Frey (forthcoming: 3), “modern scientific activity is based 
on a marked division of labor. The scientific production process has increasingly been 
divided into neatly separated steps. For instance, in economics, it has become customary that 
                                                            
48 In a paper published in De Economist, the Quarterly Review of the Royal Netherlands Economic 
Association, Bruno S. Frey (2006a: 295) points out in his introduction that economics “is often taken to be the 
‘Queen of the Social Sciences’. There is a higher degree of consensus about its approach and content that in 
many other social sciences (such as, for instance, in sociology or psychology). Many economists jump to the 
conclusion that they do have considerable influence on society. They believe that economics makes a major and 
beneficial contribution to the solution of economic and social problems. They routinely refer to the many 
economists called as policy advisors, and the prominent positions some economists have attained in politics. But 
such activities refer to the influence economics may have on the input side. Whether economics as a discipline 
does indeed have an effect on the economy refers to the outcome or output side. Economists’ input may or may 
not have an impact; and it may raise or lower social welfare. The widespread belief among economists of the 
large effect of economics on society is (at least so far) not based on any convincing empirical evidence.”  32 
a young scholar, usually a graduate student, collects the data, a second scholar undertakes the 
econometric analysis, and a third scholar interprets the results and writes the paper. As a 
consequence, single authorship has become an exception, and an increasing number of papers 
have three or even four authors.” Besides specialization, other factors may also explain such 
tendencies as a “greater pressure to publish, and even a decrease in the willingness of 
economists to assist each other without receiving authorship credit” (Aidan Hollis 2001: 
504).  
Figure 2 uses pie charts to show the development of cooperation over time in authoring 
AER papers. In line with Frey’s observations, we find that single-authored contributions have 
significantly decreased over time. Between 1911 and 1920, 99% of the papers were single-
authored, a number that had decreased to only 28% by the 2001 to 2010 period. Hence, 
whereas in the 1980s, over 50% of the papers were single authored, the picture has changed 
drastically over the past 10 years. Currently, close to 50% of contributions are the result of 
cooperation between two authors, and the number of contributions listing two or three (or 
even more) authors has increased.  During the 1960s, in contrast, less than 1% of the papers 
were authored by three or more authors, but by the 2001 to 2010 period, this figure had 
increased to 22%. Frey (forthcoming: 3) criticizes this situation on the grounds that, although 
each author “formally acknowledges full responsibility for the content of the paper. However, 
realistically none of the individual authors can confidently judge whether the other authors 
have done their work carefully and sincerely. (…) Each participant in a particular scientific 
endeavour has to trust that the others do their work carefully. It is generally assumed that 
reliance on trust is well taken, but there is certainly no guarantee, especially when all the 
authors are under strong publication pressure.” He also points out that “[t]he division of labor 
has led to a more efficient and rapid output of scientific results but favors partial views and 
discourages comprehensive considerations” (2). Such a situation is substantially different 33 
from that described by Harold Demsetz in his collaboration with Armen Alchian (i.e., a truly 
joint product about which, to this day, the authors cannot say who wrote which part).   
Are our results similar to those obtained by other studies? Hollis’s (2001) analysis of 
data on 5, 277 journal publications by 339 academic economists (a total of 6,656 author-
years) does point to some similarity. His study, which is based on individuals who graduated 
from U.S. and Canadian economics departments from 1965 to 1981 and covers publications 
until 1997, identifies 42.52% single-author contributions, 44.51% two–author papers, and a 
remaining 12.97% that were collaborations between three authors or more.  These results fall 




FIGURE 2: COOPERATION IN AER OVER TIME 
 
    Notes: AER Papers and Proceedings not included. 
 
                                                            
49 Our focus on AER publications precludes the exploration of life cycle relationships; however, Aidan 
Hollis (2001) finds that the average level of coauthorship (arithmetic mean of the number of authors for all 


















1 author 2 authors 3 or more authors34 
In an environment in which cooperation is increasing, it might be asked whether the 
process of deciding the order of authors could raise issues. In a study of 1,278 multiauthored 
articles from 11 mainstream economics journals between 1997 and 1999, C. Mirjam van 
Praag and Bernard M. S. van Praag (2008) find not only that 88% of multiauthored papers 
have alphabetical name ordering but that such ordering matters. For example, being an A-
author who is often listed first is beneficial for a researcher’s reputation and academic 
performance. Thus, even in an environment in which alphabetical ordering is so widespread, 
problems can still arise because this practice apparently disadvantages authors at the end of 
the alphabet. On the other hand, a nonalphabetical order may signal “uneven contributions, 
differences in hierarchical positions or the relative academic reputations of co-authors” (782–
783). Thus, although van Praag and van Praag (2008: 783) define nonalphabetical ordering as 
“merit-based,” they emphasize that the outcome of  such merit-based ordering may also be 
alphabetical. Besides focusing on productivity, they also “estimate the determinants of 
deviating from the alphabetical name ordering strategy” and describe such a goal as “novel.” 
They further point out that individual “contributions to co-authorship are unobserved. 
Truthful statements on this delicate matter are difficult to collect. Therefore we assume that 
the unequal distribution of contributions is a function of relevant observable aspects of 
inequality between authors of a specific article” (789). They therefore suggest possible 
observable dimensions, such as inequality in scientific weight (number of publications in 
refereed journals), scientific age (year 2002 minus the year of first publication in a journal 
included in the SSCI), or affiliation. Their results indicate that the average scientific age and 
weight affect negative deviation from an alphabetical name order: more experienced groups 
of authors with more publications are less inclined to deviate from the alphabetical name 
order convention (791). Moreover, XY(Z)-authors use a nonalphabetical name order more 
often than ABC-authors. Interestingly, however, a journal’s impact factor has no effect on the 35 
use of alphabetical ordering. On the other hand, they also show that longer articles, which 
have a more powerful effect on an author’s career, increase the probability of alphabetical 
ordering; for example, an article 10 pages longer than the average has a 3% higher probability 
of alphabetical name ordering (791-792). The number of authors, on the other hand, has a 
negative effect on the probability of alphabetical name ordering (791).  
For this current analysis, we work with a database of AER articles published in 1984–
1988 and 2004–2008 that excludes AER Papers and Proceedings but includes short papers 
like notes, comments, or replies (for a total of 614 AER articles published by two or more 
authors). We collect the background information on the authors via the Web, based mostly on 
available CVs. In line with van Praag and van Praag (2008), our results indicate a significant 
level of alphabetical name ordering (90.6%). To estimate the determinants of such ordering, 
we use a probit model in which the dependent variable is 1 if alphabetical name ordering 
occurs and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are group characteristics such as the share 
of female authors or the average academic age (year of publication – year Ph.D. obtained).
50 
We also explore the institutional ranking difference (calculated as the difference between the 
best ranked author and the lowest ranked author within the group)
51 and control for article 
length and the level of techniques used (number of equations, tables, and figures
52).  
Table 10 presents the results, whose robustness we check by adding certain factors 
sequentially into the first specification. These findings indicate a negative relationship 
between academic age difference and the probability of  alphabetical name ordering. On the 
other hand, rank difference and rank average are not statistically significant in most 
specifications. To assess the relationship between the number of coauthors and the 
                                                            
50 The value is always positive as we calculate the difference between, academically speaking, the oldest 
and the youngest author of an article.  
51 We used the previously discussed institutional rankings from Rabah Amir and Malgorzata Knauff (2008) 
that provide information on the best 58 institutions worldwide. Since our analysis includes universities that do 
not appear in their top 58 list, we allocate these institutions the position of 59.  
52 We consider an equation to be a mathematical formula if it is either numbered in the article or is clearly 
separated from the text (placed by itself on a line).  36 
probability of alphabetical name ordering, we use dummy variables rather than the number of 
authors used by Praag and van Praag (2008). We find a strong relationship between the 
number of coauthors and the probability of alphabetical name ordering: the values are around 
8% lower for groups of three (two coauthors) than for groups of two (one coauthor). This 
effect is substantially stronger for groups of four or more: a 30% lower probability of 
alphabetical name ordering. What, then, happens in the cases of nonalphabetical name 
ordering? Apparently, it is merit that matters because in our data set higher ranked authors or 
authors with more experience do not dominate author order.   
These two findings seem to indicate that authors have a problem with visibility. Indeed, 
as van Praag and van Praag (2008: 782) point out, “citations within articles, which clearly 
contribute to the reputation and visibility of the author cited, are shortened to ‘[first author] et 
al.’ as soon as there are more than two authors. Visibility is also constrained for other than 
first authors in frequently used search engines such as EconLit, which merely names the first 












TABLE 10: DETERMINANTS OF ALPHABETICAL NAME ORDERING IN AER  
(1984–1988 AND 2004–2008) 
  Dependent Variable: Name Ordering 
(alphabetical = 1; nonalphabetical = 0) 
Independent Variables  [1] [2]  [3]  [4] 













































































































N  614 614  614  584 
Prob.>chi
2 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R
2 0.077  0.127  0.132  0.192 
JEL Code Variables   No  No  No  Yes 
Notes: The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  Short papers (e.g., notes, comments, replies) are included. Coefficients in bold, z-statistics 
in parentheses, marginal effects (of an “average individual”) in italics (calculated at the point of the 
sample means in the case of a continuous variable). Since we include many universities that do not 
appear in the top 58 of the ranking developed by Amir and Knauff (2008), we allocate these universities 





4.  Demographic Characteristics of AER Authors 
Having briefly explored the superstars in the AER publication process and the level of 
cooperation at the group level, we now analyze the demographic characteristics of AER 
authors with a focus on two obvious elements: experience (i.e., academic age as previously 
defined) and gender.   
 
4.1 Academic Age 
Arthur M. Diamond, Jr. (1986: 521), referring to Yoram Weiss and Lee L. Lillard 
(1982), points out that research articles can be interpreted as an investment in human capital, 
specifically as “investment in knowledge at the frontiers of the discipline.  Such human 
capital, especially at major research graduate universities, increases a scientist’s productivity 
in the activities directly demanded by the university such as teaching, fund-raising, 
administration, and the gate-keeping activity of peer review. Life-cycle human capital 
investment models imply that as a scientist ages, his investment in human capital will decline 
for two reasons. One is that fewer periods remain in which additional human capital will be 
available. The other is that as a scientist ages his stock of human capital increases, thereby 
increasing the productivity of his time in nonresearch activity. (…) Related to the implication 
of life-cycle models that investment in human capital will decline with age is the implication 
that for a period of time the stock of human capital will be increasing even though the annual 
flow of investment in human capital is declining. This would occur so long as the annual 
investment remains greater than the annual loss of human capital due to depreciation.”  
Focusing on the impact of age on the quantity and quality of output for Berkeley 
mathematicians, Diamond (1986) observes that both the quantity and quality of output 
(measured as articles per year, citations per article, pages per year, and citations per page) 
decline monotonically with age. An earlier study by Stephen Cole (1979) explores the 39 
relationship between age and productivity in six fields (chemistry, geology, mathematics, 
physics, psychology, and sociology) using cross-sectional data from 1965 to 1969. Cole 
(1979) finds that age tends to have a slightly curvilinear effect on productivity, a result that is 
consistent across all six disciplines. That is, at the beginning of a career, a researcher’s 
productivity rates increase, peaking in the late thirties or forties and then dropping off. Cole 
(1979: 964) also collected longitudinal data for mathematicians, choosing this group “because 
youth is believed to be more significantly correlated with creative productivity in math than 
in other science.” Focusing on a cohort of mathematicians who received their doctorates 
between 1947 and 1950, he finds that the mean number of published papers barely changes 
between 1950 and 1974 (mean = 2.3–2.8). He also differentiates between nonproductive, 
weak, and strong publishers, observing that the proportion of the cohort who would be 
classified as active publishers remains quite constant, only varying between 17% (1950–54) 
and 14% (1970–1974). His results indicate that those who are productive at one time are the 
most likely to be productive at any other time. In addition, less than 10% of the cohort make a 
significant change in their productivity patterns during the course of their career. That is, 
highly productive mathematicians remain so as they grow older, while those who are not 
productive early in their careers rarely become more productive.  
To measure the change in productivity over the life cycle, Sharon M. Oster and Daniel S. 
Hamermesh (1998) focus on 208 economists at 17 top research institutions. Their results 
indicate that between years 9 to 10 and 14 to 15 after Ph.D. completion, these economists (as 
a group) lose 29 to 32% of their output, and between years 9 to 10 and 19 to 20, they lose 54 
to 60%. In other words, on average, the productivity loss is around 5% per year from the time 
of peak productivity. The median age of authors of full-length refereed articles in AER, the 
Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics was 36 in both the 1980s 
and the 1990s, and researchers under 36 were responsible for a large share of the publications 40 
over four decades: 51.3% (1963), 61.4% (1973), 46.3% (1983), and 46.6% (1993). According 
to Hollis (2001), there is a rapid increase in total output at two years after graduation, which 
peaks a little bit higher in the fourth year and then begins to decline steadily (fewer 
publications and lower quality).  
Taking our cue from these previous studies, we suspect that it may be informative to take 
a closer look at authors in the AER publications. We therefore collected data on the 1,818 
authors of papers published during the years 1984–1988 and 2004–2008. The results for 
output based on academic age (year of publication – year Ph.D. obtained) are plotted in 
figures 3 and 4. In line with previous studies, we find that the highest level of creativity and 
output in economics is evident in younger scholars.
53 Moreover, in terms of differences 
                                                            
53 This finding implies that young economists should not be discouraged from generating their own new 
ideas. In a discussion of age and human capital in his contribution to Lives of the Laureates, Gary S. Becker 
(2004: 258) exemplifies this principle: “I was surprised that the main hostility toward my work, at least as it was 
explicitly stated, came from economists, not non-economists. I began to realize that my original view was naïve. 
All disciplines have a strong and probably justified degree of intellectual conservatism. You do not give up 
ideas and concepts you have held for a long time without a fight. It is necessary to fight to get new ideas 
accepted.” Later he writes, “In 1959, I made the first public presentation of some of my results at a session of 
the annual meetings of the American Economic Association. I presented a short paper that compared rates of 
return to schooling and returns on physical capital in the United States. And the discussants, to my amazement, 
were absolutely outraged. Once again, I continued to be surprised by what I should have anticipated. What was 
it that so outraged my discussants? In retrospect it seems silly. They were outraged that I was treating education 
as an economic activity, believing that this assumption somehow denigrated the cultural or non-economic 
aspects of education.  It was one of the more heated sessions of the meeting. I was taken aback, but truth be told, 
I did not lose any confidence about what I was doing because their comments seemed so silly to me. I could not 
really believe that senior economists—I was 29 years old at the time—were making such dumb comments on 
my paper” (260–261). The paper to which he was referring has been published in the AER Papers and 
Proceedings under the title “Underinvestment in College Education?” (1960, vol. 50, pp. 346–354). Such 
extreme reactions may seem surprising to today’s reader. Becker summarizes his findings as follows: “Several 
aspects of college education in the United States were examined in terms of their contribution to economic and 
military  progress. The limited available evidence did not reveal any significant discrepancy between the direct 
returns to college education and business capital, and thus direct returns alone do not seem to justify increased 
college expenditures. This puts the burden on external or indirect returns since they would have to be important 
to justify increased expenditures. Unfortunately, very little is known about them; so a firm judgment about the 
extent of underinvestment in college education is not possible. Many recent discussions have emphasized the 
external contributions of scientists to economic and military progress and have called for large increases in 
scientific personnel. Such an increase could be accomplished with a small increase in total college expenditures. 
A large increase in expenditures would be warranted only if external returns were produced by a much larger 
fraction of all college graduates. A sizeable fraction of all persons with high I.Q.’s or grades do not go to college 
after graduating from high school. It appears that an increase in the fraction of able persons going to college 
would raise the average return from college. An improvement in the quality of college students may well be an 
effective way to raise the contribution of college education to progress” (354). Becker then “continued working 
on the economics of human capital and in 1962 published an article on it.  It was in fact well received” (Becker 
2004: 261).The paper, “Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,” was published in Journal of 
Political Economy (Becker 1962). Becker outlines subsequent events: “Then, in 1964, I published a book called 
Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 41 
between the 1980s and the 2000s, author age distribution seems to have shifted leftward. This 
decrease in age is statistically significant (z = -5.38). In figure 5, we then explore the 
publication performance of the AER superstars listed in table 9. Interestingly, these 
superstars’ AER publication performance peaks substantially later (20 years post doctorate), 
indicating that publishing productivity for such top researchers peaks at a fairly late age.
54 It 
may be that their high research productivity helps reduce the allocation of their time away 
from research or it may simply be a sign of unwillingness: as Samuelson (2004: 59) admits, 
“I am notorious for shirking tasks I hate to do. I minimize administrative duties, displaying an 





Reference to Education. The long subtitle is now forgotten—it is now called Human Capital. Actually, I debated 
a long time before I used the title Human Capital because I had been aware that people said that if you call it 
‘capital’ you are treating human beings as if they had no soul. Some people would make fun of it and call it 
‘human cattle,’ suggesting that one is not treating humans as individuals. I knew that, and could have weaseled a 
little and called it ‘human resources,’ a phrase that was becoming common at the time. I decided to take the bull 
by the horns and title the book Human Capital, although it had this long subtitle to protect myself a little. By the 
time I finished this research, I was indeed convinced that human capital was a crucial concept to understand 
economic and social issues in many areas of life. Still, and this I will also confess, I was not prepared for the 
magnitude of its impact. Eventually, it would be referred to endlessly, and by that language—human capital—
not only in academic writing but by politicians of both parties, journalists, even in ecclesiastical encyclicals. 
After a while some of the people who had resisted using this term began to think ‘Well, look, if we call 
everything human capital and say we are investing in people, this can provide a good rationale for obtaining 
public monies’” (261). Today, a large set of journals include the notion of human resources in their title (e.g., 
the Journal of Human Resources, Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Human Resource 
Costing and Accounting, and International Journal of Human Resources Development and Management). There 
are also journals with human capital in their title, including, for example, the Journal of Human Capital, a 
quarterly journal founded in 2007 and published by the University of Chicago. Using “human capital” as a 
Goggle search term produces about 11,300,000 results (January 21, 2010).  Paul A. Samuelson (2004: 61 also 
points out that there “was never a time when I didn’t strive to please myself. There have been those who thought 
that my fooling around with thermodynamics was an attempt to inflate the scientific validity of economics; even 
perhaps to snow the hoi polloi of economists who naturally can’t judge intricacies of physics. Actually, such 
methodological excursions, if anything, put a tax on reputation rather than enhancing it. So what? Taxes are the 
price we pay for civilization. Such work is fun. And I perceive it adds to the depth and breadth of human 
knowledge.” 
54 At the end of his contribution in his section Indian Summer, Samuelson (2004: 63) writes, “As I veer 
toward the traditional three score and ten, how do I feel about it? Goethe, who like Wagner and Verdi had a 
great long run, wrote that the difference between age and youth was that in youth, when you called on it, it was 
always there in response. By contrast, only on the best good days could the octogenarian attain the peak 
performance. To myself, I am sixty-nine going on twenty-five. All the days seem as good as ever. But, as the 
lyricist says and reason insists, the stock of what’s left of the good times must shrink as you reach September.” 
 42 
FIGURE 3: PUBLISHING IN AER AND ACADEMIC AGE 1984–1988 (N = 865) 
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FIGURE 5: SUPERSTARS AND ACADEMIC AGE (N = 261) 
 
Notes: Includes all researchers listed in table 9 except Boulding, who is not 
reported to have a Ph.D.; Papers and Proceedings excluded.  
 
In figures 6 and 7, we focus on citations rather than publications. Specifically, figure 6 
reports the citations of AER papers from the superstar list reported in table 9, while figure 7 
focuses on AER articles published between 1984 and 1988 (excluding Papers and 
Proceedings).  We measure the number of citations using the 2009 Journal Citation Reports 
(see earlier discussion), but to give the articles enough time to attract citations, we exclude 
data from 2004 to 2008. Because single papers drive the results, we observe many spikes in 
both figures, a finding that is not surprising given the high level of citation inequality 
reported in figure 1.  Authors can even generate upward spikes 35 years after earning their 
doctorates. For superstars, many high spikes occur at an academic age somewhere between 
year 9 and year 23, whereas the peaks start emerging earlier among all the AER authors that 
published between 1984 and 1988. For these latter, the yearly mean of citations barely 
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FIGURE 6: CITATIONS FOR AER SUPERSTARS 
 
Notes: Number of observations = 411, AER Paper and Proceedings included.  
 
FIGURE 7: CITATIONS FOR AER AUTHORS 
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4.2 Females Publishing in AER 
As discussed in the introduction, the first article in the first issue of AER was authored by 
a woman. This admirable beginning, however, was not indicative of things to come (see 
figure 8). Between 1911 and 1920, female researchers were responsible for only 2.4% of the 
articles written and, although the proportion of articles authored by women increased to 10% 
between 1931 and 1940, this momentum was not sustained during the 1950s when only 2.3% 
of AER authors were women. Even in the 1980s, this share only increased to 3.85%. We do, 
however, observe a significant improvement in female authorship during the 2001 to 2010 
period, in which 12.24% of the authors were women.  
 
FIGURE 8: NUMBER AND SHARE OF WOMEN CONTRIBUTING TO AER 
 
Notes: Includes only main articles exclusive of those that appeared in Papers 
and Proceedings. We were unable to classify the gender in six cases: one case 
each in vol. 22 (1932), vol. 24 (1934), vol. 41 (1951), vol. 75 (1985), vol. 89 
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TABLE 11: PUBLICATIONS BY WOMEN IN AER BETWEEN 1936 AND 1950 
Year 
# of Females 
Main Articles  % 
# of Females 
Communications % 
# of Females 
Book Reviews  % 
1936  6 17.14 0 0  4  4.21 
1937  4 11.76 0 0  5  4.35 
1938  5 13.51 0 0  1  0.89 
1939 3  8.11  2  10  8  7.34 
1940 2  5.00  0  0  6  6.38 
1941 2  5.71  3 6.67  5  4.20 
1942 0  0  0  0  9  7.03 
1943 2  7.41  0  0  7  5.74 
1944 6  24.00 5  22.73 10 8.70 
1945 3  11.11  3 8.33  6  5.26 
1946 1  3.57  1 3.85  7  8.24 
1947 0  0  0  0  4  3.13 
1948 0  0  0  0  2  1.71 
1949 1  3.45  1 3.13  4  2.76 
1950 2  5.56  0  0  8  6.45 
Notes: We were unable to identify the gender of a few authors: two in 1938 (book reviews), one two-time 
contributor in 1941 (book reviews), one in 1944 (communication and book reviews), one in 1948 (book 
reviews), and one in 1949 (communication).  
 
The noticeably large proportion of female authorship during 1931 and 1940 raises the 
question of what happened before, during, and after World War II.  To answer this question, 
we first address the general situation faced by economists during the war. W. Allen Wallis 
(1980: 320), recalling the atmosphere at Stanford soon after the United States’s 1942 
declaration of war against Japan, Germany, and Italy, throws some light on this issue: “That 
spring was satirized by a squib in the student paper saying, ‘It is rumoured that in the outside 
world there is a war and a shortage of Coca-Cola.’” At that time, AER was under the editorial 
guidance of Paul T. Homan, who, A. W.  Coats (1971: 33) reports, “unlike many editors of 
scholarly periodicals  …  deliberately exercised his editorial initiative by soliciting 
contributions from the many economists then employed in wartime Washington.”
55 Yet, as 
                                                            
55 It may be worthwhile to briefly discuss what actions some of today’s economics Nobel Laureates were 
taking during war. James Tobin was recommended by Edward S. Mason for a job in Washington with the 
civilian supply division of the nascent Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply: “So I left Harvard in 
May 1941, having completed all the requirements for the Ph.D. except the dissertation. I would not return until 
February 1946. After nine months of helping to ration scarce material, I went to the Navy and served as a line 
officer on a destroyer until Christmas 1945” (James Tobin 2004: 101–102). Ronald H. Coase remembers that in 
1941, “I moved to the Central Statistical Office, one of the Offices of the War Cabinet. I ended up responsible 
for munitions statistics, those relating to guns, tanks, and ammunition. I did not return to LSE until 1946. My six 
years in government service played little part in my evolution as an economist, except perhaps to confirm my 
prejudices” (Ronald H. Coase 2004: 198). Milton Friedman (2004: 72–73) points out that his experience during 47 
table 11 shows, there is no clear observable trend of female engagement during World War II 
despite some volatility on a yearly basis. However, 1944 clearly marks the period with the 
largest share of female participation in all sections of AER (main articles, communications, 
and book reviews): 24% of all primary articles were published by female researchers,
56 who 
essentially became the “servicewomen of the AER.”
 57 Recalling that female contributions 
during the period between 2001 and 2010 made up only 12% of the total, it is interesting to 
note that female participation was very low after the war for the years we report.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
World War II had a major influence on his scientific work. He spent the years 1941–43 at the U.S. Treasury as 
an economist in the division dealing with taxes. The second two years of the war (1943–1945) he spent as a 
mathematical statistician at the Statistical Research Group (SRG) of the Division of War Research of Columbia 
University: “It had been set up to provide statistical assistance to the military  services and to other groups 
engaged in war research. It was a subsidiary of the wartime-created Office of Scientific Research and 
Development. Harold Hotelling was its intellectual sponsor and Allen Wallis its executive director. That 
experience exposed me to physical scientists from a wide range of fields with whom I would otherwise never 
have had much contact. It also required me to apply statistical techniques to non-economic data. Surprisingly, 
perhaps, it turned out that social scientists were often more useful than physical scientists in doing operational 
research that involved interpreting the results of battlefield experience. The reason is simple: social scientists are 
used to working with bad data and the wartime data were all very bad.” George J. Stigler (2004: 84) stresses that 
by “1942 the outbreak of war led to a general retrenchment of academic life, and I took a sustained leave of 
absence from Minnesota, first to the National Bureau of Economic Research. (…). From the bureau I went to the 
Statistical Research Group at Columbia University, where statistical analysis was being used on military 
problems. The director was Allen Wallis, and the senior figures included Harold Hotelling, Milton Friedman, 
Jacob Wolfowitz, and, among other statisticians, L. J. Savage and Abraham Wald. I learned a little statistics 
there, and I did not seriously delay our nation’s victory.” Other interesting and well-known names also appear 
among the members of the Statistical Research Group (SRG): Edward Paulson, Julian Bigelow, Abraham Wald, 
Albert Bowker, Harold Freeman, Rollin Bennett, Jimmie Savage, Kenneth Arnold, Milliard Hastay, Abraham 
Girshick, Frederick Mosteller, Churchill Eisenhart, and Herbert Solomon. As W. Allen Wallis (1980: 322–323) 
points out, these economists played an important part: “Fighter planes entered combat with their machine guns 
loaded according to Jack Wolfowitz’s recommendations about mixing types of ammunition, and maybe the 
pilots came back or maybe they didn’t. Navy planes launched rockets whose propellants had been accepted by 
Abe Girshick’s sampling-inspection plans, and maybe the rockets exploded and destroyed our own planes and 
pilots or maybe they destroyed the target. During the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, several high-
ranking Army officers flew to Washington from the battle, spent a day discussing the best settings on proximity 
fuzes for air bursts of artillery shells against ground troops, and flew back to the battle to put into effect advice 
from, among others, Milton Friedman, whose earlier studies of the fuzes had given him extensive and accurate 
knowledge of the way the fuzes actually performed. We were never wholly responsible for what happened. In 
fact, we seldom knew whether we were slightly responsible or even knew exactly what happened and to whom. 
But this kind of responsibility, although rarely spoken of, was always in the atmosphere and exerted a powerful, 
pervasive, and unremitting pressure.”  
56 Simone De Beauvoir, as quoted in David A. Cotter, Joan M. Hermsen, and Reeve Vanneman (2001: 
429), made the following remark: “It is through gainful employment that woman has traversed most of the 
distance that separated her from the male; and nothing else can guarantee her liberty in practice. Once she ceases 
to be a parasite the system based on her dependence crumbles; between her and the universe there is no longer 
any need for a masculine mediator.”  
57 It has been documented and reiterated that the war led to a dramatic increase in the number of women 
working in the United States, reversing a downward trend attributed to the depression (Marc Miller 1980: 42). 
More specifically, the number of women working in the U.S. increased from 10.8 million in March 1941 to 
more than 18 million in August 1944. Although many of these women were entering the labor force for the first 
time, in 1944–1945, 29% of women already had over 10 years of work experience. 48 
To gain a broader understanding of the position of female researchers in subsequent time 
periods, it may make sense to take a closer look at the advancement of women in the 
economics profession. We therefore examine various Reports of the Committee on the Status 
of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP) published annually in AER Papers and 
Proceedings since the 1970s, after the AEA decided to promote the progress of women in the 
profession and passed a resolution to end discrimination against them. The stated purpose of 
the CSWEP, introduced at the AEA’s annual meeting in New Orleans on December 1971, is 
to monitor the status and promote the advancement of women in the economics profession. 
As Robin L. Bartlett (1998: 177) points out, “in the late 1960s and early ’70s, women were 
discouraged from studying economics with questions about what they were going to do with 
a major in economics after they got married. At that time, college-educated women were 
steered toward teaching certificates or nursing degrees. Some of the country’s most 
prestigious economics departments had higher admission standards for women than they did 
for men, and admission to a graduate program did not guarantee financial aid. Fellowships or 
assistantships were disproportionately given to men, since directors of financial aid argued 
that men were more likely to need the experience to get a good job.”  
Results from the AEA’s Universal Academic Questionnaire indicate that the proportion 
of female assistant professors and associate professors tripled between 1974 and 1989, 
increasing from 8 to 20% and from 3 to 9%, respectively. The proportion of female full 
professors, in contrast, grew only from around 2% in the late 1970s to around 3% in the late 
1980s (see the Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession 
published in 1991
58). These results also indicate that during the 1980s, female assistant 
professors were more often employed by lower-quality schools, although there was little 
difference between male and female associate and full professors. In fact, the proportion of 
                                                            
58 AER Papers and Proceedings, vol. 81, no. 2 (1991): 409–412.  49 
newly hired assistant professors resembled the proportion of new female Ph.D. recipients. 
These data do however point to a growing pool of women eligible for promotion to associate 
and full professor in the future. These changes over the last two decades are outlined in 
Figure 9, which shows an obvious growth trend. Since 1972, when only 8.8% of assistant 
professors and 3.7% of associate professors were female, the representation of women in the 
economics profession has increased dramatically, with 21.8% of tenured associate professors 
being female and the proportion of female full professors rising from 3% in the late 1980s to 
9.7% in 2009. Such promising development may help to explain the increase shown in figure 
8 of females publishing in AER over the last 10 years.  
 
FIGURE 9: SHARE OF FEMALE ACADEMICS IN THE LAST TWO DECADES 
 
 
In an AER paper from 30 years ago, John M. McDowell (1982) discusses the rate of 
obsolescence or depreciation of knowledge as reflected in the age profile of cited works. To 
estimate what he terms the “literature decay rate” (over years 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967, and 
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and English with those in economics and generates data on the proportion of total citations in 
each that reference publications within the preceding five-year period. He finds the largest 
decay rate in the relative frequency of citation to older communications in physics and 
chemistry (an annual average of 18.30), followed by sociology and psychology (10.82), 
biology (8.68), history (3.85), and English (2.67). For economics journals (including AER, 
the Journal of Political Economy, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics), he finds an 
annual average literature decay rate of 13.18 from 1950 through 1974, which suggests that 
knowledge in economics is relatively less durable than that in other social science fields. 
Such evidence implies that economics professors who experience a career interruption 
because of childbearing face high opportunity costs directly related to the rate of skill 
obsolescence. He also claims that women have responded to the incentives implicit in the 
differing levels of durable job-related knowledge. More specifically, he relates the proportion 
of women in specific academic areas to the durability of research knowledge in that area: “A 
women is twice as likely as a man to specialize in humanities, but only one-third as likely to 
specialize in physical science. Evidence also suggests that, as fertility rates have declined, 
women have become more willing to enter nontraditional careers” (761–762). In terms of 
publication profiles, he shows that married female humanities professors appear to distribute 
their research publication over a career in patterns similar to those of married men, but that 
female publication output in nonhumanities fields demonstrates a relative decline during the 
childbearing years. 
Bartlett (1998: 180) also reports that although “the AEA and CSWEP have been 
successful in eliminating most forms of overt discrimination against women, more needs to 
be done. A variety of smaller battles have been won. Women have been appointed to 
prestigious editorial boards and their presence at the national meetings is noticeable. In 1997, 
three of the six members of the executive committee are women. Seven of the 39 members of 51 
the editorial board of the AER are women, and three of the 18 members of the editorial board 
of the JEL are women. When the Journal of Economic Perspectives was initiated in 1987, 
only one of its 13 editorial board members was a woman. By 1997, however, women held 3 
of the 15 editorial slots on that board.” We wondered, therefore, what the situation is 13 years 
later. In December 2010, AER’s editorial board included 11 women among its 49 members 
when all movements throughout the year are taken into account (see appendix table A2), and 
in January 2011, 10 out of the 20 editorial board members were female. Since the 1980s, 
however, only 4 AER coeditors have been women,
59 even though, as previously mentioned, 
AER now has its first female editor-in-chief (in place since 2011). Female representation in 
editorial positions for all AEA journals (including the four recently founded) is summarized in 
table 12, which shows that participation is relatively high in the Journal of Economic 
Literature (JEL). Females, however, are also less likely to be affiliated with the 10 best 
universities (see table 1).  
  
TABLE 12: AEA JOURNALS AND THEIR SHARE OF FEMALE EDITORS AND COEDITORS 





59 See http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/AER_Editors_Coeditors.pdf.  
Journal Females  Females: Top 10 
Universities  Males  Males: Top 10 
Universities 
JEL  10 (43.48%)  4 (36.36%)  13 (56.52%)  7 (63.64%) 
JEP  3 (13.04%)  3 (27.27%)  20 (86.96%)  8 (72.73%) 
Economic Policy  3 (13.04%)  1 (9.09%)  20 (86.96%)  10 (90.91%) 
Applied Economics  3 (13.04%)  2 (18.18%)  20 (86.96%)  9 (81.82%) 
Microeconomics  2 (8.7%)  1 (9.09%)  21(91.3%)  10 (90.91%) 
Macroeconomics  2 (8.7%)  0 (0%)  21(91.3%)  11 (100%) 
Total: All Journals  23 (16.31%)  11 (15.49%)  118 (83.69%)  60 (84.51%) 52 
5. AER Editors, Coeditors, Board Members and Referees 
Given that the spotlight so far has been on the glory of the authors who managed to 
publish in AER, it might now be interesting to also go backstage. We therefore now clear the 
stage and raise the curtain on the editors, coeditors, and referees to reveal (among other 
things) their individual profiles. In examining the growing literature on “publishing 
economics,”
60 we note that the evaluation of editor, coeditor, editorial board member, and 
referee characteristics is relatively less developed. This lack of accessible information was 
emphasized several years ago by Daniel S. Hamermesh (1994: 153), who, commenting on 
referees, pointed out that we know “very little about who they are.” Because the names of 
AER editors, coeditors, editorial board members, and referees are now transparently 
available, however, we were able to collect a wide variety of individual characteristics from 
the CVs available on the Web. Most particularly, we borrowed a technique from the motion 
picture industry, considered the major information industry of the twentieth century (see 
Arthur De Vany’s (2004) Hollywood Economics); namely, using awards as a symbol of 
recognition.
61 Accordingly, assuming academia to be a true source of information and 
knowledge, we round out this section by devoting some time to the empirical data on awards.  
 
5.1 Editors 
AER editors have not only shaped academic knowledge through their editorial work but 
have also influenced both their academic surroundings and the policy landscape beyond. For 
                                                            
60 For example, for a great selection of 15 papers, see Publishing Economics, edited by Joshua Gans (2000).  
61 Samuelson (2004: 60) expounds on this theme in his section Chasing the Bitch Goddess of Success: “Let 
me close with a few remarks on the motivation and rewards of scientists. Scientists are as avaricious and 
competitive as Smithian businessmen. The coin they seek is not apples, nuts, and yachts; nor is it the coin itself, 
or power as that term is ordinarily used. Scholars seek fame. The fame they see, as I noted in my 1961 American 
Economic Association presidential address, is fame with their peers—the other scientists whom they respect and 
whose respect they strive for. The sociologists Robert K. Merton has documented what I call this dirty little 
secret in his book The Sociology of Science. I am no exception. Abraham Lincoln’s law partner and biographer 
William Herndon observed that there was always a little clock of ambition ticking in the bosom of honest and 
whimsical Abe. No celebrity as a Newsweek columnist, no millions of clever-begotten speculative gains, no 
power as the Svengali or Rasputin to the prince and president could count as a pennyweight in my balance of 
worth against the prospect of recognition for having contributed to the empire of science.”  53 
example, Davis R. Dewey shaped MIT’s graduate course structure and played a crucial role 
in expanding its economics department,
62 while Bernard F. Haley had a significant impact on 
Stanford’s economics department.
63  Likewise, Ben S. Bernanke, editor of AER between 
2001 and 2004, is currently chair of the United States Federal Reserve after previously 
serving as its governor and as chair of President George W. Bush’s Council of Economic 
Advisers.
64  
The first AER editor, Davis R. Dewey, born in Burlington, Vermont, on April 7, 1858, 
had the longest editorial reign in AER’s history, occupying the post for 30 years from 1911 to 
1940. It may therefore be interesting to have Dewey return to the stage, by revisiting his 
speech at the testimonial dinner that marked the ceremonial transfer of his editorial blue 
pencil to Paul T. Homan (“Remarks” 1941):
65  
May I now give a few words of advice to our new managing editor?
66  
1)  Be sure to have one article containing involved mathematical equations with unusual fonts of 
type. Inasmuch as the printer has to spend a good deal of time in ransacking the type 
foundries of the country, this affords you a good excuse for a delay in publication. 
2)  Be sure that a majority of the leading articles contain at least six references to Keynes. Adam 
Smith, John Stuart Mill, Marshall, Francis A. Walker and their contemporaries are now 
                                                            
62 See http://econ-www.mit.edu/about/.  
63 Tibor Scitovsky, who was recruited to Stanford by Haley after World War II, stated that: "Stanford's 
economics department wasn't very good before the war, and he was tremendously successful at building it" (see 
“Economics Department architect Bernard Haley dies at 94,” Stanford News Release, June 8, 1993: available at 
http://news.stanford.edu/pr/93/930608Arc3228.html).  
64 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Bernanke.  
65 He began his speech with, “Your tribute has been so overwhelming that I find it difficult to speak. 
However, in order to restore my tranquility I shall tell a story. A Vermont famer was leading a calf along a road 
until they came to a bridge. There the calf balked. An automobile came along, but the calf blocked the way. 
Finally the farmer said to the chauffeur, ‘If you will toot the horn maybe the calf will move.’ The chauffeur 
blew the horn and the calf jumped clear off the bridge into the water and was drowned. The farmer said, ‘What 
did you do that for?’ The chauffeur replied, ‘You told me to blow.’ ‘Yes,’ said the farmer, ‘but wasn’t that a hell 
of a big toot for a little bit of a calf?’”  
66 Coats (1969: 62) points out that “Paul Homan professed to be ‘bursting with ideas’ when he took up the 
reins of office of Managing Editor at the age of forty-seven and there is no doubt that he transformed the A.E.R. 
during his eleven-year tenure. From the outset he introduced a personal note which had hitherto been lacking, 
addressing himself directly to his readers in occasional editorial notes and in the annual reports, inviting advice 
and criticism, and disclosing his plans for improving the content and the format of the journal. Circumstances 
were difficult owing to the outbreak of the war, which inevitably disrupted academic life, and to the fact that he 
moved several times between Ithaca, Washington, and London before settling in Los Angeles in 1950s.” He also 
points out that the change to Paul Homan was welcome: “Dissatisfaction with the character and contents of the 
A.E.R.  had been growing for some time, and as Dewey  was eighty-two when he retired, it is hardly surprising 
that his efficiency had declined and that he was out of touch with the ideas and needs of the younger generation 
of economists.” 54 
passé. And it is your duty to see that the articles you select do not burden the readers with 
reasoning which has been outmoded. 
3)  Publish at least one review in each issue which will arouse the animosity of the author. There 
is nothing more stimulating than controversy. Is not controversy the essence of that much 
debated theme, democracy? (…) 
4)  Be sure to have occasionally an article contain fifty-cent and one-dollar words. Though 




What, then, are the requirements of becoming an AER editor? Coats (1969: 65) recalls 
the process involved in selecting Paul T. Homan as the second editor of AER. AEA’s 
president at that time, Frank H. Knight,
68 describes the process as “worse than making a 
                                                            
67 American Economic Review, vol. 30, no. 5 (February 1941): vii–xi. 
68 For those few readers who do not remember Frank H. Knight, below are some telling statements about 
him made by several Nobel Laureates. Samuelson (2004: 50) refers to “Frank Knight and Jacob Viner, my great 
neoclassical teachers in Chicago,” while Friedman (2004: 70) recalls that “[o]ther faculty members at Chicago 
included Frank Knight, Henry Simons, Lloyd Mints, Paul Douglas, and Henry Schultz. Economists will 
recognize their names; the rest of you will not.” James M. Buchanan (2004: 140) also reminisces about Knight: 
“During the first quarter I took courses with Frank Knight, T.W. Schultz, and Simeon Leland. I was among the 
very first group of graduate students to return to the academy after discharge from military service during World 
War II. We swelled the ranks of the graduate classes at Chicago and elsewhere. Within a few short weeks, 
perhaps by mid-February 1946, I had undergone a conversion in my understanding of how an economy 
operates. (…) For the first time I was indeed an economist. I attribute this conversion directly to Frank Knight’s 
teaching, which perhaps raises more new questions than it answers.” Later, Buchanan writes, “In the classroom 
he came across as a man engaged always in a search for ideas. He puzzled over principles, from the 
commonsensical to the esoteric, and he stood continuously dismayed at the arrogance of those who spouted 
forth the learned wisdom. Knight gave those of us who bothered to listen the abiding notion that all is up for 
intellectual grabs, that much of what paraded as truth was highly questionable, and that the hallmark of a scholar 
was courage in cutting through the intellectual haze. The willingness to deny all gods, to hold nothing sacrosanct 
—these were the qualities of mind and a character that best describe Frank Knight. And gods, as I use the term 
here, include the authorities in one’s own discipline as well as those who claim domain over other dimensions of 
truth. Those of us who were so often confused in so many things were bolstered by this Knightian stance before 
all gods. Only gradually, and much later, did we come to realize that in these qualities it was Frank Knight, not 
his peers, who attained the rank of genius. As he was the first to acknowledge, Frank Knight was not a clever or 
brilliant thinker. He was an inveterate puzzler; but his thought process probed depths that the scholars about him 
could not realize even to exist. To Knight, things were never so simple as they seemed, and he remained at base 
tolerant in the extreme because he sensed the elements of truth in all principles. (…) Knight was the advisor 
who told me not to waste my time taking formal courses in philosophy, who corrected my dissertation grammar 
in great detail, and who became the role model that has never been replaced or even slightly dislodged over a 
long academic career. In trying to assess my own development, I find it impossible to imagine what I might 
have been and become without exposure to Frank Knight” (144). Ronald H. Coase (1994: 195) was also 
influenced by Knight: “At Dundee I began to read the literature of economics—Adam Smith, Babbage, Jevons, 
Wicksteed, Knight,” as was Gary S. Becker (2004: 256): “I stayed at Chicago for six years, the first three as a 
graduate student. During the second year I was looking for a thesis topic and had already done some research on 
an economic approach to political democracy. My paper on this topic was almost published in the Journal of 
Political Economy, but one of my teachers, Frank Knight, was the referee, and he did not like it. I have kept his 
comments to this day. Knight was a great economist, but he looked at democracy with what I would characterize 
as a normative point of view. He defined democracy as government by discussion.” Finally, George J. Stigler 
(2004: 81) too recalls Knight positively: “There I met and got to know three economists I still consider to be 
outstanding: Frank Knight and Henry Simons, and a year later, on his return for the U.S. Treasury, Jacob Viner. 
Knight was both a great and an absurd teacher. The absurdity was documented by his utterly disorganized 
teaching, with constant change of subject and yet insistent repetition of arguments. In the course on the history 
of economics he was interested mostly in the seamy side of religious history, but got great relish out of 55 
major appointment to the faculty and that’s bad enough”. The requirements for a successful 
editor were laid down by one of the selectors:  “[He] should be someone who has already 
made something of a reputation; he should neither be too young nor too old (say 40 to 55); he 
should have a good background in theory (which after all is the common meeting ground of 
all the special fields of economics). He should command respect for character and judgment, 
as well as proficiency in some of the more decent parts of economics; he should have some 
enthusiasm for the job of editor; and he should have good prospects of lasting (from the age 
[sic. angle?] of age, health, and stability of character, for a decade or so). A journal stands to 
gain a good deal from continuity in its direction” (Coats 1969: 65).
69  
To assess the applicability of these requirements, we now test them ex post. However, 
because of problems with degrees of freedom (N = 9) and data availability, we do so using 
simple case studies on the three latest male AER editors, Robert A. Moffitt, Ben S. Bernanke, 
and Orley C. Ashenfelter. We choose to exclude Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg (who became 
editor in 2011)
70 to be consistent with the original’s reference to “a man” as a potential 
candidate. The data are derived mainly from these scholars’ CVs to produce the profiles 
summarized in table 13.
71 In terms of the first point that the editor “should be someone who 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
emphasizing the perversities and blunders of Ricardo and other historic figures in economics. His greatness is 
attested best by the fact that almost all the students were much influenced by him. He communicated beyond 
any possible confusion the message that intellectual inquiry was a sacred calling, excruciatingly difficult for 
even the best of scholars to pursue with complete fidelity to truth and evidence .” He adds, “ One thing that 
Knight and Simons both succeeded in teaching me, and in fact overtaught, was that great reputation and high 
office deserve little respect in scientific work. We were told to listen to the argument and look at the evidence, 
but ignore the position, degrees, and age of the speaker” (82). He also explains that “I wrote my dissertation in 
the history of economic thought under Knight. He was the soul of kindness and generosity in dealing with me, 
then and forever after but in retrospect there was a fly in the ointment. He was so strong-minded and so critical a 
student of the literature that it was a good many years before I could read the economic classes through my eyes 
instead of his. I have never brought myself to read through my doctoral dissertation, Production and Distribution 
Theories: The Formative Period, because I knew I would be embarrassed by both its Knightian excesses and its 
immaturity (83)”Lastly, he admits that “I am no longer a faithful follower, although I am still an admirer, of 
Frank Knight and Henry Simons: each person has a mind-style of his own, and eventually it asserts itself. This 
does not mean that we are immune to our environment, but it does argue for me that environmental influences 
will be subtle” (93).  
69 Bernard Haley was chosen for fulfilling these requirements.  
70 Dr. Goldberg’s background data was evaluated when she was considered for her prior position as AER 
coeditor (2007–2010, see figures 10, 11, and 12).  
71 As regards awards, AER publications, publications in QJE, JPE, and Econometrica, and total journal 
publications, we focus on the period before these individuals began work as AER editor. 56 
has already made something of a reputation,” such is clearly the case for all three editors. All 
three, for example, became Fellows of the Econometric Society several years prior to 
accepting their positions as editor, one (Ashenfelter) was already a Fellow of the American 
Academy of Arts and Science (AAAS), and another (Bernanke) became an AAAS fellow the 
same year he began as AER editor. All three published widely before their appointment 
(between 47 and 102 refereed journal articles) , including several publications in AER 
(between 4 and 9 including the Papers and Proceedings) and other top economics journals 
(between 6 and 9 in QJE, JPE, and Econometrica). According to their current positioning on 
IDEAS/RePEc,
72 all three are ranked among the top 200 researchers worldwide. 
The next requirement for an AER editor, that “he should neither be too young nor too old 
(say 40 to 55),” also seems to hold up. Ashenfelter, born in 1942, began his position as editor 
in 1985 and was therefore in his early forties; Bernanke, born in 1953, started in 2001 and 
was therefore in his late forties; and Moffitt, born in 1948, took the position in 2004, and was 
therefore in his mid-fifties. Likewise, all three appear to meet the third requirement that “[the 
editor] should have a good background in theory (which after all is the common meeting 
ground of all the special fields of economics). He should command respect for character and 
judgment, as well as proficiency in some of the more decent parts of economics.”  Prior to 
their respective  appointments, all three editors had carried out important work on a large 
variety of issues that reflected a strong background in theory. The publication proficiency of 
each editor is apparent in the successes discussed earlier, and the question of whether they 
met the standards laid down by their predecessor is well illustrated by their peers’ evaluation 
of their work. One simple way to measure this factor is to examine the content of award 
speeches or statements, a technique for which Ashenfelter provides a good case study. When 
                                                            
72 Data for the time at which they took over the editorial role were unavailable.  57 
he received the 2003 IZA Prize in Labor Economics,
73 IZA Director Klaus F. Zimmermann 
introduced him as “one of the most influential economists of our time, [one who had] played 
a crucial role in the evolution of modern empirical labor economics, especially excelling in 
the methodological advancement of evaluation research.” The award statement also points 
out that Ashenfelter’s  scholarly contributions have made him “one of the most influential 
architects of modern labor economics” and that his “intellectual work stands out due to his 
ingenuity in devising clever ways to derive and test hypotheses of economic models, his 
exceptional creativity in using and collecting data, and his originality in pioneering the 
natural experiment methodology.” It also identifies him as “the founding father of what has 
by today developed into the separate fields of quantitative social program evaluation.”  
The criteria for a successful editor also demand that “he should have some enthusiasm 
for the job of editor.” As table 13 clearly shows, all three editors had remarkable prior 
editorial accomplishments in excellent and often specialized journals, which may indicate a 
preexisting high level of enthusiasm for the editorial job. For example, Moffitt had been 
associate editor of AER, deputy editor of Demography, coeditor/associate editor of the 
Review of Economics and Statistics, associate editor of Labour Economics, associate editor of 
the Journal of Public Economics, chief editor of the Journal of Human Resources, associate 
editor of the Journal of Population Economics, and associate editor of the Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics. It is therefore hard to imagine that he did not like editorial 
work.  
There is but one remaining criterion from the statement of requirements: “…and he 
should have good prospects of lasting (from the age [sic. angle?] of age, health, and stability 
of character, for a decade or so).” Evaluation of this criterion we leave to family members, 
friends, colleagues, and loved ones. We must point out, however, that although these 
individuals are no longer editors of AER, they seem, to the outside observer, quite alive! 
                                                            
73 See IZA Compact, November/December 2003: http://ftp.iza.org/compacts/iza_compact_en_16.pdf.   58 
 
 
TABLE 13: PROFILE OF AER EDITORS BETWEEN 1985 AND 2010 BASED ON THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
 A YEAR BEFORE STARTING AS EDITOR 
NAME  ROBERT A. MOFFITT  BEN S. BERNANKE  ORLEY 
ASHENFELTER 
TERM  2004–2010 2001–2004  1985–2001 
AFFILIATION  The Johns Hopkins 
University 
Princeton University  Princeton University 
BORN  1948 1953  1942 
Ph.D. (YEAR)  Brown University (1975)  MIT (1979)  Princeton University 
(1970) 
AWARDS:       
FELLOW, ECONOMETRIC 
SOCIETY 
YES, 1997  YES, 1997  YES, 1977 
FELLOW, AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF ARTS AND 
SCIENCE 
NO  YES, 2001  YES, 1993 
AER PUBLICATIONS 
INCLUDING PROCEEDINGS  
5 9  4 
AER PUBLICATIONS  IN 
THE PAPERS AND 
PROCEEDINGS  
3 5  1 
PUBLICATIONS IN QJE, JPE 
AND ECONOMETRICA  















1994–2001, Coeditor, NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 
Cofounder of the 
American Law and 
Economics Review 
  1991–1998, Coeditor, 







  1991–1997, Associate 
editor, Labour Economics 
1990– present, Associate 




  1988–1997, Associate 
editor, Journal of Public 
Economics 
1993, Associate editor, 




  1988–1991, Chief editor, 
Journal of Human 
Resources 
1985–1992, Associate editor, 




  1987–2006, Associate 
editor, Journal of 
Population Economics 
1993, Associate editor, Review 
of Economics and Statistics 
 
 
  1987–1992, Associate 
editor, Journal of Business 
and Economic Statistics 
 
  
  1986–1991, Associate 
editor, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 
  








We now take the analysis one step further by looking more closely at AER coeditors, 
who, because of the quantity of papers submitted, play a crucial role in the journal’s success. 
Such a large share of submissions may also increase the need to guarantee that coeditors have 
a higher level of autonomy in their decision process.
74 Although the three editors discussed 
above have also been coeditors, we exclude them from this analysis, which gives us a total 
sample of 26 individuals. As appendix table A3 shows, 8 of these coeditors earned their 
doctorates at MIT,
75 5 have a Ph.D. from Stanford University, and 73% have a Ph.D. from an 
institution that ranks among the 10 best universities listed in table 1, with which 42% of the 
coeditors are still affiliated.  
 






74 See, for example, the Public Choice literature on local autonomy or federalism.  
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Number of Journal Publications60 
In terms of quantity of journal publications, however, figure 10 shows a certain 
diversity: the number of publications before being appointed coeditor ranges from only 14 to 
111
76. On average, an AER coeditor has 39 such publications (std. dev. = 21.24). To check 
not only for quantity but also for quality, in the appendix, we report the number of 
publications in AER (figure A1) and those in the other top journals QJE, JPE, and 
Econometrica (figure A2). Doing so reveals a certain level of heterogeneity: on average, each 
researcher published 4.5 AER publications before becoming coeditor (std. dev. = 3.04) and 
close to 6 publications in QJE, JPE, and Econometrica (std. dev. = 3.12). We also check their 
overall IDEAS rankings for November 2010 (post analysis) and find that, apart from the two 
coeditors who are not registered, all coeditors are in the top 5%. Nonetheless, as figure A3 
shows, their rankings differ substantially, from position 12 to position 1223 (std. dev. = 375; 
mean = 385).  
Figure 11 reports the link between the coeditors’academic age (first year as coeditor -
year Ph.D. obtained), and, in line with the previously mentioned figures, we find substantial 
heterogeneity. Academic age ranges from 7 to 32, with a mean value of 17 (std. dev. = 6.88), 
indicating that on average, AER coeditors do have substantial academic experience before 
their appointment to the position.  
Next, in figure 12, we report the level of editorial experience gained prior to becoming 
AER coeditor, with attention to a variety of past involvement in other journals (e.g., as editor, 
coeditor, guest editor, editorial board member). Again, we observe substantial differences 






76 The number of journal articles published (including AER publications); we exclude book reviews, 












FIGURE 12: COEDITORS’ EDITORIAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 
Notes: Covers all the coeditors’ former editorial experience before 
starting the position as AER coeditor (editor, associate editor at a 
journal other than AER, editorial board member, guest editor, and so 
forth), except for the three editors (and former coeditors) analyzed in 
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5.3 Connections between Editors and Coeditors and Citation Success 
The existence of an editorial favoritism, a so-called “connection award,” is the subject of 
frequent discussion. The conferral of such favoritism, however, is obviously far less 
transparent. Daniel L. Sherrell, Joseph Hair, Jr., and Mitch Griffin (as cited in David N. 
Laband and Michael J. Piette 1994: 194–195), in their survey of 15 editorial practices among 
328 marketing faculties, identify two that are regarded as the least ethical:  “(1) favoritism to 
friends and personal associates by an editor or reviewer and (2) selection of reviewers that 
have a strong bias (pro or con the manuscript’s content area and methodology) in order to 
ensure acceptance or rejection.” Laband and Piette (1994: 195) thus suspect a belief by 
academic scholars that journal editors should be  “disinterested gatekeepers” rather than 
“self-interested deal cutters.”  They suggest, however, that this “shared perception of 
scientific advancement as a steady progression, however slow, from error to truth is an 
illusion that is seemingly shattered by the practice of editorial favoritism” (195). Moreover, 
such “editorial favoritism implies a wealth redistribution in favor of certain members of the 
scientific community at the expense of other members,” one to which these members “are 
liable to object vociferously” (195).  In fact, Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Harry Rothman 
(1999: F172), in a study in the Economic Journal, claim that their results show clear evidence 
“of a domination of journal articles and editorships in economics by just a few U.S. academic 
institutions. Clearly, this evidence raises disturbing questions about the existence of an 
‘oligopoly’ of U.S. institutions dominating leading journals in economics and economics 
research throughout the world. This dominance manifests itself both in terms of editorial 
control and in terms of highly cited journal articles.” In drawing conclusions from their 
results, they ask the following question: “Is there evidence here of ‘favouritism’ by editors on 63 
behalf of authors with similar institutional origins or connections? Such a causal connection 
is not proven. The clearest evidence of editorial favouritism towards specific institutions in 
the selection of articles for publication would depend upon a comparison of data on the 
institutional origins of submissions, with the institutional origins of acceptances. If the 
institutional (or country) pattern of submissions was very different from that for the 
institutional (or country) locations or origins of editors then there would be a case for further 
investigation. It might suggest the possibility of institutional bias. Regrettably, however, no 
general evidence is available on the institutional affiliation of the authors of all articles 
submitted to journals” (F180). They also admit, however, that apart “from favouritism, a host 
of other explanations are possible. Some of these may involve path-dependent processes. 
Institutions with an initial concentration of editors or authors may benefit from processes of 
positive feedback involving, for example, an increasing capacity to recruit leading 
researchers, and increasing research output” (F180). However, in line with other researchers 
such as David Colander (1994)
77, they refer to the importance of diversity : “There are 
grounds to presume that the dominance of the profession by a few leading institutions is 
likely to reduce the diversity in approaches and beliefs” (F180–F181). Laband and Piette 
(1994: 195–196) further point out that there “are two competing arguments about the nature 
of the relationship between quality of papers published in scientific journals and personal ties 
between the author(s) and the editor. On one hand, editors may publish substandard papers 
                                                            
77 “The economics profession is not in a crisis. It is simply in a slow decline, as is suggested by the 
declining number of US citizens receiving Ph.D.s in economics over the last twenty years. Eventually, the 
problems in the profession will cause the current institutional structure to break down, or to change, to 
better accommodate disagreement in judgment. But any change is unlikely to occur anytime soon. 
Nonetheless, the current institutional structure of the profession has short-run costs. To be sincere in one's 
disagreements, as I believe economists are, and simultaneously to hide the true nature of the disagreement 
requires a certain detachment from the analysis. Hiding the true nature of the disagreement makes it 
impossible to arrive at intuitively satisfying resolutions to debates. Moreover, it makes the resulting 
research less valuable than it could be. Another effect of the institutional structure in the profession is that 
it strongly discourages disagreement based on judgment and sensibility, where much of the disagreement 
about economic theory and policy resides, and that it encourages economists to surround themselves with 
like-minded economists, rather than encouraging interaction and debate with economists who have 
differing sensibilities and judgments. This leads to geographical pockets of agreement” (David Colander 
1994: 54).  64 
written by their personal friends or professional allies. That is to say, the publication standard 
applied by the editor to papers submitted by these individuals is lower than the one that must 
be met by individuals with no connection to the editor, and perhaps substantially lower than 
the standard that must be met by individuals whom the editor dislikes. We are painfully 
aware that we have no ready answer to the question ‘Why would editors do this?’ except to 
emphasize that, to our knowledge, no widely accepted theory of editorial behavior has ever 
been articulated. This difficulty notwithstanding, editorial favoritism of this form implies that 
papers authored by individuals with personal ties to the editor will be of lower quality than 
those written by individuals unconnected to the editor, ceteris paribus. In stark contrast to this 
view stands the argument made to us by numerous journal editors (independently) over the 
years: the personal feelings of authors to the contrary notwithstanding, there is a consistent 
shortage of truly good papers authored by scholars in economics. Journal editors compete to 
identify and publish the (few) papers with relatively great substantive impact.”  
To explore this question empirically, Laband and Piette (1994) explore the extent to 
which an author’s personal ties to the editor of a journal influence subsequent citations to 
published articles using an impressive data set of 1,051 full articles published in 28 top 
economics journals in 1984. They define “an author/editor connection to exist whenever any 
of the authors of an article received his or her Ph.D. from the same university that the editor, 
coeditor, or any associate editor of the journal that published the paper was affiliated with in 
1984 or received his or her Ph.D. degree from, or if any of the authors of a paper was 
affiliated in 1984 with the same university that the editor, coeditor, or any associate editor 
was affiliated with in 1984 or received his or her Ph.D. degree from” (197). After controlling 
for author gender, mean age, stock of citations 1979–1983, article (length, whether a lead 
article), and journal-specific characteristics (journal quality), they find that connections have 
a highly significant positive not negative impact. This finding, the authors argue, “provides 65 
empirical support for the contention that the editorial process is competitive and that editors 
use their connections to actively search out high-impact papers for publication in their 
journals” (199). They also point out that it “seems possible, if not probable, that part of the 
implicit compensation offered to journal editors is the opportunity to publish low-quality 
papers, relatively speaking, written by professional friends (including himself) and allies. 
Indeed, to the extent that an editor can arrange quid pro quos in the form of invitations to give 
paid lectures, attend prestigious conferences, join esteemed societies, and the like, this 
prerogative may, on the margin, be one of the more powerful inducements motivating the 
supply of editors. If this prerogative were denied journal editors, either the quality of editors 
would decline or we would have to pay more for subscriptions” (202).  
Motivated by their study, we investigate the relationship between connections and 
citations by focusing on AER articles published between 1984 and 1988. For the dependent 
variable, we use the number of citations accumulated up until September 2008 as reported by 
Journal Citation Reports. We identify and report separately three author/editor connection, 
which we define as authors who are departmental colleagues of editors or coeditors, who 
obtained their Ph.D. from the same university as the editors and coeditors,  and who share an 
editor’s or coeditor’s former university affiliation.
78 In this way, we are able to explore three 
author/editor connection variables. The results of a similar analysis focusing on the first two 
variables by Laband and Piette (1994: 201) remain unreported, however, these authors do 
suggest that according to their results, “editors’ colleagues, not former graduate students of 
the department” are “the source of the most heavily cited papers.”  
In line with the methodology employed by Laband and Piette, we control for length of 
paper, whether or not the paper is a lead  article, and author gender;
79 however, rather than 
                                                            
78 The AER editors during our period of investigation were Robert W. Clower (1981-1985) and Orley 
Ashenfelter (1985–2001); the coeditors were John G. Riley (1983–1987), John B. Taylor (1985–1988), Robert 
H. Haveman (1985–1991), Hal R. Varian (1987–1989), and Bennett T. McCallum (1988–1991). 
79 Share of females.  66 
focusing on the authors’ mean age, to avoid missing values, we use their mean academic age 
(year of publication – year Ph.D. obtained). To estimate a proxy for author quality, we focus 
not on the author’s stock of citations in previous years but, in the spirit of our AER 
investigation, on the number of former AER publications (excluding Paper and Proceedings 
articles) although we realize that this proxy may be criticized.  The focus on AER 
publications alone means that, unlike Laband and Piette, we need not control for journal 
quality. We do, however, control for several additional factors that Laband and Piette do not 
take into account: the number of coauthors (one, two, three or more, with single-authored 
contributions as the reference group), the level of technique used in the articles (number of 
equations, tables, figures, and references), and the article’s subject-areas based on the JEL 
code classification system. In addition, because a paper published in 1984 has more time to 
attract citations than a paper published in 1988 (defined as the reference group year), we 
include year dummies. We also include a dummy for main articles as we also consider short 
papers. In line with Laband and Piette, however, we report OLS results for the number of 
citations as the dependent variable.  
We first explore the three single-connection factors independently in specifications 1, 2 
and 3 and then report them jointly in specifications 4 to 7 (including always only one 
affiliation proxy), the second of which (specifications 6 and 7) includes the JEL subject areas. 
Our results, given in tables 14a and 14b, show a positive relationship for the editor/author 
connection based on graduate school (doctoral institution) that is weakly statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the connection coefficients for university affiliation (current 
and past) are not statistically significant, albeit negative for current affiliations and positive 
for past affiliations. These results do not support the notion that connections help authors 
publish papers that are lower in quality based on the assumption that citations are a good 
proxy for quality. Rather, in line with previous results like those presented in tables 1 and 5, 67 
they may indicate that graduate programs in these top universities provide their graduates 
with a solid foundation for survival in the academic landscape. Thus, although our findings 
confirm Laband and Piette’s primary finding of favoritism, they identify the connection 
between editors and the former graduate students of the departments in which they obtained 
their doctorates as the source of the most heavily cited papers. Interestingly, in the late 1990s, 
AER introduced a policy to avoid such conflicts of interest: in May 1998, the Report of the 
Editor, published in the Papers and Proceedings, stated that as “a general rule, editors are 
never assigned papers written by authors at the same institution” (511).
80  
The control variables also reveal some interesting results. When, rather than focusing 
entirely on lead articles, we use a dummy for main articles,
81 we find a positive correlation 
between primary article and citation success once length of the paper is controlled for. 
Moreover, we find a negative correlation between lead articles and subsequent citation 
success. In all estimations, the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, 
assuming that AER editors care about the order of the main articles, we, unlike Laband and 
Piette (1994: 198–199), find no support for the claim that “editors correctly select high-






80 The May 2005 Report of the Editor provides an extension:  “Co-Editors are not assigned papers written 
by authors at their own institution, or papers written by individuals with whom the Co-Editor has a close 
professional relationship, most often a present or past co-author relationship. Such papers are handled by other 
Co-Editors or the Editor. In addition, all submissions by Co-Editors themselves are handled by the Editor” 
(485). A year later, the statements were extended again:  “Coeditors are generally not assigned manuscripts 
authored by an individual at his or her institution, by an individual with whom the Coeditor has been a recent 
coauthor, by an individual who has a close professional or personal relationship with the Coeditor, or by an 
individual who has served as a graduate student advisor or advisee of the Coeditor. Papers falling into these 
categories are handled by the Editor or by a different Coeditor with appropriate procedures for confidentiality of 
refereeing. Papers submitted by a Coeditor are handled by the Editor and papers submitted by the Editor are 
handled by a Coeditor, again employing appropriate confidentiality procedures” (497).   
81 Other short articles such as notes, replies, or comments make up the reference group.  68 
 
 
TABLE 14A: CONNECTIONS AND CITATIONS SUCCESS 
  Dependent Variable: Total Citations 
Independent Variables  [1] [2] [3] 
University Connection (Current Affiliations)  -1.294 
-0.07 
   




PhD University Connection   
  21.117* 
1.75 


















































































































Notes: Coefficients in bold, t-statistics in italics. To obtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use 
the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical 





TABLE 14B: CONNECTIONS AND CITATIONS SUCCESS 
  Dependent Variable: Total Citations 
Independent Variables:  [4] [5] [6] [7] 
University Connection (Current Affiliations)  -3.584 
-0.21   
-3.39 
-0.19   
University Connection (Past Affiliations)   
0.818 
0.06   
1.825 
0.13 































































































































































Notes: Coefficients in bold, t-statistics in italics. To obtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use 
the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical 




According to our findings, gender has no impact on future citation success. Academic 
age is also negative (in line with Laband and Piette’s findings on their author’s mean age 
variable), but in our case, it is not statistically significant. We also find that the number of 
coauthors has no statistically significant impact on future citation success.
82  This latter 
observation raises the questions already asked by Hollis (2001: 521–522): “Why would such 
a relationship exist? (And why do economists persist in working together, if indeed there is a 
negative effect on output per author?)”  Based on his empirical results, Hollis suggests “three 
types of explanations for the apparent negative relationship between output and collaboration. 
First, there is the possibility of systematic mismeasurement. The second type of explanation 
assumes teamwork is chosen for some reason other than its effect on output, which may lead 
to unproductive collaboration.  The third class of  explanation assumes that teamwork is 
endogenously determined and that the observed relationship is the result of the individual 
choosing to be sole author of the ‘easiest’ and most productive projects.”  
As regards the remaining control variables, we observe a positive relationship between 
the number of figures in a paper and the citations; however, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant in one of  the seven specifications. Other article characteristics, such as number of 
equations, tables, or references per article, do not seem to matter. In addition, the year 
dummies indicate that “having more time” may not per se result in more publications. We 
                                                            
82 Hollis (2001: 521) explores in detail the relationship between coauthorship and the output of academic 
economists using citation data for the years 1995 to 2000 and a subsample of 74 authors whose surname starts 
with A. He then regresses the number of citations on the number of authors and a year index, using dummies to 
control for author effects. He not only shows that on average, an extra coauthor increases the number of 
citations by approximately two from a mean of six, but that a higher average rate of coauthorship increases the 
frequency of publishing articles. Taking this latter into account, he then calculates at the mean that, when the 
number of authors increases by one, the number of citations per author declines by around 10–20%. He thus 
concludes that the “fact that all of the methods I used to deal with zero-output problem resulted in a single 
conclusion—that co-authorship is negatively related to the current output of academic economists—demands an 
explanation. The results presented above show that for most economists, while collaboration appears to increase 
the frequency, quality and length of publication, it is also correlated with lower total output per author after 
discounting for the number of authors” (521). 
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also conduct several robustness tests. For example, assuming publication delay to be a 
possible source of bias in our connection variables (i.e., the influence of an editor who leaves 
a journal in 1984 may still be visible in publications appearing in 1985) and taking into 
account that there have been editorial changes throughout the period under investigation, we 
report (in the appendix) a set of estimations that allow for a publication delay of one year. As 
evidenced in tables A4a and A4b, the previous results remain robust.  
 
 
5.4 Board of AER Editors 
Between 1911 and 1951, six people were part of the AER editorial board, whose 
members are usually relatively active in reviewing papers. In fact, Coats (1969) claims that in 
the 1940s, Homan’s ability to command the respect of his fellow economists contributed to 
his success because, in addition to a willingness to submit manuscripts and write reviews, he 
was able to enlist the services of some of “‘the most gifted younger economists’ as members 
of his editorial board” (p. 63). In 1956, the size of the editorial board increased to 7 and then 
to 8 in 1958. It increased again during the Gurley editorship (1963–1968) to 10 members and 
today (2011) includes 40 economists.
83   
 
                                                            
83 See table A5 (http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php). 72 
FIGURE 13:  ACADEMIC AGE OF AER BOARD MEMBERS IN JANUARY 2011
 
Notes: Board members taken from http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php, accessed 
January 2011.  
 
 
FIGURE 14:  NUMBER OF JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS OF AER BOARD MEMBERS  
LISTED IN JANUARY 2011 
 
Notes: Board members taken from http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php, 
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For the analysis of board member profiles, we look in detail only at the AER Board of 
Editors as it appeared in January 2011 (40 individuals).
84 Seventeen board members are in 
the top 5% of the IDEAS author ranking, 25 are in the top 10%, and 30 out of 40 are 
affiliated with the universities listed in table 1. An examination of where these individuals 
obtained their Ph.D.s shows that MIT leads with 9 researchers, followed by Harvard with 5, 
and Chicago and Stanford with 4. These figures are also very consistent with tables 1 and 5. 
An overview of the board members’ academic ages is provided in figure 13. On average, they 
have almost 10 years of academic experience post doctorate, and, interestingly, are 
significantly younger than the coeditors (z = 3.965), which may partly reflect a strategy 
comparable to Homan’s of attracting gifted younger economists to the board. The distribution 
of board member journal publications, given in figure 14, shows that when they start their 
term, they have on average 14 journal publications, a significantly lower number than the 
coeditors (z = 5.624). Nonetheless, when Papers and Proceedings are included, most board 
members had published in AER when they joined the board.
85 Only 12.4% had never 
published in AER, although 40% had just one AER publication. Twenty percent had no 
publication in the other top journals QJE, JPE, and Econometrica, and 37.5% had only one 
publication in these journals.  
 
6.  Submission Strategies, Referees, and Awards 
6.1 Submission Strategies and Submitted Papers 
In a paper published in AER, Sharon M. Oster (1980: 444) asks an important question: 
“To which of the many available journals should a paper be sent?”  To address this question, 
                                                            
84 In some cases, we had to exclude Miguel Costa-Gomes and Holger Sieg because of the limited 
availability of online data on these two board members. 
85 Once Papers and Proceedings are excluded, 80% of the board members have previously published in 
AER (47.5% once).  74 
she develops two alternative objective functions: “journal choice based on maximizing the 
stream of ‘prestige’ points from an article versus journal choice based on maximizing the 
discounted stream of readers of the article.” She defines the choice process as follows: “For 
each journal i, there is some probability, Pi, that the paper will be accepted. If it is accepted, 
the article earns its author a discounted stream of benefits over his or her lifetime. If the 
article is rejected by the first journal, it can then be submitted to a second journal, or a third. 
If there were no costs to a rejection, one would always adopt the strategy of first submission 
to the ‘best’ journal. As it is, there is a cost to being rejected (other than the obvious psychic 
one): the rejection process takes time and while one is waiting the articles obsolesces, tenure 
slots fill up with other people, and so on. In short, one trades off waiting against the quality of 
journal that finally accepts the article.”  She therefore develops a formal optimization 
problem.
86 For this decision process, she focuses on eight journals: AER, Econometrica, 
Economic Inquiry, International Economic Review, Southern Economic Journal, Journal of 
Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics and Review of Economics and Statistics. 
Her results, presented in appendix table A6, indicate that for a professor or assistant professor 
seeking prestige, the submission choice number 1 would be AER. AER should also be the first 
choice for a patient assistant professor seeking readers. It would be the second choice, 
however, for a professor or assistant professor seeking readers, for an impatient assistant 
professor, or finally, for a prestige-seeking professor nearing retirement.  
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    , where B = 
expected benefits from submitting to journals in the order 1,2,3…n, P1…Pn = the probability of acceptance in 
journal 1…n (for AER = 0.14, although, as the entry for 2009 in figure 12 shows, today, it would be lower), 
g1…gn = gain from acceptance in journal 1…n measured through number of prestige points based on survey 
study among 160 economists (as an alternative f, the size of the journals’ readership; highest values for AER), 
w1…wn = waiting time before decision  by journal 1…n (0.33 for AER), and r = discount rate (see appendix table 
A6). For T, she assumes retirement age (no posthuman glory), and Ps are independent of each other (e.g., 
rejection by AER does not itself diminish the probability of acceptance in another journal).  The effect of time 
loss is incorporated in the discount rate and not through probabilities.  
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The number of papers submitted to AER has increased substantially over time, which has 
led to an increase in rejections (see figure 15). In 1953, 22% of the papers submitted were 
published, whereas in 2009 the number fell to only 6.4%. This increasing number of 
submissions also increases the editorial burden, which requires a large referee pool. Because 
the annual Report of the Editor has also provided the names of AER referees (since 1953), we 
were able to count the yearly numbers and graph them between 1953 and 2009 (see figure 
15). This figure does indeed show that the number of referees has significantly increased over 
time and quite substantially in the last 10 years.  
 
FIGURE 15: SUBMITTED AND PUBLISHED PAPERS AND REFEREES IN AER (1953–2009) 
 
 
We also attempt to get an idea of the sort of papers that have been accepted or rejected. 
For the period during which George H. Borts was editor, the editorial reports not only 
provide general data on the submission and acceptance rate over time but also the division of 





















shows an increase in rejections over time, reveals no clear rejection pattern throughout that 
period. On the contrary, we observe a high level of volatility, in particular for those subject 
areas in which fewer papers were submitted. Such significant differences across years and 
among the different subject areas may indicate a fair review process or at least a process that 
is not driven by editorial preferences based on subject areas.  
 
6.2 Referees 
Although referees are important for a journal’s success, they may not necessarily act in 
the best interest of science as a whole (Frey 2005). First, since they have no property rights to 
the journal, they may not be concerned with the effect that their advice has on the publication. 
This absence of property rights could also lead to shirking behavior. Moreover, because a 
referee report has minor consequences for the referee (a low-cost situation), it may be 
tempting for referees to judge submitted papers based on whether their contributions are 
sufficiently appreciated and cited. They may even reject a paper based on a dislike that is 
subjectively driven (e.g., if their own work is criticized in the paper). In fact, based on 
information gathered from 50 referee requests
87 sent to seven editors, Hamermesh (1994: 
155) finds that referees “are neither neophytes nor gray-beards. The mean Ph.D. experience is 
16 years, implying that the average referee is roughly 45. Not surprisingly, people are asked 
to referee increasingly as they near the peak of their careers. Past that peak, they are called on 
at a diminishing rate.” His data set also shows that 95% of referees are men and nearly one-
third had published recently in the requesting journal (others had articles under review or 
forthcoming at the time they were asked to act as referee). In addition, “with an entire 
profession to choose from—there are economists in over 2000 institutions of higher 
education in the United States alone—the extent that editors rely on colleagues in their own 
                                                            
87 Out of 350 possible data points, 343 were usable.  77 
departments attests to the role of propinquity in the choice of referees” (156). In summarizing 
his results, he notes that “referees are disproportionately the top people in their specialty. But 
editors also rely heavily on scholars to whom they have easy access” (156).  
To conduct a similar analysis, we collected data on recent AER referees. The sample 
consists of 676 referees for the periods 2007, 2008, and 2009. We took the data from the 
Report of the Editor published in the 2009 and 2010 Papers and Proceedings, which 
announced in 2009 a new award titled the AER Excellence in Refereeing Awards “for 
referees who have provided exceptional services to the Review by a large number and quality 
of referee reports” (664). In 2008, 47 individuals were recipients, while in 2007, 79 received 
the award. The 2010 Report of the Editor names 212 award-winning individuals, meaning 
that a total of 338 awards have been distributed. We then randomly selected the same number 
of names per year from the nonaward winning referees (79, 47, and 212), giving us a total of 
158 observations for 2007, 94 for 2008, and 424 for 2009. Next, we collected background 
data on these referees via the Web (including details such as institutional affiliations, 
university at which they obtained their Ph.D., gender, academic age (year of refereeing for 
AER – year Ph.D. obtained), publication record in top journals (number of AER, QJE, JPE, 
and Econometrica publications at the time of refereeing for AER), and position 
internationally on the IDEAS ranking).
88  Of the 207 different institutions from which these 
referees come, the 10 with the highest referee participation are (in descending order) New 
York University  (4.74%), Columbia University (4%), Harvard University (3.56%), Stanford 
University (3.11%), University of California, Berkeley (2.96%), University of Chicago 
(2.96%), Northwestern University (2.67%), University of Michigan (2.37%), Yale University 
(2.22%), and University of Pennsylvania (2.22%). Together, these institutions are responsible 
for 30.8% of the refereeing work carried out. When we examine this same factor looking at 
                                                            
88 Average ranking score as of November 2010; for the latest update, see 
http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.person.all.html 78 
the referees’ Ph.D. affiliations, we note significantly fewer institutions, 121 rather than the 
207 reported beforehand.  Of these, the following 10 universities have the largest share of 
referee engagement: Harvard University (10.55%), MIT (9.36%), Stanford University 
(6.69%), University of Chicago (5.65%), Princeton University (4.75%), Yale University 
(3.86%), Northwestern University (3.57%), University of California, Berkeley (3.57%), 
University of Pennsylvania (3.12%), and University of Wisconsin (3.12%). Thus, these 10 
universities are responsible for 54.24% of the refereeing work carried, reflecting a 
substantially increased concentration that is consistent with the ranking evaluations presented 
at the beginning of our paper. Moreover, the universities listed here are the same institutions 
that appear in the list of the 10 best universities in table 1 with only one difference, the 
University of Wisconsin instead of the University of California, Los Angeles. Overall, the 
ordering based on the share of refereeing is not far from the ranking structure reported in 
table 1, and our referee statistics are similar to the rankings given in table 5: 8 out of 10 
institutions are the same and the best 5 universities are identical. Nonetheless, there is less 
concentration in the referee market.  
Of these referees, 14.34% were female, a slightly larger proportion than the 12.24% of 
female researchers who published primary articles in AER between 2001 and 2010. On 
average, referees have an academic age of 12 (see figure 16 for the academic age 
distribution), and 62% have an academic age of 12 and below. Only 20% of referees have an 
academic age of 19 years and above, so our group of referees is relatively younger than those 
in Hamermesh’s (1994) dataset. In terms of IDEAS ranking, our data indicate that 12% have 
been positioned among the top 5%. However, only 1.42% of the referees had previously 
published in AER (including Papers and Proceedings) and only 1.28% in QJE, JPE, or 
Econometrica.  
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Bruno A. Frey (2006b: 377) once remarked that “[i]f an alien were to look at the social 
life of people here on earth, it would be stunned by the enormous number of awards in the 
form of orders, medals, decorations, prizes, titles, and other honours. It would be hard pressed 
to find any area of society in which awards are not used.” Thus, it is not surprising that 
universities and the academic environment in general have also developed an extensive 
system of awards (Bruno S. Frey and Susanne Neckermann, 2009). Indeed, Bruno S. Frey 
and Margit Osterloh (2010:871) note that the “incentive system for scholars has to match 
their main motivation factors. Prizes and titles are better suited for that purpose than citation 
metrics. Honorary doctorates, different kinds of professorships and fellowships (from 
assistant to distinguished), membership of scientific academies and honours such as the 
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such a prize. The money attached to such rewards is a bonus, but less important than the 
reputation of the award-giving institution.” Compared to monetary payments, such accolades 
are “less likely to destroy the signal value of actions requiring special commitment, or of 
actions beyond what is typically expected” and are motivating because winning an award 
“makes the recipient feel good about himself or herself” (Frey and Neckermann 2009: 76). 
Awards are provided by a “principal whose opinion the agent values” and generate “social 
prestige and bring recognition within the peer group”; they are also “typically set up as 
tournaments and many persons enjoy competing; that is, working towards an award generates 
process utility.” Thus, the recent AER policy of rewarding a selection of those who have 
volunteered their services may generate a positive motivational effect. As an indication that 
researchers take this award seriously, we note that some recipients have listed the AER award 
on their CV. However, the contingent of referees who have earned this AER award is large, 
and indeed some in our data set have already received it twice,
89 which may reduce its 
attractiveness. That is, awards “are in demand only if they are valuable to recipients because 
they signal distinction to other persons. If an award is easy to get, it loses this value and no 
longer serves this purpose” (Frey 2006b: 381) 
Frey and Neckermann (2009: 74) also point out that despite “the importance of awards in 
society, economists have largely disregarded them.” There are, however, very few empirical 
studies on this area of economics and awards, a shortfall we attempt to rectify.
90 We first 
                                                            
89 The following individuals in our dataset received the award twice: Ashish Arora, Lori Bennear, Marianne 
Bertrand, Nicholas Bloom, Ariel Tomas Burstein, Luis Cabral, Estelle Cantillon, Eugene Choo, Brian Copeland, 
Martin Dufwenberg, Raymond Fisman, Michael Grubb, Peter Ireland, Emir Kamenica, Kai A. Konrad, Marco 
Mariotti, Virgiliu Midrigan, Massimo Morelli, Benjamin Olken, Jesse Shapiro, Matthew Shapiro, Dan 
Silverman, Joel Waldfogel, and Stephen Yeaple.  
90 For a recent empirical paper on awards, see, for example, Susanne Neckermann, Reto Cueni, and Bruno 
S. Frey (2009). These authors use an interesting employee performance dataset for 155 call center agents of a 
credit card service company over the January 2004 to October 2007 period to explore a so-called Gold Reward 
given for exceptional efforts that benefit the entire work group. Their performance index comprises a large 
variety of performance factors (calls taken per hour, call handling time, after call work time, transfer rate to 
colleagues or other service units, days employee shows up late, and client-based quality assessment), most of 
which are evaluated in relative terms (scaling based on percentage deviation between individual performance 
and the average monthly performance of all call center agents). Their results indicate that award winners 81 
investigate whether there are characteristics differences between AER referees who received 
awards and those who did not. Our results show that award winning referees are academically 
younger than the other referees (11.91 vs. 12.52), less likely to be female (11.8% vs.16.9%), 
and slightly more likely to have AER publications (1.6% vs. 1.25%) or publications in the top 
journals such as QJE, JPE, or Econometrica (1.4% vs. 1.08%). They are also more likely to 
be affiliated with the 10 best universities reported in table 1 (30% vs. 20.7%) or to have a 
Ph.D. from the 10 best universities (58% vs.47%). The award-winning referees are also more 
likely to be in the top 5% of the IDEAS ranking
91 (28.9% vs. 19.8%). 
In table 15, we present the estimates from probit regressions in which the dependent 
variable is whether someone received the award (= 1) or not. We present various 
specifications that apply different quality measures (e.g., referee’s affiliation or referee’s 
Ph.D. institution). In the last two specifications, we exclude the researchers who appear twice 
in our data set.  We find that being female rather than male reduces the probability of 
receiving the AER Excellence in Refereeing Award by over 10%. Academic age is also 
negatively correlated with the probability of earning an award: a marginal change in 
academic age of one year (from the average 12) reduces the probability of receiving an award 
by close to 1%. The quality of the referees also seems to make a significant difference. Being 
ranked in the top 5% of researchers worldwide increases the probability of receiving an 
award by around 15%.  Similarly, affiliated referees in the best 10 universities listed in table 
1 have a 9% higher probability of being award recipients, and holding a Ph.D. from these 
universities also increases the award probability by at least 8%. Extending the number of 
institutions to the entire list reported in table 1 leads to similar results. For affiliated referees 
in these institutions we even observe a 15% higher probability of being awarded. The number 
of accumulated AER publications (including Papers and Proceedings articles) before 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
increase their subsequent performance relative to their previous performance and relative to nonaward 
employees.  
91 IDEAS ranking as of November 2010. 82 
refereeing
92 for AER is positively correlated with award reception, but the coefficient is not 
statistically significant in all specifications.  
Next, we explore whether earning an award for refereeing in 2007 has an impact on 
publishing a primary article in 2009 focusing only of those who refereed in 2007
93. 
Specifically, we explore the number of primary articles published in AER during 2009 
reporting probit estimates (dependent variable = whether or not a referee has published in 
AER). Controlling for referee characteristics such as gender, academic age, and more 
important, quality,
94 we find evidence that receiving an award has positive publications 
externalities. Indeed, when factors like referee quality are held constant, the probit estimates 
show that obtaining an award for refereeing in 2007 increases the probability of publishing a 
primary article in 2009 by around 10% (statistically significant at the 1% level in all two 
estimations). We also find that referees who obtained a Ph.D. from the best 10 universities 
(see table 1) have a higher probability of publishing in AER in 2009. On the other  hand, 
referees who rank in the top 5% of the IDEAS ranking are not more likely to publish in AER 
(coefficient is not statistically significant).  Similarly, the coefficient for the number of 









92 One year beforehand.  
93 One should note that we have no information on whether these referees actually submitted a paper to 
AER.  
94 Affiliation and Ph.D. in the best 10 universities listed in table 1 and being in the top 5% of researchers 
worldwide according to the IDEAS ranking. 
95 Although we do not report the results here, we also explore the number of AER publications (with and 
without Papers and Proceedings): the coefficient was positive but not statistically significant.    
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TABLE 15: DETERMINANTS OF OBTAINING THE AER EXCELLENCE IN REFEREEING AWARD 
  Probit Model, Dependent Variable: Award (yes = 1, no = 0) 
Independent 
Variables  [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
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Referee Ph.D. 
from one of the 
Best 10 Institutions  
(Table 1) 
  0.247** 
(2.45) 
0.098 




Institution in  
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   0.219** 
(1.98) 
0.087 
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N  666 666  666  666  619  619 
Prob.>chi
2 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001 
Pseudo R
2 0.029  0.032  0.030  0.040  0.023  0.024 
Notes: Coefficients in bold, z-statistics in parentheses, marginal effects in italics. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 84 
TABLE 16: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECEIVING AN AWARD IN 2007 AND PUBLISHING IN AER IN 2009 
  Probit Regressions, Dependent Variable: AER Publication in (2009 yes=1, 
0=no). Researchers who refereed in 2007. 
Independent Variables  [1] [2] 





















Number AER Publications (without 
Papers and Proceedings Publications) 








Referee Affiliated in Best 10 







Referee Ph.D. Obtained in Best 10 












N 155  155 
Prob>chi2 0.029  0.004 
Pseudo R2  0.143  0.192 
Notes: Coefficients in bold, t-statistics in parentheses, and marginal effects in italics. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
7.  Paper Characteristics 
Finally, we take a closer look at the characteristics of papers published in AER, with a 




The “length inflation” of AER papers has been discussed by Margo (2011),
96 who finds 
that the length increased from an average 17.2 pages in 1950 to 22 pages in 2005. There 
were, however, years in between in which the articles were substantially shorter; for example, 
in 1970, the average length of a paper was 12.6 pages and in 1980 it was 13.1. Thirteen years 
before Margo’s study, David N. Laband and John M. Wells (1998) published a paper in 
American Economists that explores the changing length of articles over time. Their focus was 
on the general-interest journals AER, JPE, and QJE from their respective beginnings until 
1995. They show that prior to 1970, there was considerable yearly volatility in the average 
length of a journal article, trending toward a decline in the average article length from around 
23 to 17 pages. However, since 1970, there has been less volatility and a relatively rapid 
increase in length, with the average again reaching 23 pages. The authors also present a 
regression that explores the impact of JEL subject codes
97 on the page length of feature 
articles without controlling for further factors. The constant shows a historical mean length of 
19.45 pages. In general, articles on general economic theory and international economics are 
significantly shorter than those on other subjects, whereas papers on business administration; 
industrial organization, technical change, and industry studies; and quantitative methods and 








96 See table 2, page 47.  
97 They applied a previous 10-category JEL code system.  86 
 
TABLE 17: DETERMINANTS OF PAPER LENGTH  
Dep. Var.: Length of Main Article  [1] Full Model  Estimated Length  [2] Main Articles Only  Estimated Length 
(A) General Economics and Teaching  -1.588 
-1.02  6.43 
-2.585 
-1.29  8.13 
(B) Schools of Economic Thought and 
Methodology 
0.796 
0.64  8.82  1.747 
1.07  12.46 
(C) Mathematical and Quantitative 
Methods 
1.114 
1.24  9.14  1.203 
1.37  11.92 
(D) Microeconomics  0.362 
0.71  8.38 
-0.036 
-0.07  10.68 
(E) Macroeconomics and Monetary 
Economics 
2.238*** 
3.56  10.26  1.676*** 
2.66  12.39 
(F) International Economics  1.768** 
2.31  9.79 
1.164 
1.55  11.88 
(G) Financial Economics 
2.735*** 
3.34  10.76 
1.752** 
2.12  12.47 
(H) Public Economics 
0.180 
0.27  8.20 
0.847 
1.14  11.56 
(I) Health, Education, and Welfare 
0.785 
0.82  8.81  -0.256 
-0.25  10.46 
(J) Labor and Demographic 
Economics 
2.215*** 
3.77  10.24  1.931*** 
3.18  12.65 
(K) Law and Economics 
1.063 
0.74  9.09 
-0.684 
-0.48  10.03 
(L) Industrial Organization  1.220* 
1.92  9.24 
1.064 
1.59  11.78 
(M) Business Administration and 
Business Economics; Marketing; 
Accounting 
0.223 
0.17  8.24 
-0.225 
-0.14  10.49 
(N) Economic History  2.683** 
2.19  10.71 
1.829 
1.49  12.55 
O) Economic Development, 
Technological Change, and Growth 
1.100 
1.35  9.12 
1.563* 
1.90  12.28 
(P) Economic Systems  1.664 
1.23  9.69 
1.758 
1.26  12.48 
(Q) Agricultural, Natural Resources: 
Environmental, Ecological Economics 
0.242 
0.21  8.26 
-1.017 
-0.82  9.70 
(R) Urban, Rural, and Regional 
Economics 
0.829 
0.61  8.85 
0.803 
0.67  11.52 
(Z) Other Special Topics  1.621 
1.13  9.64 
0.253 
0.18  10.97 
2004–2008 Dummy  9.379*** 
17.3  17.40 
8.508*** 
15.73  19.23 
One Coauthor  0.434 
0.91  8.46 
0.989* 
1.99  11.71 
Two Coauthors  1.360* 
1.72  9.38 
1.819** 
2.26  12.54 
Three or More Coauthors  0.339 
0.16  8.36 
-0.082 
-0.03  10.64 
Female Share  -0.042 
-0.04  7.98 
-0.542 
-0.49  10.18 
Academic Age  -0.068** 
-2.52  7.95 
-0.078*** 












Notes: Coefficient in bold, t-statistics in italics. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In specification [2], we exclude shorter papers such as comments, replies, 




Drawing inspiration from this study, we run OLS regressions on the relationship 
between JEL subject codes and article length but control also for gender (female share), 
academic age (year of publication – year Ph.D. obtained), the number of coauthors (using a 
dummy variable, with single-authored contributions as the control group), and changes over 
time (also using a dummy variable). Using the time periods 1984–1988 and 2004–2008, we 
present estimations both with and without short articles
98 but excluding Papers and 
Proceedings. As table 17 shows, similar to Laband and Wells (1998), we find that the 
subject-area general economics and teaching is characterized by the shortest articles, whereas 
labor and demographic economics, economic history, financial economics, and 
macroeconomics and monetary economics are the subject of longer papers. Thus, all these 
topics have a strong and significantly positive effect on the length of an AER paper. Looking 
at the control variables, we find that academic age is negatively correlated with article length, 
while gender does not seem to matter. Ceteris paribus, articles with three authors seem to be 
longer than single-authored papers (statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level); 
however, the other two dummies (one coauthor or three or more coauthors) are barely 
statistically significant.  Interestingly, ceteris paribus, we find a strong increase in length 
between the 1984–1988 and 2004–2008 periods.   
 
7. 2 Subject Areas 
It is understandable that researchers have different ideas about the relative importance of 
particular subject areas, and we are unable to cover each of the different views. We therefore 
select two specific areas for illustrative discussion, the history of economic thought and 
economic history.  As Coats (1969) documents, in the early period of the AEA (i.e., during 
                                                            
98 We define short articles as notes, comments, replies, and so forth.  88 
AER’s pre-history),
99 the association came under criticism for becoming dependent on studies 
in economic history and economic thought. In 1895, H. H. Powers, then chairman of AER’s 
publication committee, stated that “we shall run the Association into the ground if we make it 
too much of an archaeological society” (57). Twenty years ago, William Baumol (1991), who 
has an extremely successful publishing record in AER (see table 9), authored a paper entitled 
“Toward a Newer Economics: The Future Lies Ahead!” in which he expresses rather 
sceptical sentiments about expanding the history of economic ideas: “[T]hough I have taught 
such a course for many years, I am much more sceptical about any attempt to inveigle more 
students in that direction. It is my belief that much attention is paid to the work of the past 
only in fields where there is currently little progress at the frontier…. Still, there are 
undoubtedly matters of greater urgency demanding the student’s very scarce time, and so it is 
my predisposition to leave the area to those who are attracted to it (or to any other specialised 
research area) by what Veblen described as ‘idle curiosity’” (5). In its stead, he favors the 
“reintroduction of emphasis on the teaching of economic history…. It seems to me that many 
institutional areas lend themselves to study via historical materials, and in some it may not 
even be possible to carry out effective research without them. Besides, for those whose forte 
is not a high level of abstraction, history is apt to prove a very good source of ideas and is apt 
to contribute considerably to general understanding. It should also provide vital practice in 
the empirical analysis of messy and complicated problems of which economic history has an 
endless supply” (5).  
Table 18 provides an overview of how subject relevance has changed over time 
(specifically, between 1984–1988 and 2004–2008) based on the JEL codes reported in AER 
                                                            
99 At this time, the association was putting out irregular series of monographs, conference proceedings, 
annual reports, and handbooks under the rubric Publications of the American Economic Association. 89 
papers for 1,081 published articles (excluding Papers and Proceedings)
100. In the 584 articles 
published between 1984 and 1988, there were 1,490 JEL codes, a number that increased to 
1,884 (497 articles) in the 2004–2008 period.  Thus, it seems that on average, in recent years, 
authors have been using more JEL codes in their papers, possibly because doing so may help 
to increase the visibility of their papers in search systems such as EconLit.  For both periods, 
we observe that “microeconomics” dominates the agenda, with a statistically significant 
increase from a 20% share in 1984–1988 to a 25% share in 2004–2008. In 1984–1988, 
“industrial organization” and “labor and demographic economics” had a slightly higher 
proportion of contributions than did “macroeconomics and monetary economics”; however, 
the shares for these two areas have decreased considerably over time at a highly statistically 
significant rate. Likewise, the share for “macroeconomics and monetary economics” has 
decreased from 12.28% to 10.08% (also statistically significant) and downward trends in the 
relative share are also observable for “public finance,” “general economics and teaching,” 
“history of economic thought, methodology, and heterodox approaches,” “international 
economics,” “business administration and business economics; marketing; accounting,” 
“economic systems,” and “agricultural and natural resource economics; environmental and 
ecological economics.” A relative increase in contributions is found, however, for 
“mathematical and quantitative economics,” “financial economics,” “health, education, and 
welfare,” “law and economics,” “economic history,” “economic development, technological 
change, and growth,” and “urban, rural, and regional economics.”  
One driver of these developments might be the emergence in the 1970s and 1980s of 
highly specialized journals that influenced the relative importance of the subject areas 
published in AER. For example, in areas with a decreasing relative share, such top specialized 
                                                            
100 We matched the JEL codes prior to 1991 to the current JEL codes based on an article published in JEL 
(“Classification System: Old and New Categories.” Journal of Economic Literature, 29(1), pp. xviii-
xxviii). 
 90 
journals emerged as the Journal of Labor Economics (founded in 1983), the Journal of 
Monetary Economics (1975), and the Journal of Public Economics (1972). Therefore, as 
Margo (2011: 26) points out, a “labor economist who came of age in 1960 could publish in 
the mainstream journals plus the Industrial and Labor Relations Review founded in 1947. Her 
counterpart twenty years later could add Industrial Relations, The Journal of Human 
Resources and Research in Labor Economics to the list. Twenty years after that the list has 
grown to include The Journal of Labor Economics and Labour Economics, and others.” 
Today, the number of economics journals is impressive: we counted a total of 1,484 journals 
listed in EconLit,
101 and IDEAS includes information on 1,231 journals (including series).
102 
Thus, the subject areas showing an upward trend have also been affected by the emergence of 
such new publications as the Journal of Financial Economics (1974), the Journal of 
Economic Theory (1969), the Journal of Econometrics (1973), the Journal of Development 
Economics (1974), and the Journal of Mathematical Economics (1974). Nonetheless, given 
that other important journals—for example, the International Economic Review (1960) or the 
Journal of Law and Economics (1958)—were founded much earlier than the 1980s, it is not 
fully clear what might explain the changes in subject-area development over time.  
In general, one does have to be careful in interpreting these results: disciplines can split 
in many different ways. For example, while there has been a growth in mathematical theory, 
there has been a decline in mathematics in empirical fields. Likewise, there has been growth 
in some fairly technical econometric applications, but in fields like labor and public 
economics, the increase in empirical work has been followed by a decline in purely 
econometric analysis.
103 Such arguments also hold for the next subsequent discussion in 




102 http://ideas.repec.org/, accessed January 2011.  
103 We are thankful to Robert A. Moffitt for providing us these thoughts and facts.  91 
TABLE 18: SUBJECT-MATTER DISTRIBUTION OF PAPERS OVER TIME 
 
To assess whether the relative importance of the subject areas in AER publications is also 
reflected in the relative priorities for the job market, we now compare the previous results 
with job market variables such as job listings and changes to the types of job openings listed.  
Although we must stress that the job market is more forward looking than journal 
publications, such data can give, in aggregated terms, some hints on the future development 
of economics departments and their long-run prioritization of research and teaching efforts. 
Therefore, using Job Openings for Economists (JOE) data for the last 20 years, we calculate 
the shares over time to measure the relative importance of the fields.
104 As figure 17 shows, 
                                                            
104 Data collected from the Report of the Director: Job Openings for Economists, published in the AER 
Papers and Proceedings.  
Variables 
Period 1984 to 
1988 
N = 1490 (584 
Articles) 
Period 2004 to 
2008 




(A) – General Economics and Teaching  1.74% 0.42%  -3.873 
(B) - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and 
Heterodox Approaches  2.08% 0.16%  -5.196 
(C) - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods  3.62% 6.53%  9.644 
(D) - Microeconomics  20.07% 25.21%  20.905 
(E) - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics  12.28% 10.08%  -14.560 
(F) - International Economics  7.38% 5.79%  -11.180 
(G) - Financial Economics  3.96% 6.16%  9.849 
(H) - Public Economics  8.32% 4.25%  -10.954 
(I) - Health, Education, and Welfare  2.42% 5.10%  8.307 
(J) - Labor and Demographic Economics  12.42% 8.97%  -14.731 
(K) - Law and Economics  0.34% 2.49%  5.568 
(L) - Industrial Organization  13.02% 8.12%  -14.177 
(M) - Business Administration and Business Economics; 
Marketing; Accounting  1.95% 1.91%  -6.245 
(N) - Economic History  1.01% 2.28%  5.916 
(O) - Economic Development, Technological Change, and 
Growth  3.83% 6.37%  10.050 
(P) - Economic Systems  1.54% 1.06%  -5.196 
(Q) – Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; 
Environmental and Ecological Economics  2.75% 1.17%  -5.745 
(R) - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics  1.28% 1.86%  5.477 
(Y) Miscellaneous Categories  No observations 
(Z) Other Special Topics  0% 2.07%  - 
Total   100% 100%   92 
the top 5 fields in 1991 include “financial economics,” which was among this top group in 
2009. Likewise, “microeconomics” (D) has remained relatively stable across the last 20 
years, whereas the relative importance of “macroeconomics and monetary economics” (E), 
“international economics” (F), and “industrial organization” (L) have decreased. 
“Mathematical and quantitative methods” (B) and “financial economics” (G), on the other 
hand, show an upward trend.  
 
FIGURE 17: TOP JOB OPENINGS IN PERCENT OVER TIME (1991–2009) 
 
Notes: Shares relative to the total field. Data derived from the annual Papers and Proceedings (Report of 
the Director, JOE).  
 
In appendix table A8, we also examine whether there is a correlation between the subject 
areas appearing in JOE and those appearing in AER publications during the same 1991 to 
2009 period.
105 For 12 out of the 19 subject areas, we observe a positive correlation between 
job openings and the subject codes published, although the correlation is statistically 
                                                            




















significant in only 5 out 19 cases (JEL codes C, E, L, N, R). These results may indicate 
differences between what is of interest to AER and the existing demand in the job market. It is 
clear, however, that these results should be viewed with caution. Not only is it problematic to 
take AER as representative of the entire economics discipline, but 19 years of data and a 
simple correlation analysis cannot provide insight into whether a job market develops hand-
in-hand with the publication market. Rather, a dynamic analysis would provide additional 
valuable information.  
 
7.3  Level of Technique 
The level of economic theory and the use of mathematics in economics, which we here 
group under the broader label “level of technique,” has been a matter of discussion among 
economists for some time. AER has been no exception, and its past issues are scattered with 
transcripts of debates on the topic. For instance, during his testimonial dinner speech, Dewey 
(“Remarks” 1941: viii) explained that he demurred at the suggestion he become managing 
editor of AER “on the ground that my chief interest was in American economic problems and 
not in the refinements of economic theory. My acquaintance with theory was limited to some 
knowledge of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and Francis A. Walker. I had tried 
to keep pace with the newer Marshallian analysis and to reconcile the reasoning of the 
Austrian school with the antiquated concepts of pre- and mid-Victorian economists. And such 
economics as I had imbibed was imbedded in a thick layer of Vermont G.O.P. Thus you can 
see that I was but poorly qualified to assume the editorial responsibilities which the year 1910 
demanded. My shortcomings in theory were met by the answer that the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics ably took care of theory.” Later, he points out that “[f]or thirty years I have been 
occupied in reading manuscripts and giving hasty and regrettably only a superficial 
consideration to the thousands of volumes published in our field of study. These volumes 
may be roughly divided into two classes: (1) factual studies or reports of investigations; (2) 94 
speculative and theoretical discussions of the working of economic principles or laws. With 
the first class I have no concern. They are all welcome, for they furnish the data needed for 
the second class. It may be that some of the authors of this first class are not necessarily 
economists in the true sense of the term. They are machinists who do the mechanical work 
for the engineers. My special interest is in the authors of the second class. What is the 
competency of writers on economic theory; and what sort of training have they had to 
warrant their prescription for social welfare? Have they some sort of certificate which 
warrants the appellation “economist”? Now it must be recognized that our universities have 
attempted to solve this question of certification by laying out courses leading to a doctoral 
degree, and there is a growing tendency for administrative officers to demand this 
certification as a price for appointments. This brings us face to face with the character and 
quality of the Ph.D. degree in the field of economics. Does this degree represent the 
accumulation of a certain number of credits in detached or scattered economic subjects, 
supplemented by a so-called research termed a thesis; or does it represent a ripening of 
scholarship in the wide expanse of economic life? Is not the curriculum for the Ph.D. degree 
frequently too strictly confined to economic subjects, and should it not include a larger 
proportion of history, politics, psychology, philosophy, and jurisprudence? Is not a 
knowledge of American and foreign constitutional history an absolute requisite for 
understanding and interpreting the working of economic principles? If there were this 
knowledge, it seems to me that some of our economic theorizing and writing would be more 
effective” (ix–x.).  Coats (1969: 59) records a similar statement by Dewey: “we have been 
living too much on theoretical hypotheses in the past, and there is a vast amount of testing to 
be done before we are going to make substantial progress in understanding economic 
structure.” Nonetheless, Dewey was criticized for making AER a “journal unreceptive to the 
growing technical rigor and formalization of economics,” an effect, some suggest, that “was a 95 
good deal stronger on the AER than on the profession. In effect Dewey subsidized the rise of 
Econometrica” (Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland 1995: 344).  
According to Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland (1995: 334), economic theory is “the 
authoritative central core of economics, and even the many applied economists who will not 
employ the advanced techniques are expected to maintain some familiarity with what is 
evolving in economic theory… As a consequence of the dominant status of economic theory, 
the major journals all emphasize this subject as their central agenda and thereby reinforce 
their status…. Conversely, none of the major journals is able to fill its pages only with 
articles that have primary or substantial theoretical content, although a few come fairly close. 
And conversely again, major theoretical contributions appear occasionally in journals outside 
the central core of the discipline.” Samuelson (2004: 49) also recounts that when he “began 
the study of economics back in 1932 on the University of Chicago Midway, economics was 
literary economics. A few original spirits—such as Harold Hotelling, Ragnar Frisch, and R. 
G. D. Allen—used mathematical symbols; but, if their experiences were like my early ones, 
learned journals rationed pretty severely acceptance of anything involving the calculus. Such 
esoteric animals as matrices were never seen in the social science zoos. At most a few chaste 
determinants were admitted to our Augean stables. Do I seem to be describing Eden, a 
paradise to which many would like to return in revulsion against the symbolic pus-pimples 
that disfigure not only the pages of Econometrica but also the Economic Journal and the 
American Economic Review? Don’t believe it. Like Tobacco Road, the old economics was 
strewn with rusty monstrosities of logic inherited from the  past, its soil generated few stalks 
of vigorous new science, and the correspondence between the terrain of the real world and the 
maps of the economics textbook and treatises was neither smooth nor even one-to-one.” In 
discussing the role of mathematics, Baumol (1991: 2) refers to a time when authors were 
“expected to begin with a few words of apology, arguing, or at least asserting, that 96 
employment of this tool did not necessarily make the resulting work less ‘realistic’ or less 
relevant. Even so, it was customary for the algebra to be relegated to an appendix where it 
would not disturb the sensibilities of the normal reader.” He further recalls working with 
some determination to change this situation (e.g., being in favor of some grounding in 
mathematics as a standard of a postgraduate curriculum). Nonetheless, Baumol also levels the 
criticism that “things may have gone a bit far in the opposite direction,” pointing out that 
“few specialised students are allowed to proceed without devoting a very considerable 
portion of their time to the acquisition of mathematical tools, and they often come away 
feeling that any piece of writing they produce will automatically be rejected as unworthy if it 
is not liberally sprinkled with an array of algebraic symbols” (2). Thus, researchers may have 
experienced a shift in the requirements for a publishable paper. Indeed, Frey (2005: 181) 
reports an interesting personal communication on May 14, 2002, with Robert H. Frank, 
whose “If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One 
with a Conscience?” was published in AER in 1987. Originally, this article consisted of two 
parts: “The first part contained what he really wanted to convey to the readers, and the second 
part was a formal appendix Frank himself did not find of much importance. One of the 
referees demanded that the first part be deleted, and that the appendix (which was clearly less 
interesting according to Frank) essentially constitute the entire paper. Frank agreed, because 
he knew that this was the price he had to pay to have the paper accepted by the AER.”
106 This 
                                                            
106 The publication in AER of a theoretical comment by Joseph E. Harrington (1989: 593–594) that contains 
three propositions and proofs followed two years later. Harrington concludes with the statement that “the 
behavior that Frank sought to explain certainly represents an important and interesting class of behaviour with 
which economists and more generally, social scientists should be concerned. It is a weakness to the neoclassical 
approach that it has been unable to provide an adequate explanation for such behaviour. Though the approach of 
Frank offers promise toward providing such an explanation, it appears that it is quite sensitive to relatively small 
modifications of the behavioural model. While we find that cooperation can indeed emerge as part of an 
evolutionarily stable  outcome, the fact is it need not emerge and when it does emerge it will probably have a 
difficult time doing so.” Frank (1989: 594) provides the following response: “In my model of the evolution of 
honesty, I assumed the existence of a signal — a blush, perhaps—extreme values of which served to identify 
some individuals as being honest with certainty. Joseph Harrington notes that without this assumption, honest 
individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors. For readers who do not wish 
to work through the algebra in his comment, the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms. Suppose 97 
incident is only one example of the influence exerted by the preference for technical 
expression.
107 Nonetheless, we suspect it could be interesting to collect data on referees’ 
comments to assess whether such tendencies are actually observable or not. As Baumol 
(1991: 2) acknowledges, mathematical methods have provided invaluable contributions in 
many economic fields and there is “no reason to impede or discourage the work of even the 
most abstraction-minded and esoteric of mathematical economists.” However, the “trouble is 
that if individuals are not respected for the pursuit of alternative approaches, if only those 
whose writings are pockmarked by algebraic symbols receive kudos, one can expect a 
misallocation of resources like that which always results from a distortion of relative prices.” 
Moreover, “not only can we expect more than optimal amount of study and publication to be 
based on mathematical methods, but we can expect people to be induced to adopt this 
approach even though they are relatively poorly endowed with the requisite talents. Graduate 
programmes, for example, will be burdened with a spate of  dissertations that qualify 
primarily as mathematical (or econometric) exercises whose sole raison d’etre seems  to be 
the opportunity they afford to their authors to display whatever facility they can muster in 
manipulation of the tools of abstraction. Even the most mathematically-oriented of our 
colleagues will undoubtedly agree that this is what has already happened” (3).   
                                                                                                                                                                                         
two honest mutants, A and B, arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons. 
And suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is, say, 0.999, while the 
corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0.001. When A sees an intense blush on the face of B, what 
will then be his estimate of the probability that B is honest? Assuming that A knows the laws of elementary 
probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population, it will be zero. When virtually 
everyone in the population is dishonest, even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest, 
provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush. Without a fail-safe 
signal whereby A and B could identify one another as being honest, each would expect that it would not pay to 
interact with the other. And so it follows that the honest mutants could not reap the fruits of cooperation under 
these circumstances. If, however, A and B had a sure way of identifying one another as honest persons, they 
could then interact selectively with one another and make headway against the rest of the population.” He 
concludes by saying that “[i]n any event, there is surely no doubt that many honest persons have managed to 
make their way into the population somehow. And given that they have, the signaling mechanism in my model 
will operate just as described, whether or not it is possible to say with certainty that any specific individual is 
honest.”  
107 We would like to note that we are confident that there are many examples out there in which the 
opposite has occurred.  98 
In 1957, a survey sent to members by the association
108 did indeed indicate the presence 
of sentiments in favor of less technical papers. Twenty years later, to explore the attitudes and 
needs of the users of economics journals, Stephen Kagann and Kenneth W. Leesson (1978) 
also conducted a survey among 15,860 AEA members and managed to gather a total of 455 
useable responses. This survey evaluates the technical levels of articles by collecting data on 
economists’ attitudes toward mathematical and statistical exposition in the published 
literature. First, it asks respondents whether they feel that each journal is “too technical,” 
“about right,” or “not rigorous enough.” It also includes items that explore the relationship 
between the number of mathematical expressions and the number of readings of each article 
appearing in the selected journals list. The results indicate that 50% of the respondents judged 
AER to be “too technical,” but just 16% felt that way about JPE and only 21% about QJE. 
Only Econometrica received more criticism: 61% of the respondents found the journal too 
technical.
109 This result surprised the researchers: “It had been our impression that the 
technical level of these journals are [sic] roughly similar. Apparently, many of the 
respondents, perhaps because they are more familiar with AER which they receive on a 
regular basis, are dissatisfied with the ‘too technical’ level of the articles published in this 
particular journal” (989). The survey results also indicate that students and economists 
connected to research organizations were much less likely than the entire group of 
respondents to describe a journal as “too technical.” On the other hand, business and 
government economists were far more likely to consider the journals in the survey as too 
technical.
110 Criticism of the technical level of publications in AER during the late 1970s led 
                                                            
108 A random sample of 578 derived by taking every 14th name (U.S. and Canada) from a directory 
(response rate: 43%), together with a selected sample of members who wrote book reviews for AER in 1956 and 
1957 (two issues), which covered 103 authors (73 of whom responded) published in the Papers and 
Proceedings of May 1958.  
109 Other journals: JEL, EJ, ReStat, ReStud, JMCB, JF, JHR, IR, and MLR.  
110 Sixty-five percent of the respondents were affiliated with academic institutions.  99 
to the creation in 1987 of a new journal, the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Diamond 
1988).  
Although few papers explore in detail the levels of technique used in journals, one 
exception is the study by Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland (1995: 339, 342), in which they 
correctly point out that it “is not easy to characterize precisely the level of technique 
employed in an article: it may employ advanced techniques only at one point and hence be 
virtually fully comprehensible to a reader untrained in mathematics. Even when an article’s 
text is wholly verbal, on the other hand, it will usually employ regression techniques or much 
more advanced econometrics.” These authors’ results, summarized in appendix table A9, 
show a significant movement toward the use of mathematics over the past few decades. For 
example, in the 1922–1923 period, only 1% of the total articles in the journals they explored 
used geometry and only 2% used algebra and/or econometrics. By 1989–1990, however, 
37.4% of the total articles published in AER used algebra and/or econometrics (JPE 26.1%, 
QJE 50%).  Likewise, in 1922–1923, only 2% of the total articles in AER, JPE, and QJE used 
calculus or more advanced techniques, but by 1989–1990, 52.3% of AER articles included 
calculus or more advanced techniques (JPE 65.2%, QJE 44.4%).  Thus, only 10.3% of the 
total articles analyzed for the 1989–1990 period used primarily verbal techniques.  
To extend this analysis, we examine AER content not simply in terms of whether an 
article contains algebra and/or econometrics but focusing also on how often equations, tables, 
or figures appear in the papers.  To identify changes over time, we also explore two time 
periods: 1984–1988 and 2004–2000. Use of equations serves as a proxy for the mathematical 
tools used, and the number of figures and tables proxies for the application of statistical and 




TABLE 19: NUMBER OF EQUATIONS, TABLES, AND FIGURES IN 1,082 AER ARTICLES 
Variables 
Period 1984 to 1988  Period 2004 to 
2008  z - score 
N = 585  N = 497 
Equations           
Numbers of equations in the main text per article  11.9  14.64  4.881 
Number of equations in the appendix per article  1.37  7.49  10.006 
Total equations per article  13.27  22.13  6.85 
Total equations/length of article  1.27  1.11  -0.301 
 Tables          
Tables in the main text per article  1.73  3.30  8.195 
Tables in the appendix per article  0.06  0.22  6.405 
Total tables per article  1.79  3.52  8.834 
Total tables/length of  article  0.16  0.18  3.664 
 Figures          
Figures in main text per article  0.96  3.00  13.235 
Figures in appendix per article  0.03  0.07  3.101 
Total figures per article  0.98  3.07  16.586 
Total figures/length of article  0.1  0.15  9.584 
Notes: We consider an equation to be a mathematical formula if it is either numbered in the article or is clearly 
separated from the text (e.g., placed on a line by itself).  We test the statistical significance of the differences 
between 1984–1988 and 2004–2008 using two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests.  
 
The results of our analysis, presented in table 19, show that in 1984–1988, a paper 
contained on average 11.9 equations in the main text and 1.37 equations in the appendix. By 
2004–2008, these figures had increased to 14.64 in the main text and 7.49 in the appendix. In 
both cases, the difference between 1984–1988 and 2004–2008 is statistically significant. One 
might ask, therefore, whether this difference is due to the length of the articles. However, 
when we correct for article length, the total number of equations per article (main text and 
appendix) shows only a very small decrease that is not statistically significant. The number of 
tables in the main text, on the other hand, increases from 1.73 to 3.30, a difference that is 
statistically significant. We observe a similar increase in the use of tables in the appendix, 
one that might again be due to an increase in article length. However, after correcting for this 101 
latter, we still observe a statistically significant increase in the use of tables between the two 
periods. The same trend is observable for figures: the number of figures per article increases 
from 0.98 to 3.07 in the main text, and the effect remains robust even when article length is 
controlled for. This outcome indicates that over time, there has been an increase in the use of 
applied econometrics or empirical approaches by the authors publishing in AER.  
In tables 20 and 21, we explore the factors that influence the levels of technique used 
with simple OLS regressions. Interestingly, we observe that female groups use fewer 
equations and more tables. We also observe a nonlinear relationship between academic age 
and total equations used (i.e., an increase at a decreasing rate). On the other hand, a reverse 
nonlinearity emerges for the number of tables used. Moreover, articles with four or more 
authors use fewer equations and more tables than single-authored contributions. An author’s 
average ranking position, however, seems barely to matter (the coefficient is only statistically 
significant for figures). A breakdown of subject area based on technique level identifies 
“macroeconomics and monetary economics” as the group leader, a position that is mainly 
driven by the number of equations. When the analytical basis is the number of tables, “health, 
education, and welfare” tops the subject area group with “microeconomics” at the bottom. 
Interestingly, “mathematical and quantitative methods” leads the subject-area group for the 
total number of figures, followed by “macroeconomics and monetary economics.” Notably, 







TABLE 20: DETERMINANTS OF TECHNIQUE IN AER ARTICLES (OVERALL AND EQUATIONS) 
  Dep. Variable: Total Technical Level 
(Equations/Figures/Tables)  Dep. Variable: Total Equations 
Independent Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 








































































(A) General Economics and Teaching 




(B) Schools of Economic Thought and 
Methodology    -7.592*** 
-3.9 
  -7.521*** 
-3.75 
(C) Mathematical and Quantitative Methods 





  1.863 
1.52 
  3.24** 
2.55 
(E) Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics 




(F) International Economics 
  0.181 
0.11 
  0.338 
0.19 
(G) Financial Economics 




(H) Public Economics 
  -2.489 
-1.54 
  -2.015 
-1.17 
(I) Health, Education and Welfare 




(J) Labor and Demographic Economics 
  -3.439*** 
-2.66 
  -4.167*** 
-3.09 
(K) Law and Economics 




(L) Industrial Organization 
  -3.461*** 
-2.71 
  -3.336** 
-2.45 
(M) Business Administration and Business 




(N) Economic History 
  -15.144*** 
-6.66 
  -15.634*** 
-6.57 
O) Economic Development, Technological 




(P) Economic Systems 
  -6.857*** 
-2.87 
  -8.228*** 
-3.23 
(Q) Agricultural, Natural Resource: 
Environmental, Ecological Economics    0.358 
0.13 
  0.1703 
0.06 
(R) Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics 
  -0.898 
-0.34 
  -1.06 
-0.38 
(Z) Other Special Topics 
  -7.654 
-2.2 













Notes: Includes short papers (e.g., notes, comments, replies) but excludes articles in the Papers and Proceedings. 
Coefficients in bold and t-statistics in italics. To obtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use the 
Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Since our ranking (adopted from Amir and Knauff 2008) excludes 
many universities in the top 58, we allocate these universities a constant value of 59. The higher the ranking 
value, the lower the performance. Academic age:  year of Ph.D. – year of publication. 
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TABLE 21: DETERMINANTS OF TECHNIQUE IN AER ARTICLES (TABLES AND FIGURES) 
  Dep. Variable: Total 
Tables 
Dep. Variable: Total 
Figures 
Independent Variables  [1] [2]  [3]  [4] 








































































(A) General Economics and Teaching   -0.113 
-0.27    0.408 
0.53 
(B) Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology   0.458 
0.68    -0.315 
-0.78 
(C) Mathematical and Quantitative Methods   0.466 
1.55    0.977*** 
2.99 
(D) Microeconomics   -1.086*** 
-6.12    -0.156 
-0.88 
(E) Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics   -0.587*** 
-2.6    0.447** 
1.98 
(F) International Economics   0.0005 
0.00    -0.195 
-0.86 
(G) Financial Economics   0.796** 
2.26    -0.4 
-1.39 
(H) Public Economics   0.01 
0.04    -0.56*** 
-3.09 
(I) Health, Education and Welfare   1.608*** 
4.35    -0.707** 
-2.39 
(J) Labor and Demographic Economics   0.599*** 
2.81    0.052 
0.24 
(K) Law and Economics   -0.596 
-0.93    -0.645* 
-1.69 
(L) Industrial Organization   0.233 
1.08    -0.193 
-1.1 
(M) Business Administration and Business Economics; 
Marketing; Accounting 
 -0.198 
-0.46    -0.391 
-1.29 
(N) Economic History   0.324 
0.71    0.584 
1.03 
O) Economic Development, Technological Change, and 
Growth 
 0.421 
1.33    0.208 
0.79 
(P) Economic Systems   1.469** 
2.23    0.174 
0.51 
(Q) Agricultural, Natural Resource: Environmental, 
Ecological Economics 
  0.086 
0.21    0.241 
0.65 
(R) Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics    -0.107 
-0.24    0.501 
0.94 
(Z) Other Special Topics    -0.225 













Notes: Includes short papers (e.g., notes, comments, replies) but excludes articles in the Papers and Proceedings. 
Coefficients in bold; and t-statistics in italics. To obtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use the 
Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and  1% levels, respectively. Since our ranking (adopted from Amir and Knauff 2008) excludes 
many universities in the top 58, we allocate these universities a constant value of 59. The higher the ranking 
value, the lower the performance. Academic age: year of publication – year Ph.D. obtained. 
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We finalize our investigation by reporting the level of technique used by the most cited 
AER articles (see table 7). Our results indicate that 5 out of the 11 articles include equations 
in the main text (mean = 14.9 equations per article, 1.07 equations per page), although only 2 
employ equations in the appendix. Only one article includes tables in the main text (11 of 
them), but none places tables in the appendix. On the other hand, 5 articles include figures in 
their main text (mean = 2.82 figures per article, 0.18 per page). The maximum number of 
figures used in the main text is 12, and only one article includes figures in the appendix.  
Finally, although the mean values for equations and figures are comparable to the averages 
for 2004–2008 articles, there substnatial heterogeneity among these top 11 papers.  
 
 
8.  Conclusions 
The fact that the American Economic Review is celebrating its centennial encouraged us 
to take a closer look at how the journal has developed over the past 100 years. The topics 
chosen were driven primarily by personal interest rather than a desire for completeness or for 
the purpose of developing a coherent argument. 
To characterize the successful 2011 AER author, we  apply forensic profiling to the 
evidence reported above: This author is male, with a Ph.D. from MIT (obtained in 2007), a 
B.A. from the University  of Chicago, and an M.A. from Harvard University. He likes to 
socialize with former MIT students who are still in academia. Most of these are older and 
active as editors or coeditors and are interested in keeping up to date with his research topics, 
which in the past enabled them to get successful papers from him. He works in Israel, visits 
the U.S. regularly, and has a passport from Switzerland. Because he is happy with this 
arrangement, he does not really follow job openings.  He is married, and his wife has a 
professorship in humanities, although she has just experienced career interruption due to 
childbearing. She also stresses that her husband has a female side in him that is now 105 
sustainably growing. He is currently cooperating intensively with Armen A. Alchian and 
Harold Demsetz on a paper that he believes could be quite successful, and is also working 
with Joseph Stiglitz on three other papers. He has been productive since the beginning of his 
career and has already won the John Bates Clark Medal. He has published extensively with 
both William J. Baumol and Joseph E. Stiglitz, preferring to team up with two superstars 
rather than only one. He is also involved in projects with researchers such as Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Angus S. Deaton, John Muellbauer, Peter A. Diamond (several), James A. Mirrlees, 
Avinash K. Dixit, Sanford Grossman, Dale Jorgenson, Anne O. Krueger, Paul Krugman, 
Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Robert A. Mundell, Stephen A. Ross, and Robert J. Shiller. Many 
researchers expect him to win the Nobel Prize. He is increasingly willing to publish in 
groups. Instead of going to the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, he 
prefers to discuss papers in detail with Gary S. Becker (also following his advice on the 
contribution’s title). He has read the entire work of Frank H. Knight and has even procured 
lecture notes from former Knightian students who wrote their professor’s words down in 
detail in order to fully understand the profundity of his lectures. He regularly discusses the 
potential of Knight’s work and ideas with James Buchanan.  His last name is positioned in 
the alphabet such that when he publishes with  two or more coauthors, the papers often have a 
nonalphabetical name ordering in recognition of his ability to oversee the entire paper. 
However, in recent years, he has been more willing to accept alphabetical name ordering. He 
publishes only main articles and likes to work with figures (increasingly so in recent years). 
He has recently been promoted from assistant professor to professor, and his colleagues 
describe him as someone who seeks prestige. He is, however, concerned about inequality 
because his success has led to an unequal distribution of publications and citations. He does 
not mind that his research may produce some dry holes. In fact, some of his publications have 
not so far been cited at all. Two years ago, he received the AER Excellence in Refereeing 106 
Award, and according to the IDEAS ranking, he is among the top 5% researchers. On 
average, his contributions are around 10 pages, although the length can vary. Most 
particularly, his papers can become substantially longer when he works in such subject areas 
as financial  economics and labor and demographic economics. In the past, his papers were 
shorter, but his papers tend to be longer when he works in groups of three. He is also growing 
substantially more interested in such subject areas as economic history; health, education, and 
welfare; microeconomics; and mathematical and quantitative methods.. On the other hand, he 
has lost interest in macroeconomics and monetary economics,  an area in which, his former 
friend Robert A. Moffitt points out, he was never really a leader. When he collaborates with 
women, he uses fewer equations and more tables. On the other hand, when he works in the 
area of microeconomics and monetary economics,  he uses a substantial number of equations. 
He also uses tables more frequently when working in health, education, and welfare. When 
he collaborates with superstars, he only uses equations in the main text about half the time 
and in most cases, barely at all. 
Clearly, the analysis reported in this paper has several shortcomings, not least of which 
is our exclusive focus on the history of AER. Thus, the results are not representative of the 
entire economics discipline. In addition, the paper is overloaded with tables and figures, 
which may produce an end product similar to that described by Farquhar and Farquhar (1891: 
55, as cited in Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland 1995: 344), a paper that is  “grievously 
wearisome to the eye” and from which “the popular mind is as incapable of drawing any 
useful lessons … as of extracting sunbeams from cucumbers.” We hope, however, that by 
focusing on publication data for AER, we have revealed a valuable structure. Another 
shortcoming is that the material published in AER is endogenous; however, as the overall 
sketch of this contribution indicates, we claim no causal relationships. Rather, in general, we 
are only trying to glimpse the “peak of the iceberg,” which we do using a primarily 107 
descriptive analysis. To dig deeper would require the type of cooperation from journals as 
was given to Rebecca M. Blank (1991), who used several years of AER data as the basis for 
her interesting randomized experiment.
111 Her study provides an excellent example of the 
possibilities once a researcher secures such cooperation. For our study, in contrast, most 
material was manually and single-handedly collected from published AER articles and from 
statistics available in the annual Report of the Editor. The Web also served as a valuable 
sources for author, editor, coeditor, board member, and referee profiles. As a Delphic 
Oracle,
112 we relied on Journal Citation Reports.  
The most cited AER contribution by Alchiam and Demsetz (1972: 779) (see table 7) 
begins its Team Production section as follows: “Two men jointly lift heavy cargo into trucks. 
Solely by observing the total weight loaded per day, it is impossible to determine each 
person’s marginal productivity. With team production it is difficult, solely by observing total 
output, to either define or determine each individual’s contribution to this output of the 
cooperation input. The output is yielded by a team, by definition, and it is not a sum of 
separable outputs of each of its members. Team production of Z involves at least two inputs, 
Xi and Xj, with     /         0 . The production function is not separable into two functions 
each involving only inputs Xi or only input Xj. Consequently there is no sum of Z of two 
separable functions to treat as the Z of the team production function … There exist 
production techniques in which the Z obtained is greater than if Xi and Xj had produced 
                                                            
111 One-half of the submitted papers were assigned to single-blind reviewing, while the other half were 
assigned to double-blind reviewing. The difficulties of such an experimental design is to keep it secret within 
the economics profession: “Thus, referees who knew that such an experiment was ongoing, might have behaved 
somewhat differently when they reviewed and evaluated papers that they would in the absence of such an 
experiment” (Blank 1991: 110).  
112 Wikipedia, in an entry on the Oracle of Delphi, makes the following comment on its history: “There are 
also many later stories of the origins of the Delphic Oracle. One late explanation, which is first related by the 1st 
century BC writer, Diodorus Siculus, tells of a goat herder named Coretas, who noticed one day that one of his 
goats, who fell into a crack in the earth, was behaving strangely. On entering the chasm, he found himself filled 
with a divine presence and could see outside of the present into the past and the future. Excited by his discovery 
he shared it with nearby villagers. Many started visiting the site to experience the convulsions and inspirational 
trances, though some were said to disappear into the cleft due to their frenzied state” (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pythia).  
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separable Z. Team production will be used if it yields an output enough larger than the sum of 
separable production of Z to cover the costs of organizing and disciplining team members—
the topics of this paper. Usual explanations of the gain from cooperative behavior rely on 
exchange and production in accord with the comparative advantage specialization principle 
with separable additive production. However, as suggested above there is a source of gain 
from cooperative activity involving working as a team, wherein individual cooperating inputs 
do not yield identifiable, separate products which can be summed to measure the total output 
…. Team production, to repeat, is production in which 1) several types of resources are used 
and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource. An 
additional factor creates a team organization problem—3) not all resources used in team 
production belong to one person.”  
If indeed team production is not the sum of separable outputs from each of its members, 
then a clear name ordering of authors, be it alphabetical or otherwise, may be questionable. 
As discussed in this paper, even an alphabetical ordering has real consequences. Why, then, 
do we not delete all the individual names when referencing the work of others? For example, 
one could apply the referencing style of scientific journals such as Science or Nature, which 
requires that references each be numbered in the main text in the sequence in which 
sequntially as they appear.  Given that papers can be found using just the title, volume, and 
page numbers, one could even go further by deleting all the authors’ names in the references: 
“An extreme and idealistic solution would be to publish scientific contributions 
anonymously. After all, it should not matter who wrote an article but only whether its content 
enlarges our knowledge. There are, of course, many problems with such a solution. An 
obvious one is that scholars would no longer have an extrinsic incentive to publish” (Frey 
forthcoming: 10). This practice might nonetheless reduce the “cult of personality.” In fact, in 
his contribution to the Lives of the Laureates, Robert M. Solow (2004: 153) adopts just such 109 
an attitude: “To be honest, I should warn you that I am going to tell you as little about myself 
as I can get away with in a lecture about ‘My Evolution as an Economist.’ My reason is not 
that I have anything to hide. I wish I had more to hide; that would at least suggest an exciting 
life. My problem is that I think the ‘cult of personality’ is slowly swamping our culture. You 
can see it at its most dangerous in presidential elections, where eyebrows seem to be more 
important than ideas. I tend to blame that on television, which is a better medium for 
eyebrows that for economic theory. But that sort of technological determinism won’t quite 
do: it leaves us with the task of explaining the psychologization of almost everything, the 
success of pop books on character, the fact that seven out of ten nonfiction best sellers are 
biographies, the importance attached to the ‘personal relationship’ between Mr. Reagan and 
Mrs. Thatcher. Something pretty deep is going on there. (I don’t mean between Mr. Reagan 
and Mrs. Thatcher!)... Anyway, what I have called the cult of personality has to be a sign of 
cultural decay.” Our society, then, has a flair for a cult of personality, and academia may be 
no exception: “If researchers strive for it, why not let them experience the marginal benefits 
and costs of this as long as there is a net benefit” (Samuelson 2004:  60). Why not choose, 
therefore, a less idealistic and efficient strategy that might make authors happier. Instead of 
total anonymity, one could allow authors to add their own signature in the same way that 
painters mark their work.
113 Yet how might this be done? Although we provide one possible 
answer in figure 18,  we found valuable and more comprehensive guidelines on the Web:
114 
                                                            
113 The famous theoretical physicist and mathematician Freeman Dyson (1996: 802-805) has argued: 
“Science in its everyday practice is much closer to art than to philosophy. When I look at Gödel’s proof of his 
undecidability theorem, I do not see a philosophical argument. The proof is a soaring piece of architecture, as 
unique and as lovely as Chartres cathedral. Gödel took Hilbert’s formalized axioms of mathematics as his 
building-blocks and built out of them a lofty structure of ideas into which  he could finally insert his undecidable 
arithmetical statement as the keystone of the arch. The proof is a great work of art… Gödel proved that in 
mathematics the whole is always greater than the sum of the parts… The black-hole solution of Einstein’s 
equation is also a work of art. The black hole is not as majestic as Gödel’s proof, but it has the essential features 
of a work of art: uniqueness, beauty, and unexpectedness… My message is that science is a human activity, and 
the best way to understand it is to understand the individual human beings who practise it. Science is an art form 
and not a philosophical method… Science flourishes best when it uses freely all the tools at hand, unconstrained 
by preconceived notions of what science out to be.” 
114 http://painting.about.com/cs/careerdevelopment/a/signpainting.htm 110 
 
Adding your signature to a painting is like adding a stamp to it that reads "finished.” It’s a 
sign that you’re satisfied with the painting and no longer consider it a work in progress.  
 
Is It Really Necessary to Sign a Painting? 
It’s not a legal requirement, but if you don’t add your name to a painting, how will anyone 
know who the artist is? You may argue that you’ve a very familiar style that people will 
recognize, but what if it’s the first time someone’s encountered your work? How will they find 
out who the artist is then? If it’s hanging in a gallery it’ll have a label with your name on it, 
but what if it’s in the lounge of someone who’s bought a painting and they can’t remember 
who the artist was? Think about the works by famous artists which are ‘rediscovered’ every 
now and then; is this a fate you want to risk for your paintings?  
 
What Should My Signature Look Like? 
The most important thing is that people must be able to read it. An illegible signature isn’t a 
sign that you’re extremely creative and it doesn’t add a level of intrigue to the painting. 
You’re the artist, so let it be known. But at the same time, don’t make it look like you’re using 
a stamp. You don’t have to sign your whole name on the front of the painting, you could just 
put your initials but it’s wise to put your full name on the back of the painting. The same 
applies if you use a symbol or monograph; people have to have some way of knowing what it 
stands for.  
 
Should I Put a Date With My Signature? 
I believe you should date a painting, though it needn’t be next to your signature on the front. 
The reason: when you first start painting you’ll probably be able to keep track of when you 
painted a particular painting, but wait until you’ve several years’ worth of paintings, then 
you’ll simply be unable to remember and will have to guess. Serious collectors and galleries 
like be able to see how a painter’s work has developed over the years, so get into the habit of 
dating your work now. You don’t have to put the date on the front of your painting, but could 
write it on the back (though once it’s framed you may not be able to see it). Or put only the 
year on the front and the month and year you completed it on the back.  
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I don’t buy the argument that putting a date on a painting limits your potential to sell it. Art 
isn’t like food, a product with a sell-buy date. If buyers only wanted the newest and latest 
work, then how come there’s an auction market for contemporary paintings? And if anyone 
asks why a painting from a few years back hasn’t sold, tell them you’d kept it in your 
personal collection until now because you regard it as a key work.  
 
Where Do I Put My Signature?  
It’s up to you, though traditionally a signature is put towards one of the bottom corners. A 
signature should be an integral part of a painting and not detract from the painting. Be 
consistent about where you put your signature as then when someone next encounters a 
painting they think by your, they know exactly where to look to check.  
 
What Should I Use to Sign a Painting? 
Use whatever you’ve created the painting in, whether it’s pastel, watercolor, whatever. Try to 
remember to sign the work before you clean your brushes and palette for the last time from a 
particular painting so you’ve got a suitable color to hand that will blend in with the work. (I 
do it with a thin rigger brush.) Having your signature ‘match’ the painting, rather than it 
looking like a later addition, also makes it less likely that someone will question the 
authenticity of the work at some future date (most likely after you’re dead and your paintings 
have increased in value enormously). Avoid adding your signature on top of a layer of 
varnish as it’ll look like you forgot to do it in time (and if you must, keep it small and rather 
put your full signature on the back).  
 
Should You Sign a Painting with Your Maiden Name or Married Name? 
If you change your name when you get married, how should you sign your paintings? Should 
you continue using the name you had been, your maiden name, or should you change to your 
new, married name? Ultimately, it’s a matter of individual preference. 
 
If an artist is already known professionally by a maiden name, it wouldn’t make sense to 
change it because you’d have to remarket yourself. Or if both partners are artists, then 
sometimes people prefer to have different names to avoid comparison. Using a maiden name 
certainly solves any problem if a divorce later happens, but it’s hard to say to a new partner 
because it implies a lack of belief in a relationship, which it isn’t the issue it’s tied into at all. 
Your personal identity as an artist may be strongly tied into the name you’ve had since birth. 112 
There is no correct way or choice when it comes to signing a painting with your maiden 
name or not, it’s an individual choice.  
 
 
FIGURE 18: EXAMPLE OF HOW COOPERATION AMONG AUTHORS MIGHT BE VISUALIZED IN A WORLD 
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Marchand, and Randal Thompson (1982), table 1 and table 2; table 3 from Pantelis 
Kalaitzidakis, Theofanis P. Mamuneas, and Thanasis Stengos (2003); five from Erkin Bairam 
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1985–90), table 4 (JPE 1985–90) and table 5 (QJE 1985–90); table 1 from Amir and Knauff  
(2008); three tables from Stephen Wu (2007), table 2 (AER), table 3 (JPE), and table 4 (QJE) 
between for the 2000–2003 period; and 12 by John J. Siegfried (1994), table 1 (AER, by 
decade between 1950 and 1989), table 2 (JPE, by decade between 1950 and 1989) and table 3 








Appearance as a Top 
10 University  
Appearance as a 
Top 20 University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  29  29 
Harvard University  27  28 
University of Chicago  26  27 
Stanford University  25  29 
Princeton University  23  28 
University of California, Berkeley  21  26 
University of Pennsylvania  20  25 
Yale University  20  23 
Northwestern University  15  24 
Columbia University  13  22 
University of California, Los Angeles  9  24 
University of Michigan  9  18 
University of  Wisconsin  9  22 
New York University  5  20 
Hebrew University  5  8 
Carnegie Mellon University  4  10 
University of Washington  4  8 
Brown University  3  9 
University of Western Ontario  3  10 
Cornell University  3  13 
London School of Economics  3  13 
University of Minnesota  0  12 
Rochester University  0  15 119 
 
TABLE A2: EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS IN 2010 
Name  Female  Issue1 Issue3 Issue4 Issue5 
Mark  Gertler  0  1 1 1 1 
Pinelopi  Koujianou  Goldberg  1  1 1 1 1 
Dirk  Krueger  0  1 1 1 1 
Alessandro  Lizzeri  0  1 1 1 1 
Larry  Samuelson  0  0 0 1 1 
Joel  Sobel  0  1 1 1 0 
Pol  Antràs  0  1 1 1 1 
Ralph  Braid  0  1 1 1 1 
Markus  Brunnermeier  0  1 1 1 1 
Gary  Charness  0  1 1 1 1 
Stephen  Coate  0  1 0 0 0 
Dora  Costa  1  1 1 1 1 
Miguel  Costa-Gomes  0  1 1 1 1 
Rachel  Croson  1  1 1 1 1 
Matthias  Doepke  0  1 1 1 1 
Janice  C.  Eberly  1  1 0 0 0 
Hanming  Fang  0  1 1 1 1 
Emmanuel  Farhi  0  0 0 0 1 
Jesús  Fernández-Villaverde  0  1 1 1 1 
Simon  Gilchrist  0  1 1 1 1 
Gita  Gopinath  1  1 1 1 1 
David  Green  0  1 1 1 1 
Christian  Hellwig  0  1 0 0 0 
Igal  Hendel  0  1 1 1 1 
Ming  Huang  0  1 1 1 1 
Botond  Koszegi  0  1 1 1 1 
Jonathan  Levin  0  1 1 1 1 
John  A.  List  0  1 0 0 0 
Guido  Lorenzoni  0  1 1 1 1 
Sydney  Ludvigson  1  1 1 1 1 
Shelly  Lundberg  1  1 1 1 1 
Giuseppe  Moscarini  0  0 1 1 1 
Guido  Lorenzoni  0  0 0 1 1 
Kaivan  Munshi  0  1 1 1 1 
Rohini  Pande  1  1 1 1 1 
Nina  Pavcnik  1  1 1 1 1 
Nicola  Persico  0  1 1 1 1 
Ricardo  Reis  0  1 1 1 1 
Esteban  Rossi-Hansberg  0  1 1 1 1 
Frank  Schorfheide  0  1 1 1 1 
Holger  Sieg  0  1 1 1 1 
Andrzej  Skrzypacz  0  1 1 1 1 
Balázs  Szentes  0  1 1 1 1 
Christopher  Timmins  0  1 1 1 1 
Petra  Todd  1  1 1 1 1 
Christopher  Udry  0  1 0 0 0 
Romain  Wacziarg  0  1 1 1 1 
Leeat  Yariv  1  1 1 1 1 
Stephen  Yeaple  0  1 1 1 1 120 
 
TABLE A3: PROFILE OF COEDITORS 
Coeditor Name  Term  University Affiliation at the Time of 
Starting the Appointment  Ph.D. Affiliation 
Larry Samuelson  2010–  Yale University  University of Illinois, 
Urbana 
Dirk Krueger  2009–  University of Pennsylvania University  of  Minnesota 
Joel Sobel  2009–2010  University of California, San Diego  University of California, 
Berkeley 
Alessandro Lizzeri  2008–  New York University  Northwestern University 
Pinelopi Koujianou 
Goldberg  2007–2010 Yale  University  Stanford  University 
Jeremy I. Bulow  2005–2008  Stanford University  MIT 
Mark Gertler  2005–2010  Federal Reserve Bank of New York  Stanford University 
Vincent P. Crawford  2005–2009  University of California, San Diego  MIT 
Judith Chevalier  2004–2007  Yale University  MIT 
B. Douglas Bernheim  2002–2005  Stanford University  MIT 
David Card  2002–2004  University of California, Berkeley  Princeton University 
Richard Rogerson  2003–2008  Arizona State University  University of Minnesota 
Timothy J. Besley  1999–2004  London School of Economics  Oxford University 
Valerie A. Ramey  1999–2002  University of California, San Diego  Stanford University 
Matthew D. Shapiro  1997–1999  University of Michigan  MIT 
Dennis N. Epple  1994–1999  Carnegie Mellon University  Princeton University 
Kenneth D. West  1993–1996  University of Wisconsin  MIT 
R. Preston McAfee  1993–2002  University of Texas at Austin  Purdue University 
John Y. Campbell  1991–1993  Princeton University  Yale University 
Roger H. Gordon  1991–1994  University of Michigan  MIT 
Paul R. Milgrom  1990–1993  Stanford University  Stanford University 
Bennett T. McCallum  1988–1991  Carnegie Mellon University  Rice University 
Hal R. Varian  1987–1989  University of Michigan  University of California, 
Berkeley 
John B. Taylor  1985–1988  Stanford University  Stanford University 
Robert H. Haveman  1985–1991  University of Wisconsin  Vanderbilt University 
John G. Riley*  1983–1987  University of California, Los Angeles  MIT 
Notes: We exclude editors who were coeditors at any point in time (e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Robert A. Moffitt, 























FIGURE A1: NUMBER OF AER PUBLICATIONS BEFORE BECOMING AER COEDITOR 
 
      Notes: Paper and Proceedings articles included.  
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FIGURE A3: COEDITOR’S IDEAS RANKING POSITION IN 2010 
 
Notes: November 2010 ranking, accessed December 2010. Two coeditors 
are not registered in RePEc’s authors list. We exclude editors who were 
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TABLE A4A: ROBUSTNESS TEST ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONNECTIONS AND CITATIONS I  
 
  Dependent Variable: Total 
Citations   
Independent Variables:  [8] [9]  [10] 
University Connection Lag (Current Affilations)  -1.294 
-0.07     
 
University Life Connection Lag (Past Affilations)    2.847 
0.21   
PhD University Connection Lag      16.51 
1.58 























































































































Notes: Coefficients in bold, t-statistics in italics. To obtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use 
the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Citations accumulated up until September 2008.  
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TABLE A4B: ROBUSTNESS TEST ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONNECTIONS AND CITATIONS II 
 
  Dependent Variable: Total Citations 
Independent Variables:  [11] [12] [13] [14] 
University Connection Lag (Current 
Affilations) 
-3.436 




University Life Connection Lag (Past 
Affiliations)   
0.161 
0.01    0.863 
0.06 







































































































































































Notes: Coefficients in bold, t-statistics in italics. To obtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use 
the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Citations accumulated up until September 2008.  
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TABLE A5: AER EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS IN JANUARY 2011 
 
Name 
First Year as 
AER Board 
Member University  Affiliation PhD  Obtained 
Frank Schorfheide  2005  University of Pennsylvania  Yale University 
Jonathan Levin  2005  Stanford University  MIT 
Gary Charness  2006  University of California, Santa 
Barbara 
University of California, 
Berkeley 
Ming Huang  2006  Cornell University  Stanford University 
Rachel Croson  2006  University of Pennsylvania  Harvard University 
Ralph Braid  2006  Wayne State University  MIT 
Andrzej Skrzypacz  2007  Stanford University  University of Rochester 
Holger Sieg  2007  Carnegie Mellon University  Northwestern University 
Kaivan Munshi  2007  Brown University  MIT 
Shelly Lundberg  2007  University of Washington  Northwestern University 
Botond Koszegi  2008  University of California, Berkeley  MIT 
Christopher Timmins  2008  Duke University  Stanford University 
David Green  2008  University of British Columbia  Stanford University 
Dora Costa  2008  University of California, Los 
Angeles  University of Chicago 
Hanming Fang  2008  Duke University 
University of California, 
Berkeley 
Miguel Costa-Gomes  2008  University of Aberdeen 
University of California, San 
Diego 
Nina Pavcnik  2008  Dartmouth College  Princeton University 
Petra Todd  2008  University of Pennsylvania  University of Chicago 
Rohini Pande  2008  Harvard University  London School of Economics 
Sydney Ludvigson  2008  New York University  Princeton University 
Balazs Szentes  2009  University of Chicago  Boston University 
Esteban Rossi-
Hansberg  2009  Princeton University  University of Chicago 
Gita Gopinath  2009  Harvard University  Princeton University 
Guido Lorenzoni  2009  MIT  MIT 
Igal Hendel  2009  Northwestern University  Harvard University 
Jesus Fernandez-
Villaverde  2009  University of Pennsylvania  University of Minnesota 
Leeat Yariv  2009  California Institute of Technology  Harvard University 
Markus Brunnermeier  2009  Princeton University  London School of Economics 
Matthias Doepke  2009  Northwestern University  University of Chicago 
Nicola Persico  2009  New York University  Northwestern University 
Ricardo Reis  2009  Columbia University  Harvard University 
Emmanuel Farhi  2010  Harvard University  MIT 
Giuseppe Moscarini  2010  Yale University  MIT 
Pol Antràs  2010  Harvard University  MIT 
Romain Wacziarg  2010  University of California, Los 
Angeles  Harvard University 
Stephen Yeaple  2010  Pennsylvania State University  University of Wisconsin 
Ali Hortaçsu  2011  University of Chicago  Stanford University 
Eric Verhoogen  2011  Columbia University 
University of California, 
Berkeley 
Fiona Scott Morton  2011  Yale University  MIT 
Gautam Gowrisankaran  2011  University of Arizona  Yale University 
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TABLE A6: OPTIMAL ORDER OF JOURNAL SUBMISSIONS 
Case Character  Years  of 
Retirement (T) 
Discount 
Rate (r)  
Optimal Order 
1  Professor Seeking Prestige  21  0.0822  AER, Econometrica, REStat, JPE, IER, 
SJE, QJE,EI 
2  Assistant Professor Seeking Prestige  32  0.0822  AER, Econometrica, REStat, JPE, IER, 
QJE, SEJ, EI 
3  Professor Seeking Readers  21  0.0822  SEJ, AER, JPE,Econometrica,REStat, 
QJE, EI, IER 
4  Assistant Professor Seeking Readers  32  0.0822  SEJ, AER, JPE,Econometrica,REStat, 
QJE, EI, IER 
5  Impatient Assistant Professor Seeking  
Prestige 
32 0.1800  REStat, AER, Econometrica, JPE, IER, 
SEJ, QJE, EI 
6  Patient Assistant Professor Seeking  
Readers 
32 0.0600  AER, SEJ, JPE, Econometrica,  
REStat, QJE, EI, IER 
7  Professor Nearing Retirement Seeking  
Prestige 
8 0.0822  REStat, AER, Econometrica, JPE, IER, 
SEJ, QJE, EI 




TABLE A7: SUBJECT-RELATED AER ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION BETWEEN 1969 AND 1980 WITH A FOCUS ON NUMBER OF SUBMISSIONS AND  
ACCEPTANCE RATE (IN PARENTHESES)  
  1969  1970  1971 1972 1973 1974  1975  1976 1977  1978 1979  1980 
  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio  Ratio Ratio  Ratio Ratio  Ratio Ratio 
General Economics and 
General Equilibrium 
Theory 
15 (3/20)  4 (1/26)  8 (2/24)  36 (4/11)  22 (2/9)  80 (4/5)  8 (1/12)  14 (2/14)  0 (0/16)  83 (5/6)  22 (4/18)  15 (2/13) 
Microeconomic Theory  14 (28/204)  8 (15/177)  16 (16/98)  20 (19/96)  6 (7/108)  19 (22/115)  21 (18/87)  27 (21/79)  16 (19/116)  21 (18/87)  15 (23/157)  23 (21/90) 
Macroeconomic Theory  16 (6/38)  4 (2/47)  2 (1/56)  19 (6/31)  10 (5/49)  15 (6/41)  12 (9/75)  24 (11/45)  13 (8/64)  11 (5/46)  4 (3/69)  30 (14/46) 
Welfare Theory and 
Social Choice 
15 (12/78)  23 (18/79)  29 (15/52)  19 (12/64)  25 (13/51)  28 (18/65)  21 (17/81)  17 (7/42)  22 (10/45)  21 (10/48)  39 (12/31)  45 (19/42) 
Economic History, 
History of Thought, 
0 (0/3)  18 (3/17)  13 (1/8)  13 (1/8)  33 (4/12)  15 (2/13)  0 (0/6)  0 (0/5)  18 (2/11)  9 (1/11)  24 (4/17)  10 (1/10) 
Economic Systems  33 (2/6)  0 (0/6)  7 (1/14)  33 (3/9)  0 (0/17)  10 (1/10)  10 (3/30)  0 (0/27)  0 (0/20)  26 (5/19)  4 (1/24)  17 (1/6) 
Economic Growth, 
Development, 
22 (14/64)  16 (15/96)  14 (8/57)  15 (8/52)  18 (8/44)  30 (11/37)  10 (3/30)  53 (10/19)  17 (5/29)  11 (5/44)  23 (5/22)  36 (8/22) 
Economic Statistics and 
Quantitative Methods
13 (2/16)  50 (9/18)  43 (9/21)  21 (4/19)  14 (5/37)  29 (5/17)  25 (6/24)  11 (2/18)  39 (11/28)  3 (1/31)  42 (8/19)  38 (8/21) 
Monetary and Financial 
Theory and Institutions 
18 (11/62)  10 (8/83)  20 (13/65)  44 (31/71)  15 (9/61)  8 (7/85)  12 (8/69)  38 (18/47)  18 (9/49)  14 (7/51)  20 (9/46)  24 (9/37) 
Fiscal Policy and 
Public Finance 
13 (5/38)  0 (0/24)  20 (7/35)  27 (7/26)  8 (2/25)  0 (0/27)  21 (6/29)  11 (3/28)  7 (3/42)  8 (3/38)  14 (5/35)  24 (5/21) 
International 
Economics 
19 (17/88)  22 (20/90)  18 (14/78)  18 (12/66)  21 (17/81)  20 (12/61)  15 (11/72)  34 (14/41)  24 (14/59)  17 (11/63)  20 (16/82)  18 (14/80) 
Administration, 
Business Finance 
  29 (4/14)  0 (0/31)  11 (3/27)  11 (4/37)  18 (6/34)  25 (4/16)  11 (2/18)  0 (0/21)  32 (6/19)  17 (2/12)  5 (1/20) 
Industrial Organization  20 (2/10)  7 (2/27)  13 (8/61)  19 (7/36)  16 (7/44)  15 (6/41)  13 (4/31)  14 (4/28)  8 (3/39)  20 (9/46)  11 (5/46)  15 (4/27) 
Agriculture, Natural 
Resources 
9 (1/11)  11 (3/27)  8 (3/37)  21 (6/28)  9 (3/34)  24 (8/33)  18 (2/11)  30 (3/10)  8 (2/25)  0 )/11)  21 (4/19)  0 (0/14) 
Manpower, Labor 
Population 
28 (12/43)  10 (8/78)  9 (7/77)  15 (13/68)  16 (15/96)  11 (10/94)  16 (18/112)  15 (10/66)  20 (19/97)  13 (12/90)  12 (11/92)  21 (12/57) 
Welfare Programs, 
Consumer Economics, 
8 (5/61)  22 (11/50)  15 (10/68)  11 (7/62)  19 (10/52)  20 (7/35)  4 (2/57)  30 (6/20)  31 (9/29)  26 (10/39)  23 (7/30)  35 (8/23) 
Other  6 (1/16)  5 (1/22)  0 (0/31)  0 (0/20)  0 (0/1)               128 
 
TABLE A8: CORRELATION BETWEEN JEL CODES REPORTED IN AER PUBLICATIONS VERSUS CODES 
REPORTED ON FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION (JOB OPENINGS). 
 
JEL Codes     
(A) – General economics and teaching  -0.255 (0.292) 
(B) - History of economic thought, methodology..  0.0303 (0.902) 
(C) - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods  -0.4216* (0.072) 
(D) - Microeconomics  -0.3569 (0.1336) 
(E) - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics  0.4221* (0.0719) 
(F) - International Economics  0.2108 (0.3864) 
(G) - Financial Economics  0.3346 (0.1615) 
(H) - Public Economics  -0.2755 (0.2537) 
(I) - Health, Education and Welfare  0.2384 (0.3256) 
(J) - Labor and Demographic Economics  0.0096 (0.9690) 
(K) - Law and Economics  0.3526 (0.1388) 
(L) - Industrial Organization  -0.6148*** (0.0051) 
(M) - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting  0.0308 (0.9003) 
(N) - Economic History  0.3938* (0.0953) 
(O) - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth  -0.1791 (0.4632) 
(P) - Economic Systems  -0.2435 (0.315) 
(Q) - Agricultural, Natural Resource: Environmental, Ecological Economics  0.0488 (0.8428) 
(R) - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics  0.4996** (0.0294) 
(Z) - Other Special Topics  0.2923 (0.2247) 
Notes: Data based on the Report of the Editor (published in AER Papers and Proceedings) from various years 
and the Job Openings for Economists (JOE).  We used the years 1991 to 2009 excluding category (Y) 
Miscellaneous Categories because of the lack of available data (was absent from the papers and appeared only in 














1982–93 95  3  2  – 
1902–03 92  1  6  – 
1912–13 98  1  1  – 
1922–23 95  1  2  2 
1932–33 80  1  8  10 
1942–43 65  8  6  21 
1952–53 56  6  7  31 
1962–63 33  8  13  46 









American Economic Review  10.3 37.4  52.3 
Journal of Political Economy  8.7 26.1  65.2 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  5.6 50  44.4 
Articles with  
Empirical Content 1989–90 
Percentage of Articles with 
Empirical Content 
American Economic Review  37.4 
Journal of Political Economy   52.2 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  45.8 
Notes: The table summarizes the results presented by George J. Stigler, Stephen M. Stigler, and Claire 
Friedland (1995: 342–343). Different year periods based on five journals: QJE since 1892, JPE since 1892, 
AER since 1912, REStat since 1922, and Economica since 1932.  NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 
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